Theory of Psychoanalysis

From Freudian Symptoms to Lacanian Sinthom #2

2010-07-16T11:22:00.000-07:00

5°) ”The Subjective Rectification”

At this stage proper care should be taken in assimilating the symptom to the oedipal structure or to the setting up of the Father’s Name, as it is always the case. If these statements can be conceived as the outcome of the post psycho-analytical work or of the trial of psycho-analytical symptom construction, they can quickly become stigmatising notions just like diagnosis procedures used by the medical or psychiatric circles. The risk remains with exempting the psychoanalyst from this preliminary work of the construction by making it as if only standard and graded symptoms are analysable compared to the imaginary model (and unrealistic) of what should be the demand in psycho-analysis or the relationship with the symptom.

While some clinicians are concerned with transforming the analysis’s demand or treatment and lamenting the fact that they no longer keep to their initial expectations, the question is whether it is due to the real transformation of the subjective modalities which structure the subjects of our societies or on the contrary, whether this does not come from the refusal to do this preliminary work to which lacan gave a precise name i.e. “rectification of the subject’s relations with the real" [1]

It is at this “subjective rectification” stage that we should struggle to make our patient to realise that he/she actively contributes in the formation and the perpetuation of the symptoms or the situation of which he/she is complaining. In order for the work to be achieved, the subject should at least accept to be partly responsible for this danger which is firstly interpreted as if coming from the outside or from the reality.

Lacan states that the subjective rectification is dialectic and in order to reach it, we must start with the subject’s sayings. Which means that, interpretation cannot be exact inspite of it being an interpretation.

It is clear that it is not the matter of a theoretical presentation which is done to the patient to inform or teach him/her of the unconscious’s theory, but it is about a closer intervention to the interpretation, without necessarily being exact because by definition, it operates prior to the establishment of the transference.

Furthermore, he noted that this is the threshold of the way to cover with the Other. Because the transference has already done its duty, showing that it is a matter of another thing rather than the relations of the self with the rest of the world

I take this expression, ”the way to cover with the Other”. The fact that the later should hold on in order to open the way for the analytical interpretation to take place also includes the fact that it should be done thoroughly in the analytical process. There is a long way to cover with the Other. In other words, taking this phase into account as Freud and Lacan propose implies conceiving in a broader and open manner the conditions of analysis’ possibilities, or “indications” of the analysis as earlier stated.

It is this particular point that seems to be neglected in the theory as it is often presented, and maybe it is even worse in practice. Presently, I assume that the way to cover with the Other could be longer, more costly and also difficult for the analyst, but at the end of this path the conditions for a possible analysis could be found.

It looks like the numerous demands under the pretext that they are not outrightly “rectified”, in a degraded sense of “conformity” to what we can expect of the assumption of responsibility by the subject in relation to his/her actions, symptoms or his/her real situation to start an analysis, these demands are purely and simply rejected. This is the case with some patients who have social and financial constraints that the psychoanalyst to whom they present themselves transfers them to the social workers, considering that no work is possible as long as their social problems are not solved. Evidently this is to encourage them to put their social problems aside and separate them from their unconscious role (or not pertaining to their responsibility). This is against Freudian and lacanian positions.

All we can say is that most people presenting themselves to a psychoanalyst operating from the urban centre, who made this offer of analytical lessen open to the public, are in fact already “rectified in advance” because of this personal will which drives them to the analysis . To them, this phase maybe invisible.

This is quite different from when one is faced with the challenge of offering analytical orientation lesson to people who do not have even a slightest cultural knowledge of psycho-analysis, be it that they are in particular relations with the real as it can be the case with some traumatic neuroses, and probably some adolescents and many other patients. Therefore the “subjective rectification” takes all its significance.

6°) Symptom as Compromise and Return of the Repressed.

In psycho-analysis a symptom is classically described as the expression of the unconscious conflict, a formation of compromise between the accomplishment of a desire and the repression or as the sign of the return of the repressed.

Nonetheless, knowing the fact that most of the symptoms correspond to the sign of the return of the repressed and also that this mechanism is undoubtedly universal only acquires a functional value in the framework of the psycho-analysis because it is only there that the unconscious will be taken into account as it is.

We often find ourselves in this situation whereby we know that such and such a symptom is partly linked to the unconscious, for which strictly speaking, we cannot do anything. Expertise situation is exemplary of this case. In principle, the framework is not prepared to elaborate the demand because it does not exist, neither is it prepared to put transference in place. The unconscious knowledge is going to be able to express itself, but it will not be recognised as it is and it will not end up with any sign of truth.

In my experience I recently met a man who was brutally beaten by the police. Some years later, he claimed damages and he filed a law suit in an apparently paranoiac mode. When listening to his version of the story, the fact that he was treated “like a bastard” by the police in this scenario, was due to an innate fantasy asset since his childhood for which he accused his parents. Being able to give an account of this or being conscious of it did not even transform his claim symptoms to analytical symptom i.e. analysable symptoms. However, the way in which he influenced his violation could legitimately be interpreted as the return of the repressed. What can we say about this man? Is he paranoiac or neurotic? It does not matter because what was essential was that it was either impossible to construct an analysable symptom from him or it was impossible for him to see his fault in his misfortune, but for some reason, he was far from realising that it was only due his structure. It could also just be strong invitation from an ambient speech making oneself as victim or of the effects of bad encounters in the eyes of lawyers, doctors or psychiatrists, etc. On the contrary, it is possible in a psycho-analytical profession to witness astonishing situations in which some symptoms which seemed to be displayed outside or a somatisation become analysable at ance.

For a considerable number of months, I received a man who complained of many pains mainly centralised on the lower limbs on which the neurologists had diagnosed some anomalies on the electrogram exhibiting an organic pathology. This man strongly denied it with strong and explicit term. He refused to accept that these pains could stem from the psychological effects and that they are related to his childhood problems, which are displayed by particularly painful events, or his conjugal problem which led to his divorce. He recently came to see me again with a totally different story. According to him, he was engaged in an unceasing struggle in order to keep his dignity and to come to terms with his sorrow. He had just “collapsed” for the first time before the judge who made him relate his biography during his divorce. He came back to see me, but this time he had possibly recognised the effects of this humiliation suffered at childhood stage caused by his father who influenced the present state. Up to this meeting, he was conscious of all these. He could even explain. Nonetheless, this was without effect. Today’s difficulties can appear as the echoes of psychological traces of the past.

In this perspective, lacan could say that the symptom is what can be analysed. This functional definition is more useful to us than the theoretical attempts of predicting the nature of the symptom according to the structure.

In fact, whatever the initial structure, the form and the content i.e. the supporting explanation, the symptom is in the first place what will become analysable in the psycho-analytical work. Although we can absolutely trust on the structure, except for extreme cases, we cannot qualify the symptom as analytical or non analytical from its form or content as it is. One utterance can refer to different meanings, in different positions vis-à-vis the symptom, and especially to various possibilities of the symptom construction in the psycho-analytical sense. Utterances such as, “he hates me”, “i am possessed”, “i am suffering from a fatal illness”, “I am a monster”, have nothing to do with the symptom.

7°) The Desire for Recognition and the Social Formation of the Symptom

Lacan, in the seminar on Formations of the Unconscious, highlights how much it could be paradoxical to talk about the emergence of the desire or about accomplishing the desire through the symptom. However, this is what is suggested by the term “compromise”, as though the symptom on its own or its formation, was a space of intermediary solution to the unconscious conflict by authorising a little of desire and a little of repression at the same time. In fact Lacan is clear and he reminds us that we cannot talk about satisfying our desire in the symptom. When there is a symptom it is good because the desire does not satisfy itself, no matter what we understand by satisfaction of the desire which is evidently not fulfilled by the object. In other words, the desire which manifests itself through the symptom is a particular desire. It is a repressed desire especially the desire for recognition, and therefore, something else rather than the desire according to lacan. It is an ambiguous desire, which is not oriented to an object and gives its enigmatic feature which hides the symptom.

In addition, Lacan insists on this other paradox. What about the symptom which is there to enable recognising the desire before the meeting with the psychologist? Or before the invention of psycho-analysis by Freud? He answered that this recognition of desire, is an acknowledgement by the person, not aimed at anyone, because nobody can realise it until someone starts to learn the key. This acknowledgement manifests itself in a form which is close to the Other. This is therefore recognition of the desire, but acknowledgement by a person”. However, in same pages a bit further, he went on to highlight the social role of the symptom from ethnology. He finds a confirmation, of the presence of desire in the demonstrations as perfectly conventional, inside Michel Leiris’ works on the possession among the Ethiopians.

Should it be concluded that before psycho-analysis (or the psychoanalyst) the only possible answer to this call to the recognition of the desire by the symptom is the social conformity to the rituals? The psychoanalysis’s point of departure would be to open this “closed” process which is a symptom to another reading, in contrast with the interpretations given by Lévi-Strauss and Michel Foucault, who put psycho-analysis in relation, one with shamanism the other with Christianity. This opinion should, however, be put into perspective and should also be given the credit of a possible special listenership even within the traditional procedures of healing. This is obviously an affair that needs to be considered according to each case, but of which some psycho-analysts happened to witness the surveys done in the field (cf. OLIVIER Douville).

8°) Symptom and Oedipus Complex

We can obviously draw a distinction between symptoms which will be used in the oedipal process and the symptoms which are not characterised by the passage of the Oedipus complex, provided that this distinction takes place in an analytical framework and not from medical or psychological observation. What is the real scope of this distinction? What can we expect of it in any possible analytical work? Not so much in terms of the unpredictable results, but certainly rather in terms of difficulty and discomfort for the work of a psychoanalyst, etc.

9°) Symptom, Transference and Enjoyment

The real question is rather the one that has to do with the destiny of the symptom taken in the transference. It is from this stage that a different conception of the analytical symptom could be made and we can radically move away from the medical and psychiatric conception such as broader general meaning of the symptom as message.

The transference will encounter several effects with regard to the symptom. When the psychoanalyst keeps in his place he will allow a mobilisation or putting symptom’s address into movement. All other large or small signs to which the symptom could be addressed will appear in this empty space that it occupies. If the psychoanalyst does not respond to these different places where he is successively convened, it will result in putting the symptom into perspective like emergency call from the outside. Overtime, it will become a private affair whose subject shall sort himself out and it will no longer have the same impact in social life. The other effect of the transference fits in the identification of the repetition. The psychoanalysis replaces the symptomatic repetition in social life by repetition within the transference. This is a symbolic repetition which is reparable by the return of some speeches and signifiers and it is the second way of putting the symptom into perspective. The analysing subject will be able to notice that the point is not to understand, nor get rid of the symptoms rather than to arrive at renouncing to the enjoyment provided by the repetition.

At this stage, Lacan’s statements according to which the symptom is on the one hand, what can be analysed and what could be enjoyed on the other hand are particularly useful. The progress of analytical cure goes in this sense of giving less importance to the initial symptom for the benefit of refocusing on the perseverance of some signifiers or some fantasies and their relationship with the enjoyment. Maybe the differences between psychotherapy and psychoanalysis can be picked up at this stage whereby the psychotherapy is tilted to identifying the Other while psychoanalysis in refusing to give consistency to the Other by rather allowing the emergence of the fantasy (cf. Jacques Alain Miller).

The enigma gets removed. Thus for an analyst the problem is no longer centred on determining why when driving, it happens that one has to turn back and check that he/she has not crushed a human being, but it is rather to know why he/she is attached to perceiving oneself as a monster. It is this self-perception and the cognisance of the enjoyment that she has which becomes the real question and as a result it makes the symptoms tolerable in social life.

At times the initial symptoms become useless and they are abandoned. It looks like it is often because of their uselessness that the symptoms disappear rather than the significant luminous and striking interpretation, etc. This is a phenomenon which is often encountered and which may have to do with symptoms which appear to be not easy to determine. I recently had a case of a patient who was a victim of drastic physical trauma which dated to 3 years back and who had developed headaches and daily, intense and crippling migraines which led her to taking the strongest of the most recent anti-migraines medication. She came to my consultation with the biggest scepticism, because she did not see any psychological reason behind her illnesses. To her biggest surprise, one good morning as she woke up, she was free of all these migraines after a session which made her aware that the real cause of her pains was just some unresolved clashes between her and her sister. We cannot claim that the meaning of the symptom was explained, but it became just useless because the work was centred elsewhere.

But the effect of the Other’s exclusion and repetition extends further. It finally leads to deviation from the sense register which is the one that has to do with the symptom and psychotherapy. Mourning a symptom is also the meaning in a broader general sense of the word (cf. Jacque Alain Miller and his reflections on “off sense” of analysis in Lacan’s last lessons).

10°) Production of New Symptoms in the Course of the Analysis

Besides putting the initial symptoms into perspective, transforming all the linguistic productions of the analysis into analysable symptoms, the analysis also produces the new symptoms which will show up in social life. But they do not at all have the same status as the symptoms which hindered the subject’s life before the analysis. They should be considered to be the creations of the analysis, or the way to act and show what cannot be explained even within the analysis itself. We can, therefore, see coming into life totally incongruous loves and hatreds for the analysand as well as for those who are victims or the external beneficiaries, but which are sometimes necessary in order to apply the oedipal apparatus elements which are still less structured. Thus, the hatred of a designated rival will enable us to determine, through association of ideas or dreams, the unprecedented rivalry and hatred for the mother. As for the boy, it is the manifestation of his multiple seduction ventures in the eyes of a psychoanalyst which will enable him to recognise the incestuous relation he has to his mother by the prejudice of his desexualised company.

Conclusion: Symptoms Transfer to the Anguish and the Sinthom ?

To conclude, i have two questions to ask without necessarily developing them. Is transfer to anguish not one of the destinies of the symptom in the analysis? The sinthom, taken from Lacan as “something else not related to symptom” (ptose) is it a matter of structures i.e. semi-constitutional impossibility (assumptions of the prosthesis’s necessity instead of debarment of the father’s name) or a matter of resistance and limitations to the analysis itself, while it’s impossible to go beyond the symptom, to give way for enjoyment, and “to traverse the fantasies”, as they briefly sum it up?

[source: http://www.psf-en.com/spip.php?article19]

From Freudian Symptoms to Lacanian Sinthom #1

2010-07-16T11:20:00.000-07:00

What is a psycho-analytical symptom?

What do we mean by psycho-analytical symptom or symptom in a psychoanalytical sense? To try to answer this question I followed a considerable number of criteria, the criteria which are usually ascribed to symptoms or the ones used to draw the distinction between symptoms in a psycho-analytical sense and, for example, the symptoms in medical or social sense. Our objective is to highlight a number of ambiguities and the relative or obscure aspects of some of these distinctions.

Here are a few examples of the numerous questions which are asked: what does the description of symptom’s subjective refer to? What is the symbolization or symptomatization which is traditionally linked to the use of the symptom? What is the status of the desire, the signifier and the sense inside the symptom? What is the symptom’s destiny in the transference and in the process of cure? Let us first take a symptom from its most general sense, in its role which can be called social before gradually arriving at what would be its definition and its role within the psycho-analysis.

1) The symptom is a message and a symbolic construction at all times.

This implies that it is addressed to the Other. Generally, this is worthwhile even in medicine. In fact, medical semiology can only be regarded as a vast dictionary of translation used by the one who receives the message – symptoms on the subject identified as sick. Without this enormous corpus inherited from the entire medical history and governed by very precise linguistic rules, no complaint, pain or malaise could be interpreted by doctors. Therefore, it can be realized that a symptom is a symbolic construction even in medicine. It is a determinant for a complaint or bodily signal according to the specific information and theoretical references within the medical science.

In fact, although the interest of medicine is to focus on the real, it spends much of its time ignoring this real which nonetheless gives it a signal. The recent evolutions and the more and more technical side of the medical circles are not going in the different direction. The aim is to construct a new artificial object which is more manageable and hassle-free than this living and speaking body which offers itself to bistouries.

In other traditions such as the Western Medicine there are other kinds of translation dictionaries used. They interpret in a different manner and give different meanings to the complaint and the suffering. But they play the same fundamental role i.e. to insert by always forcing, at a possible risk, the complaint’s real into the symbolic universe which is full of meaning. 90% of the world populations does not refer to the biomedical universe (scientific/scientist), but to a kind of universe full of invisible entities. Too often we pick up the indigent word “magico-religious”, whereby the distinction between an illness, misfortune and pain does not exist. This event that befalls you and hurts you is associated with a set of forces and external agents around the subject who complain. It could be witchcrafts, supernatural spirits, being possessed or a destiny which could be a divine punishment.

Seen from this angle, the Western Medicine, medical-technology or traditional medicines and divination techniques are strictly equivalent. They symbolise the real (what befalls you) and suggest an acceptable sense to the event in the eyes of both the subject and his/her relatives. And this is the first step of the entire therapy.

Scientific and technical fine-tuning which enables our Western Medicine to treat and heal a considerable number of diseases from which we die, does not make any fundamental difference under certain conditions. This means that they do not change anything to the principle of symbolisation of the real itself. Furthermore, if we look at things with hindsight, the western medical technological progress does not prove its superiority over traditional techniques in an obvious manner. We have to think of all its derived, secondary and harmful effects, such as iatrogenic pathologies, nosocomial diseases (hospital-acquired infections) medicinal addictions and more generally a noticeable weakness with regard to the first signs of the illnesses which result from intra-psychological or relational conflicts, etc.

From there, two questions transpire.

1) If the entire symptom is a product of a symbolic translation referred to by a specific cultural code of whatever kind, we must admit that all the subjects addressing their complaints to the Other presuppose that this Other has the keys of the code. As a result, the way in which this complaint is going to be expressed already includes an effort of translation which is equivalent to an effort of making oneself heard or understood by this Other. In principle, this is why it is impossible to neglect what we call a symptom which shall be a remarkable or subjective dimension belonging to the complaining individual and a social dimension borrowed from the Other’s speech. Therefore, what needs to be clarified is firstly the relationship between the symptom and the social such as speech.

The second question emanates from this observation. If the entire Symptom is already a symbolic construction addressed to the Other and that it means something to this Qther, therefore, what is this psycho-analytical symptom called? What is the symbolisation of the an illness which would be specific to the psycho-analytical operation? What is the symbolisation? What is it that will distinguish psycho-analytical symptom from the medical or traditional symptom?

2°) Constituting the symptom inside the other

If we accept the foregoing, therefore the entire symptom is immediately formed inside the Other, by at least speaking to the Other and in an effort of recognition that involves the use of signifiers of the Other.

Although there are always two combined sources to the symptoms, that is, this element of the real which makes some sense and an offer of the preliminary proposed sense or rather imposed by the Other, it is worth-realising that the symptom’s expression is first restrained by this limited register made up by the symbolic code, that is, the pool of available signifiers which refers to a culture. While some will relate their symptoms to the Djinns and Ancestral Spirits, others will draw from Marie-Claire’s Health Science, Television Programmes or the latest Lucien Israel’s Book, etc.

But it is worth-going further, because this offer is not neutral or passive. It works like a real demand addressed to the suffering subject.

When a human being is affected by misfortune, pain or an illness, given that he/she is also a social being, he/she has to match his/her problem and demand to what is expected of him/her. This is why symptoms evolve according to the historical and geographical context and according to the social status of the addressees. This phenomenon was fully described through the hysterical symptoms with pseudo-epileptic hysteria crisis example which was given a neurological look from the 19th century. It can, however, perfectly be generalised. The signifiers which henceforth most often carry the complaint and demand are borrowed from the depression register, traumatism, obsessive compulsive disorders “O.C.D”, and other entities in use.

But it is worth making some extra conclusions to avoid attributing the responsibility of the form it gives to its initial demand and to the subject itself and, or even worse, to put on the account of a change of the subjectivity in general, or “psychological economy” which would govern the observable variations of these demand to the modern human being. We can give several examples in support of this evolution.

Thus, it is a less disputable fact that the increasingly numerous demands borrow their formulation from the claim register. We spot the idea of a right to compensation and the hope that repairing the injury is going heal up the symptom. This can be quite shocking if the misfortune in question is the death of someone closer, the birth of a handicapped child, results of a natural catastrophe or an accident that befell a person of which nobody is responsible. But where does this construction come from? An evolution of the subjectivity in the sense of taking away the responsibility or rather an evolution of social speech and the judicial arsenal which is increasingly dominated by reference to the law-and-order, preventing any risk, and the inflation of the figure of the victim? Who is responsible? The complainant subjects themselves or the public offer made to them to treat their misfortunes on a mode of legal repair?

Another example is that we quite quickly denounce the aesthetic surgery or artificial procreations demands by attributing a kind of perversion to the individuals who choose it or we accuse them of pleasing in forbidden acts of immorality. However, these demands are firstly induced by the new techniques proposed to the public which make up a profitable market, and by the legal system accompanying them. The medical institution in some leading technical fields such as Artificial Insemination with donor even elaborate a sham and a specific legal fiction to justify the maintenance of donor’s anonymity and the internal failure of the Artificial Insemination Donor device to detect that it assigns paternity to a sterile male. The possible problems that can arise later for this male or his children or their mother tend to be attributed to the character’s psychology instead of the secret and the sham instituted by the law and it is never questioned as it is.

Faced with this induced dimension of the demand and the symptom, the psycho-analytical process can only be conceived for what it is likely to find or to draw the distinction between the consistant, requested and expected formulation and subject enunciation. The first-class psycho-analytical intervention is the one that identifies what is irrelevant between the interpretation which is supposed to be true by a patient concerning his symptom and the reality that obtains.

This first feature of the symptom as constituted in the Other can be generalised, whatever the meaning given to this Other.

- The big Other of the code :
- The little Other of the couple or the family without which most of the symptoms are incomprehensible. From the frigidity addressed to a particular partner, to the agoraphobia which necessarily includes the company’s contra-phobic role, or to a suicide attempt which is addressed to one’s relatives, etc. Without this Other, the symptom no longer has the reason for being.

- The Other is going to be made up by the psychoanalyst whose action shall consist in offering itself as a symptom’s address to gradually reduce this Other’s consistency in order to make it understood that the other possible recipient of the massage is the subject himself.
- and it is this “Other scene” represented by the unconscious on which the symptom as message is going to appear as a question that the subject asks himself from a knowledge that he ignores.

Lacan would have said that the symptom always has a footing inside the Other.

3°) What “symptoms” in the absence of Other?

There are cases in which a symptom is not built inside the Other in this manner. In such cases, maybe we should find another word to designate the symptom in order to avoid assimilating it to neurotic or analytical symptoms.

Sometimes the symptom cannot be built up in this manner because the Other is absent i.e. there is neither one nor the other.

It may happen that they had never existed, because the field of the other was not built up at the earliest stages of the subject structuring, that is, putting in place the third party and the imaginary at the mirror stage. This is the paradigmatic case of autism or certain forms of schizophrenia, especially paranoid schizophrenia, in the course of which it can be realised that hermetism and incommunicability of symptoms such as delirium, hallucinations and interpretation show difficulty to be communicated to the Other. In some situations, there is neither code nor interpreter to translate or interpretat the real. The Real directly makes sense or signal. The real talks on its own. The word equals the thing . There is a kind of continuity between the real and the symbolic without the intervention of the imaginary. Lacan figured the symptom as a kind of small patch separating the real and the symbolic in some topological sketches.

Maybe it no longer exists, this is to say that the Other has fallen down or has left. This is a traumatic neuroses case which is characterised by this sentiment found in “trauma subjects”, of not belonging to the universe of the living, being dead-alive, disaffiliated, abandoned and without any symbolic attachment which makes sense. The Other is no longer there to enunciate this initial demand necessary for the establishment all the subject, the need to exist and the belief to exist. This is why traumatic neuroses symptoms and especially repetition syndrome have nothing to do with the transference neuroses symptoms or the symptom as message derived from the Other. The nightmarish symptoms that we encounter are rather empty calls, emanating from beyond the grave.

Question : Is symptom a message transmitted to the Other in paranoia? In this case the difficult thing is that unlike in the case of schizophrenia, the Other exists i.e. maintenance of imaginary to similar relationship. However, this Other or this imaginary image is an object of an erotic passion or an object full of hatred which prohibits any mobility between the different plans and any translation of the message which would open to a series of meanings (univocal meaning of persecution).

4°) The Symptom in Psycho-analytical Context

From this very general definition of symptom as a message communicated to and built inside the Other, the efforts to surround its meaning and its psycho-analytical scope shall operate by a series of reductions which are, in the strict sense of the word, only valid to a specific framework of psycho-analysis i.e. contact with another person who is a psychoanalyst.

The first reduction to operate is the one that with start with the different meanings of the Other (the big Other of the code, the little Other of the similar relation, etc) then focus on the precise role of this Other who is a psychoanalyst. Without this operation created by the artifice of a particular meeting, it seems wrong to talk about the presence or absence of the psycho-analytical symptoms in a person. At best, it is in the aftermath of this meeting that the symptoms and the initial terms of the demand could appear to be fulfilling a particular role in relation to the unconscious.

Although all the symptoms are messages, they only acquire their role in the eyes of the unconscious on condition that they are received by the listener who will allow the recognition of the operating unconscious in their formation.

This implies that the distinction between neurotic or non neurotic symptom, between analytical and non analytical symptom, does not so much depend on the preliminary structure which will be easy to diagnose or to predict (this is what in a strict sense of the word, the psychoanalysis is once again unable to do), but it depends on the possibility or impossibility that the symptom is recognised by the subject as its own massage communicated from another place which is however, itself.

In other words, a symptom in a psycho-analytical sense never precedes sharing with the analyst. Adopting this point of view, already means showing resistance to the sense whereby Lacan put it in the discretion of the psychoanalyst because the absence of a dully standard symptom could lead to a contra-indication of the analysis.

A symptom is the possible construction of the analysis, that is, there is no guarantee. The limits of this construction consist, on the one hand, of resistances from the subject of demand as well as the analyst and on the other hand, it consists of the impossibilities of which there is a need to specify the reasons for not folding up too quickly on the existence of a defect, a deficit or the personality’s lack of maturity. [source: http://www.psf-en.com/spip.php?article19]

Psychoanalysis, research and science

2010-07-16T11:14:00.000-07:00

By Jorge Bekerman
Translated by Andrea Banega

1. The requirement to shorten the interventions and turn them into ten- to twelve-minute-long presentations prompted me to adopt a sort of "minimal format" for this intervention: I chose to state ten one-minute-long proposals, articulated with one another. I prepared the presentation by summarizing the contents of each proposal and by focusing on what I cannot fail to say, rather than on what I would like to say. [1]

2. The issue of the relationship between psychoanalysis and research and science strikes a personal chord: I started my professional career by doing research in Neurobiology, between 1966 and 1975, and from then onwards I devoted myself to the clinical practice of psychoanalysis. "Strikes a personal chord" means that this intervention about psychoanalysis, research and science has –at least partially- a testimonial character.

3. This enables me to pose the following question: is it possible to talk, write or do research about psychoanalysis and leave the testimonial factor aside? In other words: can we talk, write or do research about psychoanalysis leaving aside our own experience of psychoanalysis? Because –at least in the field of psychoanalysis– there is a difference between reading and experience or, if we’d rather put it this way: between theory and practice. Corollary: there is an "anomaly" in psychoanalytic science, insofar as it is a science that is not built without regard to the testimonial factor (whether or not one acknowledges such testimonial factor), although it is certainly not circumscribed to the testimonial factor.

4. The experience may be the professional "experience" of an analyst, experience written here between inverted commas because there is a reason why Freud said that with each patient, the analyst must try to forget what he already knows and listen to each case as if it were the first. This is another example of the "anomaly" of psychoanalytic science, yet at the same time it is an epistemological stance whose originality and efficacy should be underscored time and time again, since no science is built on the methodological premise that that which is already known should be forgotten; rather, the contrary is the case.

5. When we talk about the experience of psychoanalysis we refer especially to each one’s experience as a patient. The most important methodological requirement for Freud regarding the formation of the analyst is that the analyst must undergo psychoanalytic treatment; following this line of reasoning we may add that when talking, writing or researching about psychoanalysis we cannot do without our experience as patients.

6. Thus, research in psychoanalysis is always "research under transference" (positive or negative); first of all, in relation to psychoanalysis itself. This is very hard to defend in the framework of science, insofar as scientific knowledge is built by taking as reference ideals of objectivity and accuracy that may be entirely passed on to the scientific community. Psychoanalytic science (should such a science exist) would be a paradoxical science –as well as a conjectural one.

7. Let me illustrate this point with a clinical vignette. For this purpose, we shall refer to the patient as "Claudia" and to her mother as "Nelly". Nelly, devastated by psychosis, was unable to raise Claudia by herself. But Nelly had two single, childless sisters who helped her as best as they could –not very well, in fact. Once, during the course of her free association, while Claudia was commenting on an argument between her aunts I heard her say: "My three aunts are always arguing." "Three aunts?", I asked, "What do you mean three aunts? Do you not have two aunts?" She remained completely silent for an instant and then declared: "Sure, since I did not have a mother!".

8. "I did not have a mother" is an inaccurate statement that articulates a subjective piece of truth crucial to this subject: "I am three times an orphan".

9. The issue of the truth of the testimonial factor is embedded in psychoanalytic research and science. Yet on the other hand, from the moment it was born, psychoanalysis has appropriated a commitment with the scientific rationale, with that reason which proves capable of getting to the edge of the abyss of what may be known. Unlike magic, which is based only on symbolic efficacy, and unlike religion, based on the promise of an eventual reward, psychoanalysis is based on the materiality of the signifier and its effects. In my case: to solve the alienating "science or psychoanalysis" option in order to work in psychoanalysis without giving up the scientific spirit.

10. As with any type of research, psychoanalytic research is not a one-person task, even though the names of Freud, Lacan, Melanie Klein, Winnicott and others may seem to indicate otherwise. Since it is not an individual task, it is an institutional task, which raises the question of what the requirements would be for an institutional structure to be consistent with the scientific "anomaly" inherent to psychoanalytic work. This might be reduced to the minimalist principle of creating and recreating spaces that include the testimonial factor with dignity, to turn it into the axis around which the research that is consistent with the scientific spirit of psychoanalysis revolves.

------------------
References and notes
1-The author presented this work at the International Congress on Research in Psychoanalysis and Social Science (Investigación en Psicoanálisis y Ciencias Sociales) held in Tucumán, Argentina, on October 6th and 7th, 2006. The original text in Spanish was published by Editorial Letra Viva, on April, 2007 (pp 74-75).

source: http://www.lacanian-psychoanalysis.com

The Ethics of Psychoanalysis

2008-05-14T14:05:00.000-07:00

The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book VII

Author: Jacques Lacan
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 432
Published by: Routledge
Publication Date: 3rd September 2007
ISBN: 978-0-415-42361-8

About the Book

A charismatic and controversial figure, Lacan is one of the most important thinkers of the twentieth century and his work has revolutionized linguistics, philosophy, literature, psychology, cultural and media studies.

He gained his reputation as a lecturer, disseminating his ideas to audiences that included Jean-Paul Sartre and Luce Irigaray amongst other hugely influential names. The Ethics of Psychoanalysis is a transcript of his most important lecture series.

Including influential readings of Sophocles’ Antigone and Elizabethan courtly love poetry in relation to female sexuality, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis remains a powerful and controversial work that is still argued over today by the likes of Judith Butler and Slavoj Žižek.
Table of Contents
Translator's Note 1. Outline of the Seminar 2. Pleasure and Reality 3. Rereading the Entwurf 4. Das Ding 5. Das Ding (II) 6. On the Moral Law 7. Drives and Lures 8. The Object and the Thing 9. On Creation Ex Nihilo 10. Marginal Comments 11. Courtly Love as Anamorphosis 12. A Critique of Bernfeld 13. The Death of God 14. Love of One's Neighbour 15. The Jouissance of Transgression 16. The Death Drive 17. The Function of the Good 18. The Function of the Beautiful 19. The Splendor of Antigone 20. The Articulations of the Play 21. Antigone Between Two Deaths 22. The Demand for Happiness and the Promise of Analysis 23. The Moral Goals of Psychoanalysis 24. The Paradoxes of Ethics or Have you Acted Inconformity with your Desire?

www.psychoanalysisarena.com

Psychoanalysis Comparable and Incomparable

2008-05-14T13:58:00.000-07:00

The Evolution of a Method to Describe and Compare Psychoanalytic Approaches

Author: By David Tuckett
Title: Psychoanalysis Comparable and Incomparable: The Evolution of a Method to Describe and Compare Psychoanalytic Approaches
Published by: Routledge
Publication Date: 1st February 2008
ISBN: 978-0-415-45143-7

About the Book

How do we know when what is happening between two people should be called psychoanalysis? What is a psychoanalytic process and how do we know when one is taking place?

Psychoanalysis Comparable and Incomparable describes the rationale and ongoing development of a six year programme of highly original meetings conducted by the European Psychoanalytic Federation Working Party on Comparative Clinical Methods. The project comprises over seventy cases discussed by more than five hundred experienced psychoanalysts over the course of sixty workshops.

Authored by a group of leading European psychoanalysts, this book explores ways for psychoanalysts using different approaches to learn from each other when they present their work to fellow psychoanalysts, and provides tools for the individual practitioner to examine and improve his or her own approach. As described in detail in its pages, sticking to the task led to some surprising experiences, raising fundamental questions about the way clinical discussion and supervision are conducted in psychoanalysis.

Well known by many in the psychoanalytic community and the object of much interest and debate, this project is described by those who have had the closest contact with it and will satisfy a widely held curiosity in psychoanalysts and psychotherapists throughout the world.

David Tuckett is winner of the 2007 Sigourney prize.
Reviews

"This extraordinary volume describes the enormous progress made by an ongoing international scientific effort to help analysts identify a core of the psychoanalytic process that is compatible with the variety of theories and techniques that now exists in the international community...I know of no project more important than this one for the future of psychoanalysis. Each chapter is filled with ideas, and every working analyst will come away from this book stimulated to think in new and interesting ways about his or her own clinical activity." - Arnold M. Cooper, Weill Cornell Medical College, USA
Table of Contents

Birksted Breen, Introductory Foreword. Tuckett, On Difference, Discussing Differences and Comparison: An Introduction. Denis, In Praise of Empiricism. Bohm, Before the Method, Underestimating the Problem and the Meeting in Prague. Jemstedt, The Sorrento Experience: Chaos Replaced by Too Much Structure. Hinz, Some Reflections on the Problems of Comparison and Difference in the Light of Doubts and Enthusiasms. Tuckett, Reflection and Evolution: Developing the 2-Step Method. Birksted Breen, Ferro, Mariotti, Work in Progress: Using the 2-Step Method. Schubert, Experiences of Participating: Group Processes and Group Dynamics. Basile, Ferro, Some Surprises: A New Style for Case Discussion? Tuckett, Reflection and Comparison: Some Final Remarks. Tuckett, Appendix: The Origins of the EPF "New" Scientific Policy and Early History of the Working Party.
About the Author(s)

The authors of this book are a group of leading European Psychoanalysts asked by the European Psychoanalytic Federation (EPF) to form a working party devoted to understanding and comparing the different ways psychoanalysts work. They include among their number the current and former Editor of the International Journal of Psychoanalysis and the former editor of the Revue Francaise de Psychoanalyse. Between them they have contributed numerous books and scientific articles in English and other languages.

Source: www.psychoanalysisarena.com

Blogging and Making Money Online

2008-05-13T13:49:00.000-07:00

This is a good opportunity for blogger to earn some extra income from blogging. Bloggerwave invite blogger to be their partner and make money by posting any review you want. Bloggerwave is aiming to be Europes biggest advertising media on blogs and you can help us grow so more and more jobs will come. This is not free, you will be paid for each review you post on your blog.

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2008-05-09T13:43:00.000-07:00

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Curing Schizophrenia

2008-01-01T15:04:00.000-08:00

Views of Schizophrenia

A simple internet search for the word reveals a profusion of definitions with similar typecasting; e.g. Schizophrenia is “a chronic, severe, and disabling brain disorder...” (NIMHa, 2007), or “a severe, lifelong brain disorder,” (Medline, 2007), or a “disease.”

The reader may perceive something approaching a unanimity of opinion on the idea; i.e., that since this “disease” involves the brain and these authorities have deemed it to be “lifelong,” it must ipso facto be something strictly biological. A host of inferences follow: “it’s all in the genes,” “you’re born with it,” “there’s something wrong with their brains,” “the poor parents,” “medicine can cure them, if only we can find the right medicine,” “there’s no hope,” etc..., etc...

This writer thinks most of these views are about as useful as earlier ideas that people with schizophrenic symptoms were guilty of witchcraft. At least the same National Institute of Mental Health Report listed above candidly admitted:

“…schizophrenia is believed to result from a combination of environmental and genetic factors. All the tools of modern science are being used to search for the causes of this disorder.” NIMHb, 2007.

Nature or Nurture?

In fact, medical science has been looking for a biological cause for schizophrenia for close to a century and has yet to find one. Over that time, many announcements of such “findings” have been made – always accompanied by the greatest publicity, but none were proved to be verifiable.

Another curious fact of this “disease” is that people who have it sometimes spontaneously recover. How then is it a disease? Or a brain disorder? Or lifelong? It is a rare disease indeed where people spontaneously recover and where there is no known physical etiology.

What about the “environmental” factors mentioned; i.e., the family backgrounds of the people who develop schizophrenic symptoms?

Peter Breggin, M.D. (p. 103, et seq.; see generally, 1994) speaks of one of the seminal reports on schizophrenia in the history of psychiatry, the study of the Genain Quadruplets (all of whom had schizophrenic symptoms). He notes that the report of the study recites the potential “biological” evidence for schizophrenia in that case in almost inexhaustible detail – but somehow neglects to consider it noteworthy that the family life of the quadruplets included such horrors as having acid poured on their genitals.

John Modrow, did not suffer the same horrors as the Genain Quadruplets; but did endure a significant amount of craziness from his parents, which he describes throughout his outstanding book “How to Become a Schizophrenic.”

Modrow notes that:

“The claim that most schizophrenics come from perfectly normal families deserves careful consideration… (regarding a case study he presented earlier)… Although the parents in this family appeared to be very ordinary and sensible people, they were later found to be playing with their daughter’s mind, subjecting her to strange ‘telepathy experiments’… it took over a year of investigation to discover those parents’ bizarre behavior.”

1995, pp. 205-206, emphasis original.

In spite of the extreme craziness of his own parents, Modrow still thinks of them as “basically decent and relatively normal” (1995, pp. 206); but also says:

“Had a psychiatrist examined my parents… he would have found… nothing strange or odd… Moreover, had that psychiatrist known my parents intimately for several years he probably would have retained his favorable opinion of them… However… there is no doubt in my mind that their behavior towards me was the major cause of my schizophrenic breakdown.”

Modern Psychoanalysis of the Schizophrenic Patient

It is no accident that the decisive text in modern psychoanalysis is entitled “Modern Psychoanalysis of the Schizophrenic Patient.” (Spotnitz, 1985). Though the theory and techniques in that book are equally applicable to all sorts of mental difficulties, Dr. Spotnitz arrived at those results through his groundbreaking work with schizophrenic patients.

Spotnitz (1985, p. 17) proceeded from the premise that “Regardless of etiology… there is no evidence that the condition is not completely reversible.”

“The operational concept follows: Schizophrenia is an organized mental situation, an intricately structured but psychologically unsuccessful defense against destructive behavior. Both aggressive and libidinal impulses figure in this organized situation… Obliteration of the object field of the mind and fragmentation of the ego are among the secondary consequences of the defense.”

Spotnitz, 1985, p. 57, emphasis original.

As to the “environmental” variables, Spotnitz says:

“It is unnecessary to postulate that a particular type of relationship produced the infantile pattern. It may be in part innate and in part learned. Even in cases where it was taught by the mother, her attitude may not have been pathological; there may simply have been a disequilibrium between her emotional training and the infant’s impulsivity. The dynamics of the mother-child relationship are not uniform in these cases. More significant than whether the parent actually loved, hated, or was indifferent to her infant is the fact that the totality of his environment failed to meet his specific maturational needs…”

1985, p. 68, emphasis original.

In this writer’s opinion, the techniques set forth in “Modern Psychoanalysis of the Schizophrenic Patient” work equally well with other mental difficulties because mental conditions have much in common – they are all part of the human condition.

One could even say that mental difficulties are normal; part of being human - the only question being whether we still function well in spite of our difficulties, or whether those difficulties have reached intolerable proportions, such as with the schizophrenic condition.

The Talking Cure

Many people will use Herculean efforts to appear normal, to distinguish themselves from those with problems, to split themselves off from the idea that they themselves might have any mental difficulties at all.

In spite of the efforts and protestations of these ordinary people, however, skilled observers may have little difficulty seeing the underlying troubles. And, if the troubles reach a stage where they seriously interfere with the individual’s ability to love, work, or play it may be time to seek help.

When we speak of the physical illnesses we tend to think of cure as involving the complete eradication of anything relating to the condition, Not so with mental conditions – in those cases, the cure consists of placing the individual in a position where he or she can love, work and play without serious hindrance – where they can be productive and enjoy life.

The particular weakness of the individual is not likely to be completely eradicated. If a person tends to display in a phobic, or an obsessive-compulsive, or a schizophrenic, or any other way, they could have some resort to their characteristic mechanisms even after being cured. After all, we do not cure people from being human; nor do we seek to.

But, the person who has been competently treated by a modern psychoanalyst will be able to enjoy the whole range of human feelings and action available to the best of us.

References

Breggin, P. (1994). Toxic Psychiatry, New York, St. Martin's Press.

Medline. (May 24, 2007). Service of the U.S. National Library of Medicine and the National Institutes of Health, online at http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/schizophrenia.html

Modrow, J. (1995). How to Become a Schizophrenic, Everett, Wash., Apollyon Press.

NIMHa, (March 1, 2007). “Schizophrenia,” National Institute of Mental Health, online at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/healthinformation/schizophreniamenu.cfm

NIMHb, (Jan. 24, 2007). “What Causes Schizophrenia?” National Institute of Mental Health, online at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/schizoph.cfm#symptoms

Spotnitz, H. (1985). Modern Psychoanalysis of the Schizophrenic Patient: Theory of the Technique, Second Edition, New York, Human Sciences Press.

© 2007, James G. Fennessy, M.A., J.D.
Matawan, New Jersey 07747
E-mail: njanalyst@hotmail.com
http://modernpsychoanalysis.org

The Narcissistic Defense

2008-01-01T15:00:00.000-08:00

One of the unique offerings of modern psychoanalysis has to do with its understanding of the importance of “the narcissistic defense.” While it is well known that the narcissistic disorders possess a vast range of defenses available for use, something much more particular is meant when modern analysts refer to “the narcissistic defense.”

Dr. Spotnitz first observed the narcissistic defense during his clinical investigations of schizophrenia, and later successfully applied the concept to treatment of other patients:

“When the patient is frustrated, the appropriate way to discharge his feelings is to put them into words. If he is prevented from doing so when frustrated and feeling deprived by the analyst, he usually bottles up the aggression: in other words, he turns these feelings inward and begins to attack the self. This is referred to as the narcissistic defense.” (Spotnitz, 1976b, pp. 56-57, emphasis original).

Freud’s idea was that the “narcissistic wall… brings us to a stop,” and that “…(o)ur technical methods must accordingly be replaced by others; and we do not know yet whether we shall succeed in finding a substitute.” (1917, p.423). Spotnitz, however. “… discovered that the analyst resolves the adult patient’s repetitive self-attacks by changing the flow of destructive impulsivity.” (1976b, p. 56).

From the root of the word narcissism, it might at first appear that the problem is excessive “self-love,“ yet not all narcissism is “disordered:”

“We commonly recognize the value of narcissism, as well as the vital role it plays in creative activity. If we regard sleep as the quintessence of absorption in the self, we agree that narcissism is essential for self-preservation.
Need I point out that ‘narcissistic defense’ does not involve these kinds of normal activity? What we are concerned with is narcissism in a pathological sense, with self-love that serves as a cloak for self-hatred. The polarities of self-hatred and self-love are linked together in the defensive system, but the nuclear problem is the self-hatred.” (Spotnitz, 1976a, p. 104).

How might an individual develop the narcissistic defense? According to Spotnitz, the foundation is likely to be found in early childhood and:

“… is not total emotional deprivation... The defense seems to originate in a relationship which was gratifying to the infant in some respects, especially in meeting his biological needs for the intake of stimuli, but failed to meet the need of his mental apparatus for cooperation in discharging destructive energy. Nevertheless, he was not totally abandoned; he was sufficiently gratified to develop a strong craving for more gratification and, consequently, to place an unduly high value on the source of this bounty.” (Spotnitz, 1976a, p. 104).

Could it be that for the infant it is a question of survival? In the minds of very young children thoughts may have magical properties. If we have horrible thoughts; i.e., that mother frustrates us, or that we hate her, or worse; even for an instant – mother might leave us forever. Or, our violent thoughts might actually kill her; or maybe if we’re so monstrous as to think those thoughts, she might actually die, as punishment for our bad thoughts. We need to protect her at all costs.

Spotnitz hypothesizes that…

“(t)he infant got to understand that his mother might be damaged by his rage; perhaps she discouraged such reactions by withholding her favors. At any rate, the infantile ego which was not trained to release mobilized aggressive energy towards its object in feelings and language responded to prolonged periods of frustration by internalizing its destructive impulses. Much of the energy that would otherwise have been available for maturational processes was expended to bottle up this impulsivity…
The child who started out to console himself with self-love thus compensates for a specific type of damage incurred in the course of maturation by becoming the object of his own hatred. Sacrificially, he attacks his ego to preserve his external object.” (1976a, pp.104-05).

As with all the other defenses, “(t)he survival function of the narcissistic defense is respected. Though primitively organized, it has served to stabilize his mental apparatus in his interpersonal relations and insulate him against unwanted feeling states.” (Spotnitz, 1985, p. 164).

Modern psychoanalysts have a greater understanding and a wider range of techniques available to outflank Freud’s “stone wall of narcissism,” and “…(i)f the analyst provides the proper environment, the patient will re-experience emotional reactions in his relationship with the analyst that resemble those he had at some point in the past when his maturation was blocked.” (Spotnitz, 1976b, pp. 57-58).

With proper treatment, the narcissistic defense can thus be made unnecessary, allowing patients the full range of options and emotions available to mature individuals.

References

Freud, S. (1917). Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (Part 3) in the Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud, (James Strachey, et al., Ed., 1953-74), London, Hogart Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 16:243-463.

Spotnitz, H. (1976a). Psychotherapy of Preoedipal Conditions, N.Y., Jason Aronson.

Spotnitz, H. and Meadow, P. (1976b). Treatment of the Narcissistic Neuroses, NY, Man. Center For Advanced Psychoanalytic Studies.

Spotnitz, H. (1985). Modern Psychoanalysis of the Schizophrenic Patient: Theory of the Technique, Second Edition, NY, Human Sciences Press.

© 2006, James G. Fennessy, M.A., J.D.
Matawan, New Jersey 07747
E-mail: analyst@modernpsychoanalysis.org
http://modernpsychoanalysis.org

Modern Psychoanalysis and Religion

2008-01-01T14:57:00.000-08:00

One of the first questions on this topic might be: Is it useful to talk about this? The techniques used in Modern Psychoanalysis do not seem to require a religious perspective and the creeds of the major religions do not depend upon psychoanalysis. Additionally, at least some tendencies in each perspective have been noticed to consider the other either unwelcome and intrusive, or with outright hostility.

Certainly, Sigmund Freud's own ideas towards religion would fit in the latter category and at least part of the issue from the psychoanalytic view has been the inability of some to disentangle themselves from Freud's idiosyncrasies on the subject. (See e.g., Zilboorg, 1950; see also Becker, pp. 173-75, 1973).

On the other hand, it is reported that C.G. Jung "... had never, he claimed, had a patient whose neurosis was not due to his lack of religion, nor had he ever cured a patient whose cure was not due to his return to religion." (Bartemeier, p.12, 1995).

Thus, some would agree that there at least enough of an "overlap" between the goals of religion and those of psychoanalysis to warrant discussion. But, if there is to be such a discussion, what should it consist of? Alternatively, what should it not consist of? Who might be benefited by this dialogue?

In this writer's opinion, the only really useless area of inquiry concerns one trying to prove or disprove the other; i.e., advocates of religion and psychoanalysis each adhere to self-sustaining teleological tenets as part of their individual belief systems. By their very nature, these tenets are neither provable nor disprovable by outside sources; though even this should not interfere with an open dialogue if the participants are willing to respect the feelings of others. So, perhaps the dialogue should include anything the participants wish to discuss.

While one would not expect religious instruction to be included in the curriculum of psychoanalytic institutes, or psychoanalysis to be required in seminaries, it would seem to me that each could benefit from some knowledge of the other.

Modern analysts have their own spiritual existence to consider; as well as many patients who come from a religious perspective, or even have religious components integrated into their difficulties with the world. Likewise, religious leaders have their own psyches to consider; along with some followers who would be helped by being able to talk freely in a modern psychoanalytic setting. The institutional structures in place in each of the perspectives could also be broadened by further dialogue.

As a methodology, Modern Psychoanalysis should be well-suited to a dialogue about psychoanalysis and religion because of its emphasis on the role and importance of emotional communications. Individual belief systems are often highly charged with emotion, as part of the person's self-identification process with the world.

These root emotional processes have caused some to notice a correlation between the emotional forces at work in either arena, which "...emerges as the reflective awareness of powerful affectivity rather than as a purely intellectual grasp of logical relations between concepts and symbols." (Cousins, p. 36, 1995).

Perhaps it is time for us to jointly explore these powerful emotional processes.

References

Bartemeier, L.H. (1995, 1976). "Psychoanalysis and Religion," in Psychoanalysis and Catholicism. Wolman, B., ed., NY, Jason Aronson, Inc.

Becker, E. (1973). The Denial of Death. NY, The Free Press.

Cousins, E. (1995, 1976). "The Many-leveled Psyche: Correlation Between Psychotherapy and the Spiritual Life," in Psychoanalysis and Catholicism. Wolman, B., ed., NY, Jason Aronson, Inc.

Zilboorg, G. (1950). Psychoanalysis and Religion. NY, Barnes & Noble.

© 2006, James G. Fennessy, M.A., J.D.
Matawan, New Jersey 07747
E-mail: njanalyst@hotmail.com
http://modernpsychoanalysis.org

Free Association and Resistance

2008-01-01T14:53:00.000-08:00

Professor Freud (1913, p. 147) insisted that there was one “fundamental rule” the analyst needed to tell the patient “…at the very beginning:

‘Your talk with me must differ in one respect from ordinary conversation. Whereas usually you rightly try to keep the threads of your story together… here you must proceed differently… You will be tempted to say to yourself: ‘This or that has no connection here, or it is quite unimportant, or it is nonsensical, so it cannot be necessary to mention it.‘ Never give in to these objections… say whatever goes through your mind. Act as if you were sitting at the window of a railway train and describing… the changing views you see outside.’”

This fundamental rule of “saying everything” has since been referred to as “free association.” How do modern psychoanalysts implement this rule?

First, we can say that modern analysts accept that “(e)ven the analytic directive to talk must be viewed as resistance-provoking.” (Spotnitz, 1976b, p. 169).

Spotnitz (1976b, p. 159) commented that one of Freud’s first followers,

“Ferenczi had noted many devices used by patients to resist cure. He observed how difficult it was for the patient to follow the first rule of free flow of ideas until the close of the analysis, and that patients could not understand that free association did not demand complete thinking out of ideas, but complete utterance of what was actually thought.”

Dr. Spotnitz (1976a, p. 78) also recounts that attempting:

"… to overcome the resistance to free association by ‘making use of psychical compulsion’… got Freud into various difficulties. Although time-saving, his approach proved traumatizing to the patient, giving rise to feelings of disturbance, strangeness, withdrawal and the like which inhibited or even blocked communication.”

This classical approach to resistance undoubtedly also caused many patients to be labeled from the very beginning as “unanalyzable” or ‘not suitable for treatment.”

I think it could be said that most modern analysts recognize and respect the patient’s need for the “insulation” (or defenses) that result in resistances. They do not try to “smash through” the defenses and may even help reinforce some defenses until the patient is ready to give them up. This same respectful approach is taken with the question of free association.

Spotnitz (1976a, p. 141, emphasis added) indicates that cooperative behavior would be:

“…that the patient lie on the couch and talk. He is not instructed to free-associate. As the opening move in educating him to do so, he may be asked to tell his ‘ life story’ or simply to talk of his experiences; a severely disturbed individual may begin by recounting how he traveled to the office, what he ate for breakfast, and the like.”

In modern psychoanalysis, the patient’s job is to talk, while the analyst bears the responsibility of helping the patient do so.

In most cases, modern analysts rely on the contact function of the patient’s ego in deciding when and how to help in the patient’s attempts to satisfy this fundamental rule of “saying everything.” This approach helps to safeguard the patient’s developing ego from unwarranted intrusion by the analyst. (See e.g., Fennessy, 2007)

The modern psychoanalytic approach to resistance and free association has had the added benefit of expanding the number of people who may be helped by our methods to the point where “… (w)ith our increasing understanding of the psychological reversibility of the narcissistic disorders, the phrase ‘not suitable for treatment’ has been dropped from the vocabulary of the modern psychoanalyst.” (Spotnitz, 1976b, p. xi).

References

Fennessy, J. (publication pending, 2007). Narcissism and the Contact Function, in PRACTICE MATTERS, A Journal of Modern Psychoanalytic Treatment Technique (Vol. 2)

Freud, S. (1913). Further Recommendations in the Technique of Psychoanalysis (On Beginning the Treatment) in Freud; Therapy and Technique, (Philip Rieff, Ed., 1978), NY, Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.

Spotnitz, H. (1976a). Psychotherapy of Preoedipal Conditions, N.Y., Jason Aronson.

Spotnitz, H. and Meadow, P. (1976b). Treatment of the Narcissistic Neuroses, NY, Man. Center For Advanced Psychoanalytic Studies.

© 2006, James G. Fennessy, M.A., J.D.
Matawan, New Jersey 07747
E-mail: analyst@modernpsychoanalysis.org
http://modernpsychoanalysis.org

Narcissistic Transference

2008-01-01T14:48:00.000-08:00

Freud (1926, pp 52-3, emphasis original) was describing the phenomenon of transference when he said:

The neurotic sets to work because he believes in the analyst, and he believes in him because he begins to entertain certain feelings towards him…. The patient repeats, in the form of falling in love with the analyst, psychical experiences which he underwent before; he has transferred to the analyst psychical attitudes which lay ready within him…

Yet classical analysts soon found that many individuals appeared to be unable to form this type of transference with their analysts. These individuals were then often deemed “unanalyzable,” because of the central role that transference plays in psychoanalysis. (See e.g., Fennessy, 2006).

How can individuals who seem to lack the capacity to develop this “object transference” be helped? Modern psychoanalysts understand that the difficulties experienced by many patients have their origins in the pre-oedipal period. Another way of expressing this is that “(t)he narcissistic patient is arrested at some point or points in approximately the first two years of life.” (Margolis, 1981, p. 149).

Modern analysts are then able to use their skills to build a transference on a narcissistic basis. In this narcissistic transference:

“(t)he patient is permitted to mold the transference object in his own image. He builds up a picture of the therapist as someone like himself – the kind of person whom he will eventually feel free to love and hate.” (Spotnitz, 1976a, p. 109).

Dr. Spotnitz answers the question:

“’Do we want a narcissistic transference to develop?’ We do because in a negative, regressed state, the patient may experience the analyst as being like him or part of him. Or the analyst may not exist for him. The syntonic feeling of oneness is a curative one, while the feeling of aloneness, the withdrawn state, is merely protective. Because traces of narcissism remain in everyone, we seek, when beginning treatment, to create an environment that will facilitate a narcissistic transference so that, first we can work through the patient’s narcissistic aggression.” (Spotnitz, 1976b, p. 58).

Margolis further says that:

“In operational terms… the oedipal patient transfers the images of distinctive objects of his oedipal period onto the analyst, whereas the preoedipal patients transfers onto the analyst the fuzzy and ambiguous images of his narcissistic period… In building the narcissistic transference and eliciting the patient’s picture of the analyst, we are actually eliciting his picture of himself.” (1979, p.140).

Therapists who have any experience with narcissism know that narcissists are often consumed with themselves and themselves alone - given the opportunity they may talk about nothing but their own self-absorptions for years on end. Therefore, it should be apparent that the narcissistic transference will not be come into being on its own – it must be developed through the skills of the therapist.

What does the narcissistic transference look like? Spotnitz (1976a, p. 109) states that:

“On the surface it looks positive. He builds up this attitude: ‘You are like me so I like you. You spend time with me and try to understand me, and I love you for it.’ Underneath the sweet crust, however, one gets transient glimpses of the opposite attitude: ‘I hate you as I hate myself. But when I feel like hating you, I try to hate myself instead.”

Developing the narcissistic transference is normally an emotionally charged process, that proceeds at the patient’s own pace. (See generally, Fennessy, 2007). The training and clinical skills of the modern analyst, including proper use of emotional reinforcement, object-oriented questions and joining techniques, make all the difference between success and failure in nurturing this relationship.

Spotnitz (1985, p. 201) describes the result when the narcissistic transference is successfully developed:

“(w)hen one focuses on the narcissistic patterns and works consistently to help the patient verbalize frustration-tension, object transference phenomena become increasingly prominent… Eventually, the patient’s transferences are aroused by his emotional perceptions of the therapist as a parental transference figure.”

In other words, personality maturation takes place. The symbiotic relationship developed between analyst and patient (See, Spotnitz, 1984, p. 135) may help the patient’s emotional perceptions along. Repeated emotional associations to the mental images of the analyst, as constructed by the patient; strengthen the object field of the mind, or form new neuronal connections.

The greater emotional maturity which results has enduring and important ramifications for the patient in therapy, and in life.

References

Fennessy, J. (publication pending, 2007). Narcissism and the Contact Function, in PRACTICE MATTERS, A Journal of Modern Psychoanalytic Treatment Technique (Vol. 2)

Fennessy, J. (2006). Modern Psychoanalytic Education. (Online at: http://modernpsychoanalysis.blogspot.com, June 08, 2006).

Freud, S. (1926). The Question of Lay Analysis. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XX (1925-1926).

Margolis, B. (1981). Narcissistic Transference: Further Considerations. (Modern Psychoanalysis, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1981).

Margolis, B. (1979). Narcissistic Transference: The Product of Overlapping Self and Object Fields. (Modern Psychoanalysis, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1979).

Spotnitz, H. (1976a). Psychotherapy of Preoedipal Conditions, N.Y., Jason Aronson.Spotnitz, H. and Meadow, P. (1976b). Treatment of the Narcissistic Neuroses, NY, Man. Center For Advanced Psychoanalytic Studies.

Spotnitz, H. (1984). The Case of Anna O.: Aggression and the Narcissistic Countertransference. In M. Rosenbaum & M. Muroff (Eds.), Anna O.: One Hundred Years of Psychoanalysis. NY, Free Press.

Spotnitz, H. (1985). Modern Psychoanalysis of the Schizophrenic Patient: Theory of the Technique, Second Edition, NY, Human Sciences Press.

© 2007, James G. Fennessy, M.A., J.D.
Matawan, New Jersey 07747
E-mail: njanalyst@hotmail.com
http://modernpsychoanalysis.org

Wilhelm Stekel

2008-01-01T14:35:00.000-08:00

Of Polish origin, Wilhelm Stekel initially contacted Freud in 1902 for a short analysis. He then joined the group of Wednesday evenings when he met Alfred Adler. It is together with Adler that, following the Weimar congress, he founded, the Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse, whose direction they assumed.

Freud's correspondence needs to be read to note the extent of his poor regard for the two above, which caused him many torments. Whereas Adler had broken in a definitive way, Stekel remained much more ambivalent. Taking as a pretext the difference in opinion regarding the publication of a text by Tausk, Stekel resigned from the Vienna Association of Psychoanalysis, but refused to give up his position with Zentralblatt before the First World War ended its publication.

Stekel thereafter tried to join Freud again but the latter did not want to resume the old differences.

Stekel practiced a method of short analysis implying a more active participation on the part of the therapist. He is not really known to have had any disciples.

Copyright René DesGroseillers
http://www.microtec.net/desgros/index.html

Wilhelm Reich

2008-01-01T14:34:00.000-08:00

Born in Galicia, Wilhelm Reich (1897-1957) is one of the best known figures of Freudian dissidence. Continuing his studies of medicine in Vienna, Reich was quite early allowed at the Psychoanalytical Society of Vienna , in 1920, where he joined a group of brilliant young analysts.

After a bright start in his with the publication of Characterial Analysis, the first part of which always makes a classic on this subject, W. Reich radically moved away from psychoanalysis while being more and more directed towards a Marxist vision on society. He was then involved in the communist movement and worked out a line of thought giving rise to both dissension and regard from such analysts as Marxists.

One of the major problems of Reich's work lies in the fact that he takes repression for repression of sexuality. Repression is an intra psychic process, accomplishing defensive needs confronted by psychical conflicts, whereas repression of sexuality is an external social process aiming at controlling a population's sexual behaviors. We can therefore understand why Reich could urge to sexual revolution and greater sexual freedom to make neuroses disappear, while at the same time being aware that the absence of adequate external controls often increases rigidity of intra psychic defenses in place.

Because of his revolutionary ideas, Reich soon had to flee from the rise of Nazism. His settled in Maine, the United States, where he founded the Orgone Institute in 1942, in agreement with his theories based on the power of the orgasm. Towards the end of his career, Reich work out increasingly esoteric theories which had little impact in the analytical media, at least.

Following a lawsuit by the American Food and Drug Administration, Reich was imprisoned and he finally died in prison.

Copyright René DesGroseillers
http://www.microtec.net/desgros/index.html

Georg Groddeck

2008-01-01T14:33:00.001-08:00

Georg Groddeck (1866-1934) occupies a special place among those who can be regarded as Freudian dissidents. Groddeck had indeed already worked out his own theoretical vision when he came into contact with Freud who, impressed by this original doctor's ideas, prompted him to regard Groddeck as one of his own group.

In fact, the first contact between Freud and this Baden-Baden doctor went as far back as 1912, when Groddeck had published a highly critical analysis of psychoanalysis. A few years later Groddeck renewed his contacts with Freud to apologise and acknowledge his poor understanding of psychoanalysis at the time. This was the first letter of a long correspondence between the two,

It is from Groddeck that Freud borrowed the concept of Self (id), by considerably modifying however the direction he gave this term. For Groddeck, das Es represents the unknown force in control of people, the source of all physical diseases. Freud turned it into a psychic authority, the source of all impulses.

Though never an analyst, Groddeck attended psychoanalytical congresses and meetings. He often shocked the assistance by his description as a wild analyst. Ferenczi was extremely impressed by Groddeck's ideas and they often discussed the latter's own ideas on techniques known as active .

Copyright René DesGroseillers
http://www.microtec.net/desgros/index.html

Alfred Adler

2008-01-01T14:32:00.000-08:00

Alfred Adler (1870-1937) was a young doctor in Vienna and among the very first disciples to join Freud, and take part in the discussion sessions on Wednesday evenings. He was never a close relation of Freud however, as the latter's correspondence often expressed his little regard for his disciples who did not produce a significant work.

Adler quickly proved an ambitious and suspicious collaborator, not very inclined to play the role of disciple. Adler soon worked out his theoretical divergences around the idea of the dominate-dominated ratio. In his opinion, Oedipus is merely a symbol of much more fundamental problems, bringing to the fore the weak little boy seeking to compensate for his physical inferiority versus his father in his desire to dominate the mother.

Adler estimated that the position of President of the International Psycho-Analytic Association was rightfully his, and he disagreed with the appointment made by Jung in 1910. Adler was not satisfied with Freud's proposal who, in spite of his own dislike for him, offerred Adler the leadership of the Vienna Society for Psychoanalysis.

Adler, who, together with Stekel, ran the Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse , gave up his positions in 1911 in order to create, with nine of the 35 members of the Vienna Society, an association which was going to become the Society for Individual Psychology.

After having moved away from Freud, Adler worked much in the field of pedagogy. The sources of his thought seem more on the side of Marx, Nietzsche and Leibniz than of Freud.

Copyright René DesGroseillers
http://www.microtec.net/desgros/index.html

C.G. Jung

2008-01-01T14:29:00.001-08:00

Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) was considerably important in the analytical movement for his being generally regarded as the dissident prototype, for the impact of his break as well as for the extent of the movement he created thereafter.

Of Swiss origin, Jung was the son of a preacher. He made medical studies, became specialised in psychiatry, then entered Burghölzli, the famous Zurich Psychiatric Hospital, whose manager was the no less famous Eugen Bleuler.

Between 1902-1903, Jung attended a training course in Paris, with Pierre Janet, then returned to Zurich to be appointed chief physician in Burghölzli

It is in this context that Jung became introduced to Freud, in 1907. Freud was attracted by Jung's prestige and personality and was soon to see him as his spiritual son, who could ensure the survival of psychoanalysis.

BurgholzliStrong bonds were then woven between the two at the time of the development of psychoanalysis.

Jung was the subject of an impetuous rise in the hierarchy of psychoanalysis. He became the editor of the Jahrbuch, in 1908, took part in the 1909 voyage to America, and became the first president of the International Association of Psychoanalysis, in 1910.

In his desire to find a quality promoter of his ideas in Jung, Freud tended to minimize Jung's ambivalent manifestations and reserves. The latter had to do with the role of sexuality in the psychic development. Jung had in fact never truly acquiesced to Freud's sexual theory, which he judged as too extensive.

Starting with 1912, Jung took more and more distance in his writings, which cause a clamorous rupture to be made concrete in 1914, by Jung's resignation from his positions.

Freud/Jung LettersThe Freud-Jung Letters, published in English. More info about this book here. Read some abstracts here.
After a short period of personal disorders, Jung founded his own movement (the analitical psychology), and produced a considerable work which appealed to many disciples.

Forsaking the meanders of psychosexuality, Jung embraced spirituality and the so-called rational theology.

_______________
Source: http://www.freudfile.org/jung.html

C.G. Jung

2008-01-01T14:29:00.000-08:00

The Psychoanalytic Movement : The Dissidents

2008-01-01T14:27:00.000-08:00

C.G. Jung
Alfred Adler
Georg Groddeck
Wilhelm Reich
Wilhelm Stekel

The history of the psychoanalysis is strewn with debates concerning the theory and the clinical practice. More often than differently, these quarrels are also wars of being able and competitions personal. It is there probably the batch of many similar movements where abound the strong personalities and the original ideas.

As a whole, the analytical movement could compose rather well with diversity. However, certain individuals worked out from the points of view theoretical or clinical at such point far away from the central designs of the Freudian psychoanalysis which they felt the need to break with the movement or were excluded from it. We approach here the dissidents who surround Freud, those which led it to create the secret committee dedicated to the backup of the psychoanalysis.

Overdetermination

2008-01-01T13:32:00.000-08:00

(Paul Klee Death and Fire)

Overdetermination describes Freud’s unconscious as a “thought factory” in analogy with an inexhaustibly productive team of weavers.

Freud was by no means the first neurologist to refer to the fact that symptoms appear to have multiple causation. He does seem to be one of the few in the late 19th century to be making claims such that multiple causation is the rule rather than the interesting exception. In Studies on Hysteria he points out that:

There is in principle no difference between the symptom’s appearing in a temporary way after its first provoking cause and its being latent from the first. Indeed the great majority of instances we find that a first trauma has left no symptom behind, while a later trauma of the same kind produces a symptom, and yet the latter could not have come into existence without the co-operation of the earlier provoking cause; nor can it be cleared up without taking all the provoking causes into account.

Overdetermination refers to all the provoking causes of an hysterical symptom. There is a hint here already of that Nachtraglichkeit--the activated-after-the-event-ness of the provocation--that Derrida picks up on in “Freud and the Scene of Writing” and which seems rather profoundly to suggest a notion of time not subordinated to the present.

The pattern is as follows: a trauma may have little or no effect at first yet a later trauma of a similar kind provokes a symptom by triggering off the provocation of the earlier trauma as well--a process which is continued repeatedly. It is also the pattern of the repetition compulsion (and is thus indicated by the function of the letter in Lacan’s reading of Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Purloined Letter”).

Later in Studies on Hysteria it is Joseph Breuer who first writes the actual word--although he does attribute it to Freud: “Such symptoms are invariably ‘overdetermined,’ to use Freud’s expression.” The word is überdeterminiert. When Freud employs a similar term at around this time it is überbestimmt. In the Dreambook the notion is pretty much taken for granted--a parenthesis explains to the reader why it is possible to have more than one interpretation of a dream: “The two interpretations are not mutually contradictory, but cover the same ground; they are a good instance of the fact that dreams, like all other psychological structures, regularly have more than one meaning.” The notion of meaning here should be referred to the notion of “provoking cause.” But later he defines it in the famous statement derived from Goethe’s Faust. Analysing a dream (his own) in which “botanical” is a nodal point (of condensations) he says: “Here we find ourselves in a factory of thought where, as in the Weaver’s masterpiece --

' . . . a thousand threads one treadle throws,
Where fly the shuttles hither and thither,
Unseen the threads are knit together,
And an infinite combination grows.'"

The factory of thought, or the textile, is explained thus: “The explanation of this fundamental fact can also be put another way: each of the elements of the dream’s content turns out to have been ‘overdetermined’--to have been represented in the dream-thoughts many times over.” In other words the textile unconscious is overdetermined by a plural and busy production team--actively producing, causing, provoking symptoms (like dreams and puns and jokes)--ad infinitum.

In Derrida the determination that escapes all determinations is what is referred to by the term differance--and it is this that gives all those other determinations their chance. Derrida’s reading of Freud (vigilant against his concepts) finds a language describing the psyche in terms of forces and resistances, and which consistently uses metaphors of retentive writing machines (the mystic writing pad for instance as memory) with inexhaustible receptivity. In other words the phenomenon of overdetermination is in fact an effect of the unconscious as reserve of repetition and a function therefore of the inexistent repeatability of the trace--overdetermining all provocations.

In terms of deconstruction this has interesting implications. Like Freud faced with a multiplicity of dream thoughts, the reader generally is faced with the question of where to begin (the beginning of Derrida’s Glas poses the problem with underestimated clarity). So Geoffrey Bennington, for instance, in “Derridabase,” writes: “The somewhere where you always start is overdetermined (surdetermine) by historical, political, philosophical, and phantasmatic structures that in principle can never be fully controlled or made explicit.” And as if in impossible exemplification, Derrida, at the bottom of the same page: "Consign them here, but why I wonder, confide to the bottom of this book what were my mother’s last more or less intelligible sentences, still alive at the moment I am writing this, but already incapable of memory, in any case of the memory of my name, a name become for her at the very least unpronounceable . . .”

Source:http://www.angelfire.com/de/jwp/deconstruction.html

Studying Personality

2007-10-15T17:54:00.000-07:00

Living with people is probably the best way to determine their personality, as many college roommates have found out. Unfortunately, living with someone, as a method of personality assessment, takes too long and is fraught with ethical implications. So, how do psychologists measure personality in a reasonable time and without ethical violations?

All of the methods below will be affected by one of the basic problems in any type of personality assessment, namely the discrepancy between self report and actual behavior. This problem may occur without subjects realizing it, and it highlights the fact the we are often unaware of the biases we possess about ourselves. We are often struck by the discrepancy in how others view us compared to how we see ourselves. For example, I was shocked to learn some years ago that students find me a fearful stimulus, because I consider myself as easy going and pleasant. My colleagues all laugh when I tell that story, so I guess they do not find me that easy going and pleasant either. Now, I take extra effort in the first few classes to appear less scary.

The problem of self-report and actual behavior may also be created intentionally. Often, we take pains to present a certain image to the rest of the world, and that image may not reflect our actual personality or behavior. Dating, for instance, has been criticized because people tend to try to project an image, rather than their true selves, while dating. When I have interviewed, for example, I wear a suit or a sport coat. But they are the only suit and sport coat I own. When I wear them on campus, jaws drop and people ask me why I am wearing them. More seriously, criminals and mental patients may have good reason to cover up their true natures and intentions in order to be discharged from prison or therapy, respectively. With the above in mind, let's examine a few methods for studying personality.

At first glance, an interview may not seem like a very sophisticated method for determining personality. However, a skilled interviewer may be able to determine and infer much from a short interview. Interviews come in two basic types. The structured interview treats all interviewees as similarly as possible in order to assess differences among them. Employment interviews or college admission interviews may be seen as structured interviews. Unstructured interviews are less rigid by definition. An interviewer conducting such interviews may allow each interview to follow its own unique path. Interviewees may be encouraged to pursue topics they have brought up. In the hands of practiced interviewers, unstructured interviews allow deeper penetration into the personality than do structured interviews. All serious decisions concerning therapy, admission to mental health in-patient therapy, or other such situations nearly always include one or more interviews.

Rating scales have been developed to provide a tool for quickly determining both your own personality and the personality of others. Rating scales of self are particularly subject to problems relating to self-knowledge. In other words, the better you know yourself, the better the rating will be. The same logic applies to ratings of others. An interesting problem with ratings, in general, is the halo effect. The halo effect states that extreme scores on one rating will affect nearby subsequent scores in the same direction. So, an extreme negative rating on an item will bias the next several items in a negative direction. The effect also holds for extreme positive ratings. In essay tests, you can exploit the halo effect by submitting your best answer first. Do not try it with me because I read essay tests by the question, not by the student, so that I may control for the halo effect.

Personality inventories have been discussed earlier. They include the 16 PF, the MMPI (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory), the CPI (California Personality Inventory), and many others. All of these techniques ask subjects a great many questions in a pencil-and-paper format, and then the answers yield scores on a number of scales. Those scale scores are usually reported in a standard way with lines connecting them, thus, the "personality profile." The MMPI also includes scales designed to check for random responding and faking "tough" or "nice." One should not rely on scores on inventories as the only method of assessment. But when used correctly, they provide a valuable shortcut to a quick view into an individual's personality.

Projective techniques originally stemmed from psychoanalytic theory. They were designed to tap into a person's unconscious without that person being aware of such probing. The most famous such technique is the Rorschach Inkblot test (see Handout 17 4). Subjects are asked to describe all of the possible things they perceive a particular inkblot to be. Responses are analyzed according to a prescribed method. Another projective test is the TAT or Thematic Apperception Test. In the TAT, subjects are shown a series of pictures of ambiguous situations. They are then asked to tell a story about the people in the picture: Who are they, how did they get there, what are they doing, what is going to happen? Suppose, for example, a picture of two women walking down a country road at sunset toward a small house in the background, is shown. If a subject says that they live in the house, are mother and daughter, they just had dinner, and are enjoying a quiet evening's walk, that is one thing. But, if the story is that the two women's car broke down nearby, they are walking toward the house for help, but will not get it because they will be harmed, then those two stories might prove useful in further questioning of each subject. Finally, the Draw-a-person type of test asks subjects to draw themselves, their family members, or even their houses. Their drawings are then interpreted. One 6-year-old girl I tested drew her parents and siblings as huge, and herself as very small. I interpreted that as a reflection of her perception of her role in the family. Projective tests can be very useful in individual cases, but are usually not used in making comparisons between subjects.

URLs

* Personality Tests on the WWW--index, basic, short, links, graphics
o Offers 21 links to on-line personality tests. Includes tests for type-A personality, left or right brain, assertiveness, and others. http://www.2h.com/Tests/personality.phtml
* Spending Personality Self-Test--interactive, basic, medium, links
o Page contains on-line version of commercially available test users may take in order to analyze their spending habits. http://www.ns.net/cash/selftest/selftest.html
* Somatic Inkblot Series--index, adv., short, links, graphics
o Home page of the Somatic Inkblot Series, dedicated to the use of projective techniques. The page has links to sample inkblots, a journal, membership information, and others. http://www.owt.com/sis/
* Keirsey Temperament Sorter--interactive, interm., long, links
o Users may take this personality test based upon Jung's theories. The test yields 16 combinations of personality types. http://www.keirsey.com/cgi-bin/keirsey/newkts.cgi
* Axiom Software Ltd.--index, basic, short, links, graphics
o Home page of provider of personality-profiling test, DISC, page has links to information on personality profiling and other topics. http://www.axiomsoftware.com/default.htm
* The Personality Tests--index, basic, short, links, graphics, Java
o Links to on-line interactive personality tests includes: Keirsey Temperament Sorter, Enneagram, Personality Profile, Color Test, and the Maykorner Test (requires Java). http://www.freshy.com/personality/index2.html

Ego, Id, Super-Ego

2007-10-15T17:53:00.001-07:00

The structure of the personality in psychoanalytic theory is threefold. Freud divided it into the id, the ego, and the superego. Only the ego was visible or on the surface, while the id and the superego remains below, but each has its own effects on the personality, nonetheless.

The id represents biological forces. It is also a constant in the personality as it is always present. The id is governed by the "pleasure principle", or the notion of hedonism (the seeking of pleasure). Early in the development of his theory Freud saw sexual energy only, or the libido, or the life instinct, as the only source of energy for the id. It was this notion that gave rise to the popular conception that psychoanalysis was all about sex, sex, sex. After the carnage of World War I, however, Freud felt it necessary to add another instinct, or source of energy, to the id. So, he proposed thanatos, the death instinct. Thanatos accounts for the instinctual violent urges of humankind. Obviously, the rest of the personality would have somehow to deal with these two instincts. Notice how Hollywood has capitalized on the id. Box office success is highly correlated with movies that stress either sex, violence, or both.

The ego is the surface of the personality, the part you show the world. The ego is governed by the "reality principle ," or a pragmatic approach to the world. For example, a child may want to snitch a cookie from the kitchen, but will not if a parent is present. Id desires are still present, but the ego realizes the consequences of brazen cookie theft. The ego develops with experience, and accounts for developmental differences in behavior. For example, parents expect 3-month infants to cry until fed, but, they also expect 3-year-olds to stop crying when told they will be fed.

The superego consists of two parts, the conscience and the ego-ideal. The conscience is the familiar metaphor of angel and devil on each shoulder. The conscience decides what course of action one should take. The ego-ideal is an idealized view of one's self. Comparisons are made between the ego-ideal and one's actual behavior. Both parts of the super-ego develop with experience with others, or via social interactions. According to Freud, a strong super-ego serves to inhibit the biological instincts of the id, while a weak super-ego gives in to the id's urgings. Further, the levels of guilt in the two cases above will be high and low, respectively.

The tripartite structure above was thought to be dynamic, changing with age and experience. Also, aspects of adult behavior such as smoking, neatness, and need for sexual behavior were linked to the various stages by fixation. To Freud, fixation is a measure of the effort required to travel through any particular stage, and great efforts in childhood were reflected in adult behavior. Fixation can also be interpreted as the learning of pattens or habits. Part of the criticism of psychoanalysis was that fixation could be interpreted in diametrically opposite fashion. For example, fixation in the anal stage could lead to excessive neatness or sloppiness. As noted earlier, Neil Simon's play, "The Odd Couple", is a celebration of anal fixation, with Oscar and Felix representing the two opposite ends of the fixation continuum (Oscar-sloppy, Felix-neat).

Source: http://peace.saumag.edu/faculty/Kardas/Courses/GPWeiten/C12Personality/EgoIDSuper.html

Ego Defense Mechanisms

2007-10-15T17:51:00.000-07:00

We stated earlier that the ego's job was to satisfy the id's impulses, not offend the moralistic character of the superego, while still taking into consideration the reality of the situation. We also stated that this was not an easy job. Think of the id as the 'devil on your shoulder' and the superego as the 'angel of your shoulder.' We don't want either one to get too strong so we talk to both of them, hear their perspective and then make a decision. This decision is the ego talking, the one looking for that healthy balance.

Before we can talk more about this, we need to understand what drives the id, ego, and superego. According to Freud, we only have two drives; sex and aggression. In other words, everything we do is motivated by one of these two drives.

Sex, also called Eros or the Life force, represents our drive to live, prosper, and produce offspring. Aggression, also called Thanatos or our Death force, represents our need to stay alive and stave off threats to our existence, our power, and our prosperity.

Now the ego has a difficult time satisfying both the id and the superego, but it doesn't have to do so without help. The ego has some tools it can use in its job as the mediator, tools that help defend the ego. These are called Ego Defense Mechanisms or Defenses. When the ego has a difficult time making both the id and the superego happy, it will employ one or more of these defenses:

DEFENSE	DESCRIPTION	EXAMPLE
denial	arguing against an anxiety provoking stimuli by stating it doesn't exist	denying that your physician's diagnosis of cancer is correct and seeking a second opinion
displacement	taking out impulses on a less threatening target	slamming a door instead of hitting as person, yelling at your spouse after an argument with your boss
intellectualization	avoiding unacceptable emotions by focusing on the intellectual aspects	focusing on the details of a funeral as opposed to the sadness and grief
projection	placing unacceptable impulses in yourself onto someone else	when losing an argument, you state "You're just Stupid;" homophobia
rationalization	supplying a logical or rational reason as opposed to the real reason	stating that you were fired because you didn't kiss up the the boss, when the real reason was your poor performance
reaction formation	taking the opposite belief because the true belief causes anxiety	having a bias against a particular race or culture and then embracing that race or culture to the extreme
regression	returning to a previous stage of development	sitting in a corner and crying after hearing bad news; throwing a temper tantrum when you don't get your way
repression	pulling into the unconscious	forgetting sexual abuse from your childhood due to the trauma and anxiety
sublimation	acting out unacceptable impulses in a socially acceptable way	sublimating your aggressive impulses toward a career as a boxer; becoming a surgeon because of your desire to cut; lifting weights to release 'pent up' energy
suppression	pushing into the unconscious	trying to forget something that causes you anxiety

Ego defenses are not necessarily unhealthy as you can see by the examples above. In face, the lack of these defenses, or the inability to use them effectively can often lead to problems in life. However, we sometimes employ the defenses at the wrong time or overuse them, which can be equally destructive.

Freud's Structural and Topographical Models of Personality

2007-10-15T17:50:00.000-07:00

Sigmund Freud's Theory is quite complex and although his writings on psychosexual development set the groundwork for how our personalities developed, it was only one of five parts to his overall theory of personality. He also believed that different driving forces develop during these stages which play an important role in how we interact with the world.

Structural Model (id, ego, superego)

According to Freud, we are born with our Id. The id is an important part of our personality because as newborns, it allows us to get our basic needs met. Freud believed that the id is based on our pleasure principle. In other words, the id wants whatever feels good at the time, with no consideration for the reality of the situation. When a child is hungry, the id wants food, and therefore the child cries. When the child needs to be changed, the id cries. When the child is uncomfortable, in pain, too hot, too cold, or just wants attention, the id speaks up until his or her needs are met.

The id doesn't care about reality, about the needs of anyone else, only its own satisfaction. If you think about it, babies are not real considerate of their parents' wishes. They have no care for time, whether their parents are sleeping, relaxing, eating dinner, or bathing. When the id wants something, nothing else is important.

Within the next three years, as the child interacts more and more with the world, the second part of the personality begins to develop. Freud called this part the Ego. The ego is based on the reality principle. The ego understands that other people have needs and desires and that sometimes being impulsive or selfish can hurt us in the long run. Its the ego's job to meet the needs of the id, while taking into consideration the reality of the situation.

By the age of five, or the end of the phallic stage of development, the Superego develops. The Superego is the moral part of us and develops due to the moral and ethical restraints placed on us by our caregivers. Many equate the superego with the conscience as it dictates our belief of right and wrong.

In a healthy person, according to Freud, the ego is the strongest so that it can satisfy the needs of the id, not upset the superego, and still take into consideration the reality of every situation. Not an easy job by any means, but if the id gets too strong, impulses and self gratification take over the person's life. If the superego becomes to strong, the person would be driven by rigid morals, would be judgmental and unbending in his or her interactions with the world. You'll learn how the ego maintains control as you continue to read.

Topographical Model

Freud believed that the majority of what we experience in our lives, the underlying emotions, beliefs, feelings, and impulses are not available to us at a conscious level. He believed that most of what drives us is buried in our unconscious. If you remember the Oedipus and Electra Complex, they were both pushed down into the unconscious, out of our awareness due to the extreme anxiety they caused. While buried there, however, they continue to impact us dramatically according to Freud.

The role of the unconscious is only one part of the model. Freud also believed that everything we are aware of is stored in our conscious. Our conscious makes up a very small part of who we are. In other words, at any given time, we are only aware of a very small part of what makes up our personality; most of what we are is buried and inaccessible.

The final part is the preconscious or subconscious. This is the part of us that we can access if prompted, but is not in our active conscious. Its right below the surface, but still buried somewhat unless we search for it. Information such as our telephone number, some childhood memories, or the name of your best childhood friend is stored in the preconscious.

Because the unconscious is so large, and because we are only aware of the very small conscious at any given time, this theory has been likened to an iceberg, where the vast majority is buried beneath the water's surface. The water, by the way, would represent everything that we are not aware of, have not experienced, and that has not been integrated into our personalities, referred to as the nonconscious.

Freud's Psychosexual Stages of Development

2007-10-15T17:49:00.000-07:00

David B. Stevenson '96, Brown University

Freud advanced a theory of personality development that centered on the effects of the sexual pleasure drive on the individual psyche. At particular points in the developmental process, he claimed, a single body part is particularly sensitive to sexual, erotic stimulation. These erogenous zones are the mouth, the anus, and the genital region. The child's libido centers on behavior affecting the primary erogenous zone of his age; he cannot focus on the primary erogenous zone of the next stage without resolving the developmental conflict of the immediate one.

A child at a given stage of development has certain needs and demands, such as the need of the infant to nurse. Frustration occurs when these needs are not met; Overindulgence stems from such an ample meeting of these needs that the child is reluctant to progress beyond the stage. Both frustration and overindulgence lock some amount of the child's libido permanently into the stage in which they occur; both result in a fixation. If a child progresses normally through the stages, resolving each conflict and moving on, then little libido remains invested in each stage of development. But if he fixates at a particular stage, the method of obtaining satisfaction which characterized the stage will dominate and affect his adult personality.
The Oral Stage

The oral stage begins at birth, when the oral cavity is the primary focus of libidal energy. The child, of course, preoccupies himself with nursing, with the pleasure of sucking and accepting things into the mouth. The oral character who is frustrated at this stage, whose mother refused to nurse him on demand or who truncated nursing sessions early, is characterized by pessimism, envy, suspicion and sarcasm. The overindulged oral character, whose nursing urges were always and often excessively satisfied, is optimistic, gullible, and is full of admiration for others around him. The stage culminates in the primary conflict of weaning, which both deprives the child of the sensory pleasures of nursing and of the psychological pleasure of being cared for, mothered, and held. The stage lasts approximately one and one-half years.
The Anal Stage

At one and one-half years, the child enters the anal stage. With the advent of toilet training comes the child's obsession with the erogenous zone of the anus and with the retention or expulsion of the feces. This represents a classic conflict between the id, which derives pleasure from expulsion of bodily wastes, and the ego and superego, which represent the practical and societal pressures to control the bodily functions. The child meets the conflict between the parent's demands and the child's desires and physical capabilities in one of two ways: Either he puts up a fight or he simply refuses to go. The child who wants to fight takes pleasure in excreting maliciously, perhaps just before or just after being placed on the toilet. If the parents are too lenient and the child manages to derive pleasure and success from this expulsion, it will result in the formation of an anal expulsive character. This character is generally messy, disorganized, reckless, careless, and defiant. Conversely, a child may opt to retain feces, thereby spiting his parents while enjoying the pleasurable pressure of the built-up feces on his intestine. If this tactic succeeds and the child is overindulged, he will develop into an anal retentive character. This character is neat, precise, orderly, careful, stingy, withholding, obstinate, meticulous, and passive-aggressive. The resolution of the anal stage, proper toilet training, permanently affects the individual propensities to possession and attitudes towards authority. This stage lasts from one and one-half to two years.
The Phallic Stage

The phallic stage is the setting for the greatest, most crucial sexual conflict in Freud's model of development. In this stage, the child's erogenous zone is the genital region. As the child becomes more interested in his genitals, and in the genitals of others, conflict arises. The conflict, labeled the Oedipus complex (The Electra complex in women), involves the child's unconscious desire to possess the opposite-sexed parent and to eliminate the same-sexed one.

In the young male, the Oedipus conflict stems from his natural love for his mother, a love which becomes sexual as his libidal energy transfers from the anal region to his genitals. Unfortunately for the boy, his father stands in the way of this love. The boy therefore feels aggression and envy towards this rival, his father, and also feels fear that the father will strike back at him. As the boy has noticed that women, his mother in particular, have no penises, he is struck by a great fear that his father will remove his penis, too. The anxiety is aggravated by the threats and discipline he incurs when caught masturbating by his parents. This castration anxiety outstrips his desire for his mother, so he represses the desire. Moreover, although the boy sees that though he cannot posses his mother, because his father does, he can posses her vicariously by identifying with his father and becoming as much like him as possible: this identification indoctrinates the boy into his appropriate sexual role in life. A lasting trace of the Oedipal conflict is the superego, the voice of the father within the boy. By thus resolving his incestuous conundrum, the boy passes into the latency period, a period of libidal dormancy.

On the Electra complex, Freud was more vague. The complex has its roots in the little girl's discovery that she, along with her mother and all other women, lack the penis which her father and other men posses. Her love for her father then becomes both erotic and envious, as she yearns for a penis of her own. She comes to blame her mother for her perceived castration, and is struck by penis envy, the apparent counterpart to the boy's castration anxiety. The resolution of the Electra complex is far less clear-cut than the resolution of the Oedipus complex is in males; Freud stated that the resolution comes much later and is never truly complete. Just as the boy learned his sexual role by identifying with his father, so the girl learns her role by identifying with her mother in an attempt to posses her father vicariously. At the eventual resolution of the conflict, the girl passes into the latency period, though Freud implies that she always remains slightly fixated at the phallic stage.

Fixation at the phallic stage develops a phallic character, who is reckless, resolute, self-assured, and narcissistic--excessively vain and proud. The failure to resolve the conflict can also cause a person to be afraid or incapable of close love; As well, Freud postulated that fixation could be a root cause of homosexuality.
Latency Period

The resolution of the phallic stage leads to the latency period, which is not a psychosexual stage of development, but a period in which the sexual drive lies dormant. Freud saw latency as a period of unparalleled repression of sexual desires and erogenous impulses. During the latency period, children pour this repressed libidal energy into asexual pursuits such as school, athletics, and same-sex friendships. But soon puberty strikes, and the genitals once again become a central focus of libidal energy.
The Genital Stage

In the genital stage, as the child's energy once again focuses on his genitals, interest turns to heterosexual relationships. The less energy the child has left invested in unresolved psychosexual developments, the greater his capacity will be to develop normal relationships with the opposite sex. If, however, he remains fixated, particularly on the phallic stage, his development will be troubled as he struggles with further repression and defenses.

Source: http://www.victorianweb.org/science/freud/develop.html

Freud' Stages of Development

2007-10-15T17:46:00.000-07:00

Now we turn to developmental theories, and the most famous, historically, is psychoanalytic or Freudian theory. This theory sprung from Freud's observations of adults' recollections in therapy of their lives. Children were not directly observed. Although Freud's theory has been roundly criticized for its lack of scientific character, it does stand however as a grand metaphor for describing personality.

Freud's theory has three main parts, the stages of development, the structure of the personality, and his description of mental life. Here, the stages of the personality will be discussed.

Again, only from adult recollections did these stages emerge. The first stage is the Oral Stage. It runs from birth to age 2. In the oral stage infants and toddler explored the world primarily with their most sensitive area, their mouths. They also learn to use their mouths to communicate. The next stage is the Anal Stage. In the anal stage, children learned to control the elimination of bodily wastes.

The Phallic Stage (3-5 years of age) is probably the most controversial. The word phallic means penis-like. In this stage, children discover their sexual differences. The controversy comes from Freud's description of the Oedipus (for males) and Electra (for females) complexes, with their attendant concepts of castration anxiety and penis envy, respectively. Those complexes lead, according to Freudian theory, to normal differentiation of male and female personalities. The defense mechanism of repression was invoked to explain why no one could remember the events of this stage.

The phallic stage is followed by a Latency Period in which little new development is observable. In this stage, boys play with boys, and girls with girls, typically. Sexual interest is low or non-existent.

The final stage is the Genital Stage. It started around 12 years of age and ends with the climax of puberty. Sexual interests re-awaken at this time (there were sexual interests before, dormant and repressed from the phallic stage).

Neo-Freudian approaches added more stages (Erikson) and/or altered Freud's emphasis on psychosexual development. Those approaches will be discussed on a below.

Source: http://peace.saumag.edu/faculty/Kardas/Courses/GPWeiten/C12Personality/FreudStages.html
Freud's Stages of Development--tutorial, basic, short, links. Provides capsule descriptions of Freud's stages of development: oral, anal, phallic, latency, and genital. http://idealist.com/children/freud.html

Sigmund Freud's Self-Analysis

2007-10-15T17:42:00.000-07:00

by Jean Chiriac, President of AROPA

Freud's self-analysis started in the mid 1890's to reach its climaxes in 1895 and 1900. In certain authors' opinion, it was continued up to his death in 1939. Nevertheless, we have to set a clear boundary between the time of Freud's discovery of the Oedipus complex and other essential contents of psychoanalysis and routine self-analysis he performed to check his unconscious psychic life.

The first phase is full of unexpected aspects and inventiveness - the productive, creative stage. The second becomes an obligation derived from his profession as a psychoanalyst.

Freud's discoveries during his first stage of self-analysis are known to have been included in two of his main books: "The Interpretation of Dreams" and "The Psychopathology of Everyday Life".

"The Interpretation of Dreams" provides plenty of Freud's dreams in his own interpretation, among which the famous dream of Irma's injection, which he considers a key issue in understanding the mysteries of dream life. It opens Chapter II ("The Method Of Interpreting Dreams: An Analysis Of A Specimen Dream") and provides material for an analysis covering several pages ahead.

Just as Freud himself maintained, the analysis of the dream is not complete but it was here that Freud for the first time asserted that dreams are the disguised fulfilment of unconscious wishes.

The explanation of the dream is quite simple: it tries to hide Freud's lack of satisfaction with the treatment given to a patient of his, Irma, and throw the guilt of partial failure upon others, exonerate Freud of other professional errors it also hints at.

Dream interpretation also provides a dream psychology and many other issues. The volume is extremely inventive and rich in information, and, in its author's view, it is his most important work.

"The Psychopathology of Everyday Life", offers Freud room to focus on the analysis of faulty and symptomatic actions, the important thing to emphasize here being that this volume represents Freud's transfer from the clinical to normal life - it proves neurotic features are present not only in sickness but also in health. The difference does not lie in quality but in quantity. Repression is greater with the sick and the free libido is sensibly diminished. Therefore, it is for the first time in the history of psychopathology that Freud overrules the difference between pathology and health. That makes it possible to apply psychoanalysis to so-called normal life...

* Discovery of the Oedipus Complex

The discovery of Oedipus' complex is indicated in a historic letter Freud wrote to Fliess, his friend and confidante.

I have found, in my own case too, [the phenomenon of] being in love with my mother and jealous of my father, and I now consider it a universal event in early childhood, even if not so early as in children who have been made hysterical.

Freud adds a few more important details to his confession:

If this is so, we can understand the gripping power of Oedipus Rex, in spite of all the objections that reason raises against the presupposition of fate; and we can understand why the later «drama of fate» was bound to fail so miserably.

The Greek legend touches upon an urge "which everyone recognizes because he senses its existence within himself. Everyone in the audience was once a budding Oedipus in fantasy and each recoils in horror from the dream fulfillment here transplanted into reality, with the full quantity of repression which separates his infantile state from his present one."

Together with these remarks, essential for psychoanalytic practice and theory, the buds of applied psychoanalysis also emerge. Freud links the Oedipus complex to Hamlet.

Fleetingly the thought passed through my head that the same thing might be at the bottom of Hamlet as well. I am not thinking of Shakespeare's conscious intention, but believe, rather, that a real event stimulated the poet to his representation, in that his unconscious understood the unconscious of his hero. (1)

In its monograph of Freud's biography, Peter Gay asserts that "The method Freud used in his self-analysis was that of free association and the material he mainly relied upon was that his own dreams provided". But he didn't stop there: "[Freud] also made a collection of his memories, of speaking or spelling mistakes, slips concerning verse and patients' names and he allowed these clues to lead him from one idea to the other, through the "usual roundabouts" of free association." (2)

One of the most beautiful examples of self-analysis can be found in his letter to Romain Rolland, entitled "A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis".

The disturbance occurred as follows: In the summer of 1904, after prolonged hesitation, Freud suddenly traveled to Athens in the company of his brother Alexander. Once up on the Acropolis, instead of the expected admiration, he was enveloped by a strange feeling of doubt. He was surprised that something he had been learning about at school really exists. He felt divided in two: one person who empirically realized his actual presence on the Acropolis and the other that found it hard to believe, as if denying the reality of the fact.

In the mentioned text, Freud tries to elucidate this feeling of strangeness, of unreality. He then showed that the trip to Athens was the object of wish mingled with guilt. That was a desire because, from his early childhood even, he had had dreams of traveling expressing his wish to evade the family atmosphere, the narrow-mindedness and poverty of living conditions he had known in his youth.

On the other hand, there was also guilt, as for Freud going to Athens meant getting farther than his own father, who was too poor to travel, to uneducated to be interested in these places. To climb the Acropolis in Freud's mind was to definitely surpass his father, something the son was clearly forbidden to. Let us resort to Freud's own words:

But here we come upon the solution of the little problem of why it was that already at Trieste we interfered with our enjoyment of the voyage to Athens. It must be that a sense of guilt was attached to the satisfaction in having gone such a long way: there was something about it that was wrong, that from earliest times had been forbidden. It was something to do with a child's criticism of his father, with the undervaluation which took the place of the overvaluation of earlier childhood. It seems as though the essence of success was to have got further than one's father, and as though to excel one's father was still something forbidden. ("A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis".)

Fliess' friendship certainly provided Freud the dialectic relationship that psychoanalytic dialogue (or rather monologue) allows. Fliess was the "idealized other", the one who supposedly knew and understood (even appreciated) the analyst's efforts. In fact, self-analysis is of course only possible by projection.

In his letter of November 14th 1897, Freud wrote: "Self-analysis is impossible in fact. I can only analyze myself by means of what I learn from the outside (as if I were another). Were things different, no disease would have been possible otherwise but through projection".

* The Difference between Self-analysis and Introspection

The practice of introspection has its origins in St. Augustus' Confessions. It is thus defined as an analysis of our mind's contents that are directly accessible and ethical in character as it launches a debate on the relationship between moral man, which he longs to be, and immoral man, which he is by birth.

Augustin does not understand dreams and thinks it is God who is responsible for their emergence. There is no trace here of any knowledge of the unconscious mind, of the way it works works. This is the field of Christian psychology which only assumes a horizontal dimension of analysis.

Self-analysis does not deal with known things any more. Having known facts as a starting point, the self-analyser goes deep into the world of his unconscious life and leaves aside the ethic criterion for a while. Conscious psychic manifestations are connected to their unconscious roots and can be explained through the latter.

In this self-analysis God vanishes and with him the guilt of the self-analyser. Moreover, the investigation of unconscious needs resorting to the special investigation methods psychoanalysis has introduced: free associations, dream-analysis, work with slips and symbols, etc.

In short we may say that whereas introspection does nothing else but (re)integrate us into the level of our social values, psychoanalytic self-analysis offers us the opportunity of a radical change in our inner and outer being from the perspective of a reevaluation of these social values .

Notes:
1. October 15, 1897, Masson, J.M. (1985) (Ed.) "The complete letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess", 1887-1904. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
2. Translation by M. Cristea.

*Translation by Mihaela Cristea

Source:www.freudfile.org

Psychoanalysis Applications: Modern Problems of Religion

2007-08-15T16:06:00.001-07:00

By Jean Chiriac, President of AROPA

The most striking crisis of modern religious feelings today may be its inability to define the image of God from a theological, moral and cult related perspective.

For some people, God is anthropomorphic and governs mortals' lives from his heavenly abode; for others, he is a metaphysical spirit or entity, a principle, cosmic energy, universal conscience, the very carbon as the elementary structural unit of matter. In one word, God may be anyone and anything.

The more serious thing is that by applying a kind of unifying rule to all these states, people go further to apply the peculiarities of a mystic God to all its expressions. That is how total confusion is brought about with regard to the object of faith.

Secondly, faith itself as finality , a horizon of expectance and hope is ambiguous.

Christian faith, as well as all archaic faith in general, leads to redemption: Resurrection, Eternal Life, the Happy Isles, etc. Primitive populations' faith is related to the relationship with the tribe's ancestors or totemic symbol and brings about protection, well being and health. The same is true for rudimentary faiths.

For modern man though, faith brings redemption no more - it is a profession of faith and no one wonders about its finality. Faith becomes a social emblem , just like citizenship or ethnic background, for instance.

This very confusing context regarding faith, its finality and object makes one wonder about the contribution psychoanalysis can make to the study of these issues.

My opinion is that psychoanalysis may partially touch on all these aspects. It can tell us a lot about unconscious resources of faith, of its finality and object. Up to one point, it can even interfere with the much "stickier" field of religious experiences. Let us remember Freud, so convincingly writing about the oceanic feeling, underlying all religious experience, which he reduces to the newly born's diffuse and confused perception in its first moments of life ("Civilization and its Discontents" - 1930).

Psychoanalysis Applications: Child Counseling and Psychoanalysis

2007-08-15T16:05:00.001-07:00

What we should take into consideration when we confront
the difficulties in children's behavior.

By Jean Chiriac, President of AROPA

One of the applications of psychoanalysis is in the field of children's education. This field could be divided in several categories: psychoanalysis of the child up to five years, psychoanalysis of the puberty and the one of the teen-age. Each of these stages, as we could expect, presents their own peculiarities and difficulties. We wouldn't insist upon each of them, but we'll try to sketch the trends in approaching child's problems.

The development of psychoanalysis during the first decades of the last centuries, the increase of the number of the adherents to its techniques led to a sort of excessive appreciation of its virtues. Soon, psychoanalysis was thought to understand everything, and especially to interfere in every sphere of human life with an absolute authority. The alarm signals of the specialists who were not psychoanalysts and were severely criticizing the superficiality of the psychoanalysts, who were approaching fields that exceeded the proper therapy in a one-sided and even nonscientific manner, didn't come to any echo for a long time. Psychoanalysis claimed for a prominent position, if not even the main position in the study of mythology, religion, sociology, anthropology, work of art, etc.

Also in the field of education and pedagogic the involvement of psychoanalysis generated specific works. For example: Stekel's book, one of the first disciples of the Freudian psychoanalysis: "Psychoanalytical Recommendations for Mothers". The work abounds in suggestions and guidelines addressed to mothers, things that seem to be consecrated by experience and which are above any doubts.

When we read such books, we could think that psychoanalysts finally worked out the toilsome matter of child's education.

The same happens with the works of A. Adler, who later on deviated from the Freudian movement, but didn't gave up that attitude of omniscient sufficiency concerning the education problem. Everyone who reads Adler's books and has some acquaintance with psychoanalysis is stricken by the many and grievous errors made by the author when he approaches children problems. Adler's mistakes also result from his ardent wish to see that his working assumptions are confirmed rather than to have a natural scientific relationship with the studied phenomena, as a cautious observer.

The enthusiasm manifested by the psychoanalysts when they hasten to annex the field of child's education, which was justified when psychoanalysis was spreading due to the originality of the new discoveries, is not justified in reality. I mean that leaving out the indications and suggestions that come from the common sense experience (such as: it's not right to beat the child because he revolts and, moreover, this is a cruel and blameworthy method, etc.), those which could be derived from the psychoanalytical theories could hardly be taken into consideration seriously. I don't mean to say that Freud's sexual theory that also embraces infantile sexuality is improper. The infant child really has a curiosity concerning the anatomy and activity of his/her sexual organs, curiosity that could become unhealthy when repressed. However, this curiosity is not, in most cases, anything else but curiosity or, as it was also called epistemophily. Psychoanalysts did not profoundly approach the exploring curiosity. Or it was here and there connected or derived from the interests of sexual nature...

In other words, I want to say that the psychoanalytical works dedicated to the education of the child are not by far so complete as they seem to be. The classical works were written under the momentary impulse of the first psychoanalytical discoveries and are characterized rather by a prepossessed spirit than by a scientifical one. They are more useful to the promotion of psychoanalysis to the great public than to the psychoanalytical knowledge itself. Consequently, they couldn't be taken into consideration.

The later works also bear the consequences of the same error: the dogmatical application of the psychoanalytical theory. The well-known work of Françoise Dolto is also included to this category!

The conclusion called for is that we could not expect these works to give us some collections of counsels in readiness, which are generally valid and applicable to the sphere of child's education. Those parents who wish to rise to the emergency of their difficult task wouldn't find inside these books a complete lesson that could be learned by heart. Child's education is a living and direct process, which requires our total, physical and spiritual participation and calls for an opening toward its problems, which is free from any preconceived ideas, even psychoanalytical. This opening that reminds, in fact, of the attitude of the psychoanalyst – reserve/caution, suspended/poised attention – imposed by Freud himself, is useful for exploring the significance of the infantile behavior. Of course that our experience with our own unconscious protects us against the counter-transference, namely the temptation to project upon our child our own childhood experiences, our expectations, which were those of our parents, etc., but this experience results from our own analysis rather than from the analysis of someone else (even children). Consequently, it's obvious that a parent who wants to help his/her child should, first of all, know and be able to analyze himself/herself.

Nota bene:
- Self-analysis also brings up our memories from our childhood. Meditating on them, with the mind of the nowadays adult, we could better understand the significance of the psychological mechanisms that operate in the first years of life and are expressed by drams, delusions, and various symptoms. The self-analysis is by this way the starting point in the extremely difficult process of child's education.

- In the second place, we should give up by any means to the dogmatical ideas concerning education. All the automatic goads such as: "you should do this or that", must be filtered by the faculty of reasoning: why do we have to do this thing or that thing? The collective experience also collected a lot of worthless stuff, which has to be eliminated if we want to have a sound relationship with our child.

- In the third place, last but not least, we need genuine love for the child. Love gets to know in other ways. It has something magical and saving when it's exercised freely, without any dogmatical constraints. Love is the most reliable path to know the needs of your fellows. If there is no love or compassion, our mind will try to fill this void of relationship with well-known things, which are often, as we tried to show here, totally erroneous.

Experience proves that child's education shouldn't be established on a priori ground. The knowledge in this delicate field is extremely flexible. Therefore, when we deal with works concerning this field, even reference works, we should act extremely cautiously.

Paper published on this site.
Translation by Ochea Corina

Psychoanalysis Applications: Symbol and Symbolism with Freud and Jung

2007-08-15T16:03:00.000-07:00

By Jean Chiriac, President of AROPA

What is a symbol? For Freud it has always been a one-term comparison. For example, if we compare a hat to a cloud, the cloud is the symbol replacing the hat as its perfect substitute. As a result, symbols can be interpreted – both those in dreams and those brought about by free associations or coming from cultural and spiritual representations.

In his work "Introductory Lectures of Psycho-Analysis" (1916-1917), Freud provides us with a list of symbols that may occur in dreams, compared to sexual elements (symbols are not all sexual, of course). Generally speaking, they may be classified as objects and actions evoking or representing sexual life, sexual arousing, the anatomy of sexual organs, their behaviour (such as the erection of the male genitals). Here are a few examples:

Books quoted in this paper

- Sigmund Freud:
Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis

- C.G. Jung:
Psychology of the Unconscious: A Study of the Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido

The male genitals, then, are represented in dreams in a number of ways that must be called symbolic, where the common element in the comparison is mostly very obvious. To begin with, for the male genitals as a whole the sacred number 3 is of symbolic significance. The more striking and for both sexes the more interesting component of the genitals, the male organ, finds symbolic substitutes in the first instance in things that resemble it in shape - things, accordingly, that are long and up-standing, such as sticks, umbrellas, posts, trees and so on; further, in objects which share with the thing they represent the characteristic of penetrating into the body and injuring - thus, sharp weapons of every kind, knives, daggers, spears, sabres, but also fire-arms, rifles, pistols and revolvers (particularly suitable owing to their shape). In the anxiety dreams of girls, being followed by a man with a knife or a fire-arm plays a large part. This is perhaps the commonest instance of dream symbolism and you will now be able to translate it easily. Nor is there any difficulty in understanding how it is that the male organ can be replaced by objects from which water flows - water-taps, watering-cans, or fountains - or again by other objects which are capable of being lengthened, such as hanging-lamps, extensible pencils, etc. A no less obvious aspect of the organ explains the fact that pencils, pen-holders, nail-files, hammers, and other instruments are undoubted male sexual symbols.

The female genitals are symbolically represented by all such objects as share their characteristic of enclosing a hollow space which can take something into itself: by pits, cavities and hollows, for instance, by vessels and bottles, by receptacles, boxes, trunks, cases, chests, pockets, and so on. Ships, too, fall into this category. Some symbols have more connection with the uterus than with the female genitals: thus, cupboard, stoves and, more especially, rooms. Here room-symbolism touches on house-symbolism. Doors and gates, again, are symbols of the genital orifice. Materials, too, are symbols for women: wood, papery and objects made of them, like tables and books. Among animals, snails and mussels at least are undeniably female symbols; among parts of the body, the mouth (as a substitute for the genital orifice); among buildings, churches and chapels. Not every symbol, as you will observe, is equally intelligible. (Freud - Complete Works. Ivan Smith 2000. All Rights Reserved.)

Nevertheless, there are symbolic circumstances reiterated in all people's dreams and, in Freud's perspective, they all bear the same significance. Dreams of flying, for example, fall into this category and are explained by sexual type contents too:

…Dreams can symbolise erection in yet another, far more expressive manner. They can represent the sexual organ as the essence of the dreamer's whole person and make him himself fly. Do not take it to heart if dreams of flying, so familiar and often so delightful, have to be interpreted as dreams of general sexual excitement, as erection-dreams. Among students of psycho-analysis, Paul Federn has placed this interpretation beyond any doubt; but the same conclusion was reached from his investigations by Mourly Vold, who has been so much praised for his sobriety, who carried out the dream-experiments I have referred to with artificially arranged positions of the arms and legs and who was far removed from psycho-analysis and may have known nothing about it. And do not make an objection out of the fact that women can have the same flying dreams as men. Remember, rather, that our dreams aim at being the fulfilments of wishes and that the wish to be a man is found so frequently, consciously or unconsciously, in women. Nor will anyone with knowledge of anatomy be bewildered by the fact that it is possible for women to realize this wish through the same sensations as men. Women possess as part of their genitals a small organ similar to the male one; and this small organ, the clitoris, actually plays the same part in childhood and during the years before sexual intercourse as the large organ in men. (Freud - Complete Works. Ivan Smith 2000. All Rights Reserved.)

]

* Jung's opinion

It is interesting to see the way in which the theory on symbols and symbolism is different in Freud and Jung. Jung is known to have been Freud's disciple for a long time, even the follower appointed to carry on his work. Nevertheless, Jung took another way, accusing the excessive involvement of sexuality in etiology. Later on, he focussed on the study of the archetypal unconscious. The symbol was the object of extended study. In Jung's opinion, the symbol shows some unknown reality. There is no comparison here to replace an object with its substitute. For Jung, the symbol refers to a psychic content that has never been the object of personal experience. The symbol of the cross, for example - which, may we add, can get a sexual significance with Freud - with Jung it undoubtedly refers to the idea of conjunctio, a unification of contraries, where antagonistic elements, specifically conscious and unconscious merge in a unity that goes beyond the boundaries of human consciousness. The symbol therefore describes an experience (or the bias to one) of extreme complexity including but not limited to instinctual life.

Sexuality in itself is the symbol of a different reality not limited to instinctual life. Jung makes open reference to that, which has in fact led to his separation from Freud and the Freudian movement. Here we quote an excerpt from his work "Psychology of the Unconscious: A Study of the Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido."

There certainly exist dreams and typical dream patterns whose meaning is easily unravelled if considered in the perspective of sexual symbols. We could use this way of seeing things without necessarily concluding that the content thus expressed is itself of sexual origin. We know that language is full of erotic metaphors that may be applied to contents that have no relationship with sexuality whatsoever. At the same time, we are aware sexual symbolism by no means implies that the concern that used it were sexual in nature itself. Sexuality is one of the most significant instincts and it makes the basis and cause for the countless emotions, which are known to persistently influence language. Emotions and sexuality cannot be entirely identified as they may come from a certain conflicting situation: for example, the preservation instinct may also give rise to numerous emotions.

The following dream belongs to a woman and it is less complicated: she can see Constantine's triumph arch. There is a cannon at the front, a bird on the right and a man on the left. The cannon is thundering, the missile hits her and goes into her pocket, into her wallet. The dreamer holds the wallet as if there were something precious inside. The image then fades and all she can see is the cannon with Constantine's adage written above: "In hoc signo vinces". The sexual symbolism of this dream is extremely clear to substantiate the naive person's bothered wonder. If one proves the dreamer herself is unaware of the dream's sexual allusions and that these compensate for a gap in her conscious guidance, then the dream is actually interpreted. If, on the contrary, that is a current interpretation and familiar to the dreamer, it then is no more than meaningless repetition. In such case we have reason to suspect that sexual symbolism is used as dream language just as any other manner of speaking". ("Psychology of the Unconscious…").

To conclude, we may say that, whereas in Freud's opinion symbols refer to some sexual content, Jung thinks the symbol, without completely excluding sexuality, requires a much more complex reality. It is of course hard to admit that the cross, the central symbol of Christianity, could be reduced down to some sexual interpretation. The cross is a cuaternity and, referring to that notion we may add speculations related to the philosophy of elements that was familiar to Ancient Greece but also to Middle Ages alchemy. The same cross (the swastika) evokes a turn (an alternative movement) familiar to Taoist philosophy - the movement of the Heaven or the Tao of Heaven – where Yin and Ying principles succeed to each other. The cross is finally a reference to Christ's crucifixion, a central symbol of normative and esoteric Christian belief.

Translation by Mihaela Cristea.

Psychoanalysis Applications: Therapy by Faith

2007-08-15T16:02:00.000-07:00

By Ovidiu Dima

Jesus healing
Jesus healing a blind man
Therapy by faith is no late discovery. It pervades the "New Testament", related as it is to Jesus Christ's life and divine mission on Earth. The Holy Books are abundant in stories of miraculous healing performed by Jesus and his disciples. Their authors mainly quote those cases when Jesus approaches his "patients" by asking: "Do you trust me I can heal you?"

Right after the healing (quite often performed in the absence of patients themselves, by means of a human agent confident in Jesus' charisma), Jesus would say: "It's been your faith that has saved you". What do his words mean?

Belief in Jesus and his healing capacities involve some strong emotional excitement, some devotional fervor. That which psychically characterizes the faith phenomenon is the strong stimulation of the Eros - a sublimated Eros, of course, freed from its sexual function. That Eros in fact represents the agent and vehicle of healing.

The transfer of love stimulated by Jesus' charismatic person (but also by that of nowadays' therapists, people with a reputation and a public image) is also known to therapy by hypnosis. Psychoanalysis itself is well acquainted with emotional transfer and its beneficial effect on the patient. In one of his letters to his younger fellow scientist Jung, Freud stated that the main agent for the healing of neurotic people is the fixation of the unconscious libido - providing the strength necessary to the "perception and translation of the unconscious".

In other words, where there is love on the patients' part, one can notice their beneficial participation in the healing process. After all, Freud would conclude, what we are dealing with here is healing by love. And this specific healing shows that "neuroses depend on erotic life".

The above also simply demonstrate the range of diseases accessible to therapy by faith. Jesus' "patients" mostly suffered from diseases palsy, blindness, psychomotor disabilities, etc.

Whereas today almost all specialists have agreed on the psychic nature of these diseases in biblical casuistry, they say, we are dealing with neurotic disorders and mainly hysteria.

The fact that these specific diseases (hysteria) have to do with disorders of the Eros is no more novelty to anyone. Therefore, the deliverance of the Eros from traumatic or moral inhibitions is the main credit of therapy by belief.

Collective healing by hypnosis
A collective healing by hypnosis performed by a hypnotherapist
There are diseases in the Holy Books, nevertheless, that cannot be reduced to some traumatic etiology - the so-called initiation disorders. But we shall deal with these on a later opportunity.

We shall limit ourselves now to saying that love (with or without some material object) generally has therapeutic value. Where there is love, there is little room for neuroses. And love can be stimulated by faith. Faith in Jesus, in his beneficial charisma or in the healing "abilities" of a therapist in flesh and blood.

Paper first published in OMEN - Psychoanalytic Journal , no. 1, 1998.
Translation by Mihaela CristeaPs

Psychoanalysis Applications: Psychoanalysis and Religion

2007-08-15T16:01:00.000-07:00

By J.C. Popa

After Freud's example, psychoanalysis is well known to have adopted a critical, atheist position towards religion. The following fact is less known: the atheism of psychoanalysis does not originate in some nihilistic, irrational opposition to religion. It springs from two important considerations that the present article is going to explain.

* From obsessional neurosis to religion

First of all, experience acquired in psychoanalytic therapy - and we mean obsessional-fobic neuroses mainly - has revealed striking similarities between ritual-religious behavior and the conduct of obsessive neurotic persons. Hence, the widely spread assertion that religion is nothing but obsessional neurosis stretched to collective scale. The overestimation of mental activity, of wish, more specifically the belief in the power of thoughts to materialize concrete realities can in fact be found in both the obsessive neurotic person and in animist magic practices, expanded in the ritual of prayer. Neurotic persons are obsessed with the materialization of their hostile wishes and defend themselves against such threats by assuming defensive psychic positions, in fact truly extremely intricate rituals associating the weirdest of superstitions. We can meet similar in religious practices, with one amend though: with religious ideology, evil is projected outside the individual, personified in satanic, demonic images. The exteriorisation of the intra-psychic conflict (1) gives way to the illusion of a life and death struggle between the worshipper and autonomised Evil. Biblical tales about demonized people and exorcising rituals also present in Christian Church are the practical consequences of this ideology.

It was then shown that belief in an anthropomorphic, almighty God originates in impressions and feelings in the individuals' childhood that were initially related to their parents' images. Children feel vulnerable confronted with surrounding nature and therefore they look for refuge next to their parents, endowed with supernatural powers. The fact that we can find belief in God with adults too should not come as a surprise. Adult life is no less exposed to real and imaginary dangers! Adults' extended knowledge on nature and society does not shield them from anxiety; on the contrary: the more they know, the more they can realize the void of their knowledge. Hence the need for divine protection and the restoration of infantile relationships - endowed with religious significance - with parental imago.

The fact that, at the beginning, the child does not make clear distinction between maternal and paternal protection explain both the equal distribution of religions of the Mother and the ambivalent character of God - Father (He is merciful, forgiving but also rough, uncompromising, a tyrant and a devastator). Is it no surprise for us that in many religions God is even called "Father"? We could add: an idealized father mainly preserving His numinous qualities (2).

As already shown in short, experience psychoanalysis acquired in the therapeutic field can pretend some reevaluation of religious conduct. It is as true, at the same time, that it does not consume all deeds of religious life. In this sense, Jungian psychoanalysis, seemingly going beyond the "limited" perspective of Freudian psychoanalysis, has identified the archetype of religious life in human soul. This archetype, (= pattern of behavior) is the empirical basis C. G. Jung laid his entire conception of individuation on (3). We conclude that, from the perspective of psychoanalysis, the revision of religious experience has imposed an atheist attitude with regard to religion centered on the deification of parental image. This has to do with the same complex of ideas, representations and mystic rituals related to the exacerbation of obsessional neurosis.

* Scientific Exigency

Secondly, we have to demonstrate that psychoanalysis participates in the so-called scientific mentality. It lays stress on the investigation of phenomena, on the rational reflection on their nature. Rejecting the famous saying "Trust and don't search", scientific exigency focuses on what we call "research". In addition, it includes the possibility to reproduce similar phenomena, according to natural laws derived from studied phenomena. When the famous French doctor Charcot was able to hypnotically induce certain hysteria symptoms to his patients, he then scientifically proved that hysteria is no organic disturbance (even if it assumed a certain constitutional bias towards such manifestations). The influence of this demonstration, quite amazing at the time, was also felt in the elaboration of psychoanalytic methods and theories. Speculating things a little, we could say that psychoanalysis wouldn't have been born unless Freud the scientist had witnessed these demonstrations himself (4). The psychiatry of the time had been engulfed in materialist conceptions maintaining that neurotic disturbances - that were to be studied of psychoanalysis later on - were due either to patients' simulations or to symptomatic effects of their "burdened" heredity or to somatic lesions as yet undiscovered.

To conclude, let us formulate things as follows: psychoanalytic practice and experience, scientific exigency are responsible for assuming an atheist position with regard to psychoanalysis. But we then saw that the atheism of psychoanalysis is no parti pris once and forever. Psychoanalysis takes no glory in the unconditioned repression of belief in God. The entire Jungian work, in the field of religious life archetype, of the individuation process show the extremely up-to-date and concrete way in which psychoanalysis understands to creatively approach the problem of religion.

Notes:
1. The outward projection of Evil is a vivid phenomenon also present in neurotic disturbances, mainly in psychotic ones. In paranoid delirium, for instance, the patient has the sharp feeling of some prejudice, some evil made to him from the outside. The patient ascribes his own feelings to characters in their own social sphere.
In religious conduct, the outward projection of Evil spares the human subject an explanation with his/her own moral censorship. Even more, this procedure offers an extremis solution towards humans' moral rehabilitation: if Evil is projected, then it can also be symbolically suppressed by means of the scapegoat practice, for instance, or by exorcising and purification rites, so widely spread in religious communities.
The Good too is sometimes projected, in instances when we are told that the divine being is the expression of the highest perfection (it does not participate, in any way, or only transitorily, to our earthly condition). In that case, the exigency of becoming morally perfect (as in the urge: "Be perfect as your Father in the Heavens!"), imposes on the individual the illusion of some future rehabilitation depending on his/her efforts in belief and prayer.
2. The term "numinous" refers to those aspects inspiring paroxysmal feelings in the series terror - ecstasy.
3. The process of individuation refers to the accomplishment of the Self in Jungian understanding. A process of conjunction of the contraries, of union between conscious and unconscious, in short of unification of the being. This process is not restricted to moral integration - it also involves emotional integration.
4. Between 1885-1886, Freud had a stage with Charcot in Paris. He presents the vivid memories from his scientific evolution in his later writings and autobiographical specifications

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*Translation by Mihaela Cristea.

Psychoanalysis Applications: Psychoanalysis and Fairy-Tales

2007-08-15T16:00:00.000-07:00

A definition of the fairy-tale should include the idea of artistic creation and also the one of aspiration of the human soul. Therefore, a collective aspiration which found a way of expressing itself through what we call fairy-tale (a form of written and oral literature).

Of course, another characteristic feature of fairy-tale is its fantastic structure. In fairy tales we find supernatural beings and experiences. That's why fairy-tale had among its functions one related to the pleasure of following stories in which the borders of the sensitive world are overreached.

Although, beyond its fantastic character we find aspirations without anything fantastic, shared by people (or by collective soul).

In the fairy-tale "Youth without Aged and Life without Death" we find collective and individual aspirations. The hero's birth in this fairy- tale brings about the messianic expectances of the people: people hoped to have an intelligent/enlighten ruler as Emperor Solomon, says the fairy- tale. But the hero doesn't taste the public life and chooses the search of immortality as the ideal of this ego.

The fairy-tale explains us that at birth the child was crying in his mother's belly and that's why, in order to calm him, he was promised youth without aged...

At the age of adolescence he refuses any social temptation and asks his parents to keep their promise. Thus he goes in search of this ideal, helped by the fantastic horse and by many other magic instances.

At first sight, the analysis of this fairy- tale doesn't raise any difficulties - it is not about unconscious desires, but about clear ideals.

But psychoanalysis doesn't linger on the level of the ego's analysis. It pierces through the crust of appearance and deepens in the investigation of the unconscious processes. There, in the depth of the unconscious mind it finds the resorts of the conscious world, of the motives consciously stated.

In our case, the hero's desire must be understood differently as relating to his refuse to grow up. The title of the fairy-tale may be also translated as it follows: "Forever Youth". But what does this mean?

A life fixed at the first years level, when the child lives in osmosis with his mother, who offers him protection and food without asking nothing in exchange. His whole libido has as object his own body as a source of pleasure with the occasions of satisfying the organic needs and of cultivating the erogenic zones. At this level sexuality is not yet genital. We have, thus, the pre-eminence of partial instincts.

All psychoanalysts do not, of course, admit this interpretation. Jung would certainly reject it, accusing it of reduction, and proposing a totally different one, in which the characters and the conflicts of the fairy-tale are symbols of our inner world.

picture
The wolf as prima materia devours the dead King; in the background: the sublimation of prima materia and the king's rebirth.
Jung states explicitly that fairy-tales as well as myths are collectively elaborated fragments of some inner experiences which are alike in all respects with what he called individuation process.

Thus, to give a single example, the emperor in the fairy-tales is not a substitute for father (as at Freud), but a symbol of Jungian's SELF. This symbolic figure describes or personifies an autonomous complex of archetypal nature, which comes from the depths of the collective soul to get control over the subject's ego.

The symbol of the emperor is extremely often used in alchemist literature where it gets various meanings. There, for example, it represents an Ego incarnation which changes during the individuation process -in symbolic terms it dies in order to rebirth, renewed. In this way, in the work "Psychology and Alchemy" we see an illustration which bears the following significance: The wolf as prima materia devours the dead King; in the background: the sublimation of prima materia and the king's rebirth.

The king's rebirth - under the shape of the king's young son - represents the Ego's rebirth that was restructured through the infusion of a new spirit-ghost. It is the crowning of the individuation process, when the ego integrates the contents of the archetypal and personal unconscious.

Paper by Jean Chiriac
Translation by Nicoleta Onisoru

Applied Psychoanalysis

2007-08-15T15:59:00.002-07:00

There is a branch of psychoanalysis that we can hardly connect with the neurosis or its therapy. This is called applied psychoanalysis . It was Freud's contribution that laid its foundations - Freud being the author of some famous extra-clinical works like "Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's Gradiva" (1907), "Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood" (1910), "Totem and Taboo" (1912-1913), etc. They dealt with mithology, anthropology, religion and biography of famous persons.

Many specialist are actually still wondering whether psychoanalysis has the right to interfere into fields that has nothing to do with the psychoclinical work. In fact, this question doesn't takes into account since - willingly or not - all human activites share a fundamental element, that is the human soul. Or the human soul or psyche (since they are identical) are the very objects of psychoanalytic interest.

Otherwise, Freud had to study mythology, for example, because, even from the very beginning of the development of psychoanalysis, there were some persons of his circle that drew his attention to some striking similarities between the results of the clinical research and the mythological motifs and the religious ideas.

About Case Study in Psychoanalysis

2007-08-15T15:59:00.001-07:00

Psychoanalytical casuistry is the most exciting domain of psychoanalysis. And that is because when reading a case analysis, we are usually inclined to apply psychic investigation methods upon ourselves and ponder on the conclusions.

case analysisThe casuistry published for the use of our readers, nevertheless, is no easy job. For lay audiences personally inexperienced with psychoanalysis, many of its statements may seem risky. That is why case reporting requires a lot of skill, the more so as the unconditional discretion rule must also be met!

In addition, the conditions for web publication impose a limitation of editing space and no comprehensive account of the analyzed individual' personal history will therefore be available. Everything is limited to a few hints the author of the article (and of the analysis too) provides hoping to render an as complete image as possible of the analyzed individual's psychic background. AROPA

A Case with a Legacy

The best method to acquire the psychoanalytical technique is to allow yourself to be psychoanalyzed. Just as with swimming, there's nothing you can do unless you go beyond theoretical information and dare dive to see the why and the how for yourself...

No matter how much we tried to simplify things, when the uninitiated are introduced to psychoanalyzed cases, we have to keep in mind that eloquence alone cannot replace the live experience of self-analysis. Our readers will certainly understand the impediment.

An example of successful analysis in record time will get us somewhat acquainted with the psychoanalytical technique. Several other illustrations will follow, without pretending to bring the subject to a close…

Ours is the case of a lady we shall call Amelia, about 35, married and the mother of a 10-year old; she works for an important company in X. The woman complains of a troublesome symptom: persistent insomnia. "persistent", as it defies any kind of conventional treatment. "Night after night, I make desperate efforts to sleep". She succeeds towards dawn, when, actually exhausted, she finally falls asleep.

To her sleeplessness, there adds a weird mood of apprehension, an uneasiness psychoanalysts use to call anxiety. My question is:
- What brings about this condition?
- Something like an anticipation; as if I were expecting something and were not sure what...
- Would you please try to remember some circumstance when you experienced the same thing? I insist.
- Exams, maybe, when I was at school? Or, Christmas Eve rather, when I used to wait for Santa. Or, why not, when I would plan a trip or a celebration and would eagerly count every minute to it...
- Any trouble at work, I ask, any tests, exams for a higher position or things like that?
- None, came the unwavering reply, nothing special.

I then inquire about Amelia's economic standing. I find both she and her husband earn enough to make a decent living. There would be room for some additional income, though. "You know how it goes", she adds, " the more you have, the more you want".

I consider the associations Amelia has made concerning her anxiety. Exams, Christmas, Santa, family celebrations and reunions with friends etc. Anxiety is obviously a state of anticipation, just like when you are looking forward to an extremely important event you crave for. But what could that event be? Let us also keep in mind her insomnia, suggesting the same powerful, irrepressible experience. Sleeplessness and anxiety go hand in hand. Both are indicative of an intense concentration of emotions towards a certain direction we expect a lot from...

Psychoanalysts often need moments of insight, more precisely the feeling they know what a certain case is about. Theirs is an intuitive job (which we also call empathy ). That "clairvoyance" urges us to articulate it and, obviously, ask patients the key question giving instant clarification to the nature of their disturbance. In this case, the question I asked was:
- Do you happen to have a dying relative, are you looking ahead to some inheritance?
The answer was immediate, betraying Amelia's bewilderment:
- Yes! It's my uncle, she assured me, he's over 80 and he's awfully rich!
- Are you his heiress?
- His one and only heir!, she specified.
- Your case is solved then, I replied. Your eagerness to get the inheritance is to blame for both your insomnia and your anxiety. Given your uncle's age, you think the long dreamed-of moment for getting your heritage is drawing nearer by the day. Hence your anxious anticipation and sleeplessness, betraying your wish for this moment to arrive as soon as possible, just as you used to eagerly wait for your Christmas presents.

NB: Not all psychoanalyzed cases are solved on the first session. The case above was a "fortunate case", which is a rare occasion. But let us keep one thing in mind: although aware of her own wish (to lay hands on the inheritance), the patient was unable to relate it to her symptoms; hence her concern for her own health. The meaning of her symptoms clarified, Amelia was reassured (the enigma of the disease itself is reason for concern) and she was finally able to get back her wholesome sleep.

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Translation by Mihaela Cristea

Dream Interpretation: Dreaming about Dying

2007-08-15T15:58:00.001-07:00

By Jean Chiriac

Generally speaking, death cannot be represented in dreams as such, as it is no psychic content to be experienced, lived. Hence the conclusion that, when dreams about dying do occur, we have to interpret this in a completely different direction.

Personally, I have had no such dreams but seemingly dreams about dying are not infrequent. We have to conclude that such dreams are also part of the category of collective dreams, shared by many people.

Another dream about dying is that when one is aware of one's invisibility, at the same time being able to watch what everybody else is doing. The explanation would be that there are people who would like to put their fellows' love on trial and therefore produce dreams picturing themselves as dead, in order to be able to see the others' reaction. There are also sadistic persons willing to emotionally blackmail their fellows and whose dreams simulate death in order to receive more affection. Such persons displace what they would like to do in real life to the province of dreams. Nevertheless, in dreams about dying (sometimes symbolic death, as in dreams about invisibility) death is just a tool dreamers use to meet their own affection needs related to their likes.

There are yet dreams about the death of others - more or less close people. When dreaming about the death of close people, we have to discover some adverse feelings. Dreamers re-enact these feelings of adversity for relatives and friends, etc, in their dreams (feelings usually placed in one's childhood). Such feelings nevertheless are only very rarely present under their real shape and therefore corresponding dreams have to be interpreted in a different manner too.

When dealing with dreams about dying we also have to take into account the symbolism of death. Death is a structural transformation of the being - during the Ego development process we often undergo successive symbolic deaths and re-births: something of us is dying and another thing is emerging.

Death in dreams finally may point to a contrary meaning: birth, life, etc. In this context, this specific aspect should be considered in the interpretation of death.

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Translation by Mihaela Cristea

The "Key of Dreams" and Psychoanalysis

2007-08-15T15:57:00.001-07:00

A comparative analysis of the classical and psychoanalytical
method in the interpretation of dreams points out striking similitudes.

By Horia Vasilescu

In his peerless work dedicated to dreams and their interpretation in psychoanalysis - Traumdeutung ["The Interpretation of Dreams", 1900] - Freud also mentions the famous "keys of dreams", these genuine interpretation guides of common use. Considering the fact that the popular mentality grants signification to the dreams, unlike the scientists contemporaneous with him to whom dreams appear only as aberrant nervous manifestations, Freud doesn't linger in bringing them forward in a critical manner.

A "key of dreams" is, in fact, a "deciphering method", " because it treats the dream as a secret writing, in which case every sign is translated by a correspondent sign, by means of a certain key" (1). Starting from the deciphered key words, all we have to do is to comprise them in a relation, regarded in a future's prospect. Because, we shouldn't forget, in the popular mentality dreams are always premonitions concerning future events.

- Sigmund Freud:
The Basic Writing of Sigmund Freud (The Interpretation of Dreams)

- Artemidorus:
Interpretation of Dreams: Oneirocritica

- Macrobius
Commentary on the Dream of Scipio

- Eric R. Dodds
Greeks and the Irrational

That's how we could use such a "deciphering method". Let's suppose I have dreamt the following: I went to the station to take up the train and I suddenly discovered that I had forgotten my luggage home.
I open a key of dreams and find out that: "going by train" means "a trouble that lies in wait for you from an unexpected direction". "Luggage" means "good news" or "rapid unexpected enrichment". "To forget" (the luggage) - "something you don't know about yet, but you'll find out in its season"; "news (from the other end of the world)".
It's easy to elaborate the interpretation of dream if I build up a logical connection between all these elements: Overnight enrichment due to a misfortune (probably decease) of a distant person (relative); inheritance.

There is another alternative to this method, Freud continues, expounded in the writings of Artemidor from Daldis: "Here we take into account not only the content of the dream, but also the personality and circumstances of the life of the author of the dream: so-and-so detail has different significances from one individual to another, as he/she is rich or poor, married or single, orator or merchant"(2). What is characteristic to this proceeding is the fact that "the interpretation doesn't take into account the whole dream, but each of his content elements, as if the dream would be a conglomerate in which each mineral fragment demands a special determination"(3).

"The deciphering method", Freud concludes, cannot be used in the scientific treatment of the dreams. Because it depends upon a "key", and therefore it lacks any warrant"(4). It's impossible for us to detect how was drawn up this correlation between the raving element and its significance from the "key of dreams". For instance, we can't see how we could come from "going by train" to "trouble that lies in wait for you from an unexpected direction", or from "luggage" to "good news, rapid unexpected enrichment".

* Psychoanalytical method

We must emphasize that psychoanalysis doesn't consider dreams as a product of our mantic aptitude, neither as gods' messenger. The scientific approach, which Freud himself hints at, rejects those "virtues" of the dream that cannot pass the examination of the scientific investigation.
As far as it concerns him, Freud states that dream is always the hallucinating expression of a repressed wish. He insists on the fact that the interpretation cannot be deprived of the dreamer's associations, of his recollections and impressions that the elements of the dream, considered separately, evoke to him. In the above quoted dream, Freud would obtain the following information:

- Travel by train . It suggests to the dreamer a travelling manner, which he doesn't like. Because it's uncomfortable. He (the dreamer) prefers to go by his personal car, especially when he spends his weekend in a trip to the mountains or at the seaside.

- Forgetting luggage. The dreamer complains of the fact that, from some time, he noticed a suspect change of his character. He forgets easily, he is absent-minded, confused, inattentive, with his thoughts far away. All these happenings, apparently harmless annoy him. Adding to these, he was never so "scatter-brained" and, of course, he imitates his wife, who embodies the distraction itself, by this behavior.

Further examining dreamer's impressions, Freud would find out that dreamer's wife behaves like a "little princess" to him, arrogant and all airs and frills, she looks down on her husband, she treats him with an air of self-satisfied superiority. The conclusion of the dream imposes so without saying: it expresses dreamer's wish to change places with his wife (this is where the idea of imitating her comes from), for him to be "the prince" and his wife "the servant"(5).

*

Freud's statement that dream is the accomplishment of an unconscious desire creates the impression that psychoanalysis brought a revolutionary contribution in the realm of interpretation. Because it is supposed to posses, in this regard, a vision considered as "scientific", radically opposite to the popular or traditional one.

The facts are not at all like that. Anyone that studies the classification of dreams in the Antiquity period, and I especially refer here to Macrobius' work "Comments upon Scipio's vision", would notice that the tradition also remarked the dreams with a "scientific" content, the same type as those approached by psychoanalysis.

On short, Macrobius distinguishes four categories of dreams. Three of them are interesting to the interpretation effort, while the last one remains, so to say, the appanage of common people. The first three categories include: symbolical dream, vision dream and oracular dream (6). The last one refers to the dreams that comes from the nocturnal ebullition of our daytime impressions. We could clearly notice that the last category defines the dreams examined by Freud.

The conclusion imposing to us as a consequence of the above-mentioned (facts) would be: the ancient mentality also had the knowledge of the dreams of "profane" nature, namely those that aren't worth to interpret them, but which, later on, represented the subject matter of the psychoanalytical "scientific" research. On the other hand, it's obvious that, being interested in the "profane" dreams, having doubts concerning the traditional mentality, from a scientific position, Freud ignored the sacred dreams (the first three categories at Macrobius). He gave the sensation that these could be included to the chapter of desire-dreams, familiar to him, when they are not the result of the poetical creation or of an ideological conjuncture.

Notes:
1. S. Freud, "The Interpretation of Dreams", Science Publishing House, 1993, p. 91.
2. Ibid. p. 92.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. It's clearly understood that the dream is not fully interpreted through psychoanalytical method illustrated here. We have restricted to an example of psychoanalysis applied to dream, simplified at the most.
6. The symbolical dream "covers in metaphors, as in a riddle, a significance that cannot be understood without interpretation". The vision dream, horama, "is a premonitive development of a future event". The oracular dream, or chrematismos, is recognized when, while sleeping, the parent of the person who dreams or some other respected or impressive person, maybe a priest or a god, reveals, without any help of the symbols, what will happen, what should or shouldn't be done". (Eric R. Dodds, "Greeks and the Irrational", Meridiane Publishing House, 1983, p. 130).

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Translation by Ochea Corina

Dream Interpretation and Psychoanalysis (2)

2007-08-15T15:55:00.000-07:00

In the first pages of his work "New Introductory Lectures On Psychoanalysis", dated December 6th 1932, Sigmund Freud clearly asserts that the theory of dreams "occupies a special place in the history of psychoanalysis and marks a turning-point; it was with it that analysis took the step from being a psychotherapeutic procedure to being a depth-psychology" . The theory of dreams is the most characteristic and singular aspect of psychoanalytic science, "something to which there is no counterpart in the rest of our knowledge, a stretch of new country, which has been reclaimed from popular beliefs and mysticism."

Dream analysis, in psychoanalysis, provides the possibility to decipher the mystery of neurotic disorders, specifically hysteria, and secondly, it opens the road towards unconscious. Freud's phrase: "The interpretation of dreams is the royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious" has become famous. (1)
The first great dream related intuitions were materialized in 1895, when Freud considered he had discovered the mystery of dreams. That concerns the famous dream of Irma's injection, which Freud almost thoroughly analyzed and published in his grandiose work "The Interpretation of Dreams" (1900).
Dream was approached in a manner, which was to become specific for the practitioners of psychoanalysis: by means of the dreamer's associations.

Dream analysis (details are provided in the quoted book) reveals Freud's feelings of guilt towards Irma, one of his young patients, whose treatment had not yielded the expected results. Freud defends himself from these negative feelings in his dream, blaming his very patient who, apparently, were not a submissive and compliant patient, or dr. Otto, one of his colleagues, guilty of a careless medical intervention (an injection with an infected syringe).
After analyzing his dream, most coherent as it proved, Freud justly declared that dreams "are not meaningless, they are not absurd; they do not imply that one portion of our store of ideas is asleep while another portion is beginning to wake. On the contrary, they are psychical phenomena of complete validity - fulfilments of wishes [our emphasis J.C.]…" Dreams therefore require integration into the range of intelligible waking mental acts; "they are constructed by a highly complicated activity of the mind". (op. cit., chapter "A Dream is the Fulfilment of a Wish".)

This assertion in fact expresses a great opening towards the activity of abysmal psyche, and mostly the belief in psychic determinism, in the idea that all psychic deeds have their own meaning and connect to day activities, even in a somewhat less visible manner. Contrary to the general opinion of his time's scientific world, Freud thinks dreams are a coherent psychic activity, that can be analyzed in depth.

Nevertheless, the comprehensive definition of the dream includes other discoveries too, the true sign of Freudian approach original character: "a dream is a (disguised) fulfilment of a (suppressed or repressed) wish". (op. cit., chapter "Distortion in Dreams".)

This definition emphasizes two key aspects of the theory of dreams: 1. Dreams are a disguised fulfilment of a wish, and 2. This is repressed wish. We can therefore conclude that disguise is caused by repression. That is the reason why all dream researchers before Freud were not able to discover these facts: they only analyzed the manifest content of the dream, that is its outer shape at wakening time, its façade, not caring about latent thoughts giving rise to its becoming, thoughts we reach by means of the method of associations devised by Freud.

Freud goes even further to analyze the nature of distortion by the dream, partially the work of dream-censorship and partly of dream-work , a complex process by means of which latent thoughts are turned into dreams as such. Freud's analysis includes dream-work, and the end of his book also provides us his opinions concerning the psychology of the dream process: primary and secondary processes, repression, unconscious, etc.

That is why "The Interpretation of Dreams" represents the major work on dreams and unconscious life, not equaled so far! It remains an essential stage in the study of psychoanalysis!In spite of the importance of dream-analysis for the discovery of abysmal psyche functioning as well as for therapy as such, this crucial field of psychoanalysis has no more concerned psychoanalysts after Freud's research. The same work quoted at the beginning of the present article records Freud's own bitter remark: "In the earlier volumes [of Internationale Zeitschrift für (ärztliche) Psychoanalyse (2)] you will find a recurrent sectional heading 'On Dream-Interpretation', containing numerous contributions on various points in the theory of dreams. But the further you go the rarer do these contributions become, and finally the sectional heading disappears completely."

In spite of this constant lack of concern for dream theory, lack of regard nowadays materialized in schematic, abstract approach of dream in psychoanalytic therapy, the importance of this area of research is crucial. That is why we have to give it the place it deserves.

Notes:
1. "…it is the securest foundation of psychoanalysis and the field in which every worker must acquire his convictions and seek his training. If I am asked how one can become a psychoanalyst, I reply: By studying one's own dreams."("New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis".)
2. "The International Journal of Psychoanalysis".

---------------------
Paper by Jean Chiriac
Translation by Mihaela Cristea

Dream Interpretation in Psychoanalysis

2007-08-15T15:53:00.002-07:00

Interpretation of dreams is the most exciting field of psychoanalysis. Many messages we receive require the interpretation of dream symbols or dreams themselves. The fascination dreams exert on us is surely a result of the belief that dreams convey messages outside ourselves, coming from spiritual entities or God himself, messages either showing us what is about to happen or warning against unpleasant future events.

* Dreams and the unconscious

First we should agree that this is not the context predictive, spiritual, that psychoanalysis approaches dreams in. Dream interpretation in psychoanalysis is a tool aiding in the discovery of psychic contents - latent ideas which represents repressed emotions and drives - within the unconscious mind, contents pathologically manifest in neurotic symptoms. Dreams interpretation is the royal path to unconscious, as Sigmund Freud holds.

It is also Freud who first opened the road to the use of dream interpretation/analysis as a means of psychic investigation.

This less spectacular aspect imposed by psychoanalysis should never be overlooked when visiting pages dedicated to dream interpretation on this site. Articles published here do have this constant trait: shared preoccupation for the technical approach of dreams, in the spirit of the psychoanalytic use of interpretation.

Recommendations

Dream Interpretation by Sigmund Freud
Sigmund Freud's
Dream Interpretation
Here are a few very useful reference works for anybody willing to study dreams - the term "study" being the best in this context:

icon Sigmund Freud is the author of a monumental work on dream interpretation, irreplaceable to this day: The Interpretation of Dreams . An abridged version of the book has also been produced, bearing the same title and addressing the wider public. You may follow these links to Amazon.com bookstore:

*
* The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud... the Dream Interpretation
Dream Interpretation

icon The study of dreams can be historically pursued if you take our online course on dream-interpretation. Further information here. There is a downloadable PDF version of our online course on dream interpretation which may be purchased from here.

iconYou may learn more on dream interpretation in psychoanalysis by taking our initiation into psychoanalysis email course, module 4.

Psychoanalytic Techniques

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As we know, psychoanalysis is a method of investigating the unconscious mind. This task imposes the necessity of applying some special investigating "tools" like:

iconAnamnesis - which resembles perfectly to a certain extent the classical anamnesis known in the practice of general medicine. Usually, the interpretation of the biographic (personal) events during the psychoanalytical cure is sufficient to be able to settle the neurotic frame of the individual's psychopathology.

iconFree associations method - Freud's most striking invention and many times neglected by the specialists. Gathering the free associations produced by the patient makes possible a direct access to his psychic, private intimate conflict, and altogether it reveals the analyst a vivid image of the neurotic etiology of the subject analyzed.

online psychoanalytic courseOnline introduction to the psychoanalytic techniques

Learn about psychoanalytic techniques by taking our initiation into psychoanalysis email course, module 4.
Learn more...

icon The interpretation of faulty acts (slips and mistakes) - another remarkable contribution of the father of psychoanalysis. For most of us the "faulty acts", as for instance lapses, slips of all kinds have no contextual significance for our psychic life. Freud is the first to detect the logic of the faulty acts, starting from the premise, acknowledged in practice, of the determinism of all our psychic manifestations.

iconThe interpretation of dreams - based on the ideas and examples published in Freud's Interpretation of Dreams issued in 1900.

iconThe interpretation of symbols - in the same way characteristic of psychoanalysis, the symbols - be it delirious, or those related to archetypal situations - bring their contribution, by their interpretations, to the neurotic aethiology.

What is Psychoanalysis

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Psychoanalysis is a method for the investigation of mental processes inaccessible by other means. At the same time, psychoanalysis is also a therapeutic method for neurotic disorders.

Freud on Tabor street
Sigmund Freud is the creator of psychoanalysis (here Freud on Tabor Str by Joachim Torr)
As therapeutic technique, psychoanalysis is different from psychiatry and psychotherapy in general, as it stipulates the existence of a psychic unconscious, and insists on analysis and the integration of the contents of unconscious as therapeutic procedure.

The psychoanalysis gradually built on clinical observation and research, accompanied by reflections and theoretical ideas concerning the structure of the psychic apparatus, the dynamic of mental processes, repression, resistance, transference, and more...

iconDefinition of psychoanalysis includes knowledge acquired from psychic unconscious research and analysis. Such knowledge has gradually made up a new body of science called psychoanalysis.

iconPsychoanalysis is also applied to the study of social, cultural, and religious phenomena. In this latter aspect, demanding for a re-evaluation of the mechanisms and meanings of culture, psychoanalysis has penetrated the consciousness of the wider public beyond its therapeutic limits.

Psychoanalysis was Born in Vienna

Psychoanalysis was born in Vienna by the end of the 19th century and spread with the contribution of Freudian disciples and dissidents, who, more or less loyal to Freudian theories, have issued currents and schools of psychoanalysis with various shades of difference. That is the case of analytic psychology forged by C. G. Jung, as well as that of individual psychology, made up by Alfred Adler.

online psychoanalysis courseOnline Psychoanalysis Course
Study psychoanalysis online by following our course especially designed for beginners. Learn more...

Psychoanalysis together with elements of psychoanalytical doctrine and practice are also to be found in modern psychotherapeutic currents, under various shapes and blends.

Sigmund Freud on Psychoanalysis

Psycho-analysis is the name (1) of a procedure for the investigation of mental processes which are almost inaccessible in any other way, (2) of a method (based upon that investigation) for the treatment of neurotic disorders and (3) of a collection of psychological information obtained along those lines, which is gradually being accumulated into a new scientific discipline. (From "Two Enciclopaedia Articles", 1923)

Psycho-analysis may be said to have been born with the twentieth century; for the publication in which it emerged before the world as something new - my Interpretation of Dreams - bears the date '1900'. But, as may well be supposed, it did not drop from the skies ready-made. It had its starting-point in older ideas, which it developed further; it sprang from earlier suggestions, which it elaborated. (From "A Short Account of Psycho-Analysis", 1924)

Freud […] made an alteration in their technique, by replacing hypnosis by the method of free association. He invented the term 'psycho-analysis'. (From "Psycho-Analysis", 1926). AROPA

A Brief Outline of Psycho-analytic Theory

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Freudian, Lacanian and Object Relations Theory

Freudian Theory

Freud's psychoanalytic theory, coming as it did at the turn of the century, provided a radically new approach to the analysis and treatment of "abnormal" adult behavior. Earlier views tended to ignore behavior and look for a physiological explanation of "abnormality". The novelty of Freud's approach was in recognizing that neurotic behavior is not random or meaningless but goal-directed. Thus, by looking for the purpose behind so-called "abnormal" behavioral patterns, the analyst was given a method for understanding behavior as meaningful and informative, without denying its physiological aspects.

The Pre-Oedipal Stage

Freud claimed that all human beings are born with certain instincts, i.e. with a natural tendency to satisfy their biologically determined needs for food, shelter and warmth. The satisfaction of these needs is both practical and a source of pleasure which Freud refers to as "sexual". Thus, when the infant, sucking at its mother's breast discovers the pleasure inherent in this activity, the first glimmers of sexuality are awakened. The child discovers an erotogenic zone which may be reactivated later in life through thumbsucking or kissing. Through this intimate interaction with the mother, upon whom the child is dependent, a sexual drive emerges. As this drive is separated out from its original function as a purely biological instinct, it achieves a relative autonomy.

During the early stages of childhood development, other erotogenic zones emerge. The oral stage, associated with the drive to "incorporate" objects through the mouth, is followed by the anal stage during which the anus becomes an erotogenic zone as the child takes pleasure in defecation. This pleasure is characterized by Freud as "sadistic" because the child is understood to be taking delight in expulsion and destruction. The anal stage is also associated with the desire for retention and possessive control (as in "granting or withholding" the faeces).

The next stage the child enters is the phallic stage when the sexual drive is focused on the genitals. (Freud refers to this stage as "phallic" rather than "genital" because, he claims, only the male organ is recognized as significant.)

What is happening in this process -- though the stages overlap, and should not be seen as a strict sequence -- is a gradual organization of the libidinal drives, but one still centred on the child's own body. The drives themselves are extremely flexible, in no sense fixed like biological instinct: their objects are contingent and replaceable, and one sexual drive can substitute for another. What we can imagine in the early years of the child's life, then, is not a unified subject confronting and desiring a stable object, but a complex, shifting field of force in which the subject (the child itself) is caught up and dispersed, in which it has as yet no centre of identity and in which the boundaries between itself and the external world are indeterminate. Within this field of libidinal force, objects and part-objects emerge and disappear again, shift places kaleidoscopically, and prominent among such objects is the child's body as the play of drives laps across it. One can speak of this as an 'auto eroticism', within which Freud sometimes includes the whole of infantile sexuality: the child takes erotic delight in its own body, but without as yet being able to view its body as a complete object. Auto-eroticism must thus be distinguished from what Freud will call 'narcissism', a state in which one's body or ego as a whole is 'cathected', or taken as an object of desire.[1]

The child in this state is described by Freud as "anarchic, sadistic, aggressive, self-involved and remorselessly pleasure-seeking" -- wholly within the grip of the pleasure principle. It is also ungendered. That is to say, even though it is riddled with sexual drives, it draws no distinction between the gender categories masculine and feminine.

The Oedipus Complex: Gendering the Subject

At the center of Freud's theory of childhood development is the Oedipus Complex. According to Freud, a boy's close relation to his mother, as the primary love-object, leads to a desire for complete union with her. A girl, on the other hand, who is similarly attached to the mother and thus caught up in a "homosexual" desire, directs her libido (love, sexual energy broadly construed) toward her father (for reasons which we'll consider shortly). This produces a triadic relationship regardless of one's sex, with the parent of the same sex cast in the role of a rival for the affections of the parent of the opposite sex.

The boy will eventually abandon his incestuous desire for his mother out of fear of being castrated by his father. (This fear arises when the boy comes to realize that females are "castrated" and imagines that this may be his fate if he does not subordinate his desire for the mother.) Thus, the boy represses his incestuous desire, adjusts to the reality principle, and waits for the day when he will be the patriarch. In this way the boy identifies with his father and the symbolic role of manhood.

The girl's route through the Oedipal stage is far more problematic in Freud's view. "Realizing" that she is castrated and thus inferior, the girl turns away from her similarly castrated mother and attempts to "seduce" her father. When this fails, she returns to the mother and identifies with her feminine role. However, she still envies the penis that she will never have; so she unconsciously substitutes a desire to have her father's baby. (How she goes about giving up this desire is not made clear. Since she is already "castrated", fear of castration will not do the job.)

Needless to say, Freud's theory shows little insight into femininity and the experience of women. His claim that female sexuality is a "dark continent" says as much.

The Unconscious

As we say, the unconscious is that part of the mind that lies outside the somewhat vague and porous boundaries of consciousness, and is constructed in part by the repression of that which is too painful to remain in consciousness. (Not everything in the unconscious is repressed. However, repression is the ego's primary defense against disruption.) Freud distinguishes repression from sublimation -- the rechanneling of drives that cannot be given an acceptable outlet. The unconscious also contains what Freud calls laws of transformation. These are the principles that govern the process of repression and sublimation. In general we can say that the unconscious serves the theoretical function of making the relation between childhood experience and adult behavior intelligible.

Ego, Id and Super-Ego

According to Freud, the ego is an aspect of the subject that emerges from the id -- the biological, inherited, unconscious source of sexual drives, instincts, and irrational impulses. The ego develops out of the id's interaction with the external world. It is produced from the non-biological (social and familial) forces brought to bear on one's biological development and functions as an intermediary between the demands of the id and the external world.

Thus, the ego can be thought of as a variable aspect of the subject constructed as a system of beliefs that organize one's dealings with the internal and external demands of life according to certain laws referred to by Freud as secondary process. It reconciles the biological, instinctual demands and drives (both unifying and destructive in nature) of the id (governed by primary process) with the socially determined constraints of the super-ego (internalized rules placing limits on the subject's satisfactions and pleasures) and the demands of reality.

The healthy, mature ego translates the demands of both the id and the super-ego into terms which allow admission of them without destruction. Thus, constructive acceptance and transformation of the demands made by both the id and the super-ego are techniques of the ego and essential elements of mental health.

Psychoanalytic therapy involves reliving repressed fantasies and fears both in feeling and in thought. This process involves a transference, i.e. a projection of the attitudes and emotions, originally directed towards the parents, onto the analyst. This is necessary for successful treatment. Access to these repressed fears is gained often through dream interpretation, where the manifest content in dreams is understood as a symbolic expression of the hidden or latent content. (Internal censorship demands that the wish be transformed, leading to a disguised or symbolic representation.) The sources of dream content results from

*
lost memories
*
linguistic symbols
*
repressed experiences
*
"archaic" material inherited but not directly experienced.

Dreams are "guardians of sleep", i.e. wish fulfillments that arise in response to inner conflicts and tensions whose function is to allow the subject to continue sleeping. Dream-Work is the production of dreams during sleep -- the translation of demands arising from the unconscious into symbolic objects of the preconscious and eventually the conscious mind of the subject. Dream Interpretation is the decoding of the symbols (manifest content) and the recovery of their latent content, i.e. the unconscious and, hence, hidden tensions and conflicts that give rise to the dreams in the first place.

Problems

Some of the problems typically raised in response to Freudian theory are:

1. Freud's hypotheses are neither verifiable nor falsifiable. It is not clear what would count as evidence sufficient to confirm or refute theoretical claims.
2. The theory is based on an inadequate conceptualization of the experience of women.
3. The theory overemphasizes the role of sexuality in human psychological development and experience.

Lacanian Theory

The Imaginary

French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan has reinterpreted Freud in structuralist terms, bringing the theory into the second half of the Twentieth Century. Like Freud, Lacan discusses the importance of the pre-Oedipal stage in the child's life when it makes no clear distinction between itself and the external world; when it harbors no definite sense of self and lives symbiotically with the mother's body. Lacan refers to this stage as the Imaginary.

The Mirror Stage

Lacan characterizes the period when the child begins to draw rudimentary distinctions between self and other as the mirror stage. This is the period when the child's sense of self and the first steps in the acquisition of language emerge. The "I" (which is constituted as the still physically uncoordinated child in the "imaginary" state of being) finds an image of itself reflected in a "mirror" (i.e. other people or objects). The "mirror" is at once self and not-self. The child typically takes pleasure in this process.

The image which the small child sees in the mirror is...an alienated one: the child 'misrecognizes' itself in it, finds in the image a pleasing unity which it does not actually experience in its own body. The imaginary for Lacan is precisely this realm of images in which we make identifications, but in the very act of doing so are led to misperceive and misrecognize ourselves. As the child grows up, it will continue to make such imaginary identifications with objects, and this is how its ego will be built up. For Lacan, the ego is just this narcissistic process whereby we bolster up a fictive sense of unitary selfhood by finding something in the world with which we can identify.[2]

The Phallus: Entry Into the Symbolic Order

Prior to the entry of the father, the infant's life can be characterized as unified and "full". The appearance of the father in the Oedipal stage opens the child up to sexual difference (denoted by the phallus) and initiates the construction of the unconscious, i.e. the repression of incestuous desire. This Oedipal stage is reinterpreted by Lacan in linguistic terms. (Here is where the influence of structuralism becomes more apparent.) Thus the child can be thought of as a signifier; and the image it sees in the mirror is the signified, i.e. the meaning that the child gives to itself.

The symbols referred to here are not icons, stylized figurations, but signifiers, in the sense developed by Saussure and Jakobson extended into a generalized definition: differential elements, in themselves without meaning, which acquire value only in their mutual relations, and forming a closed order -- the question is whether this order is or is not complete. Henceforth, it is the symbolic, not the imaginary, that is seen to be the determining order of the subject, and its effects are radical: the subject, in Lacan's sense, is himself an effect of the symbolic....According to Lacan, a distinction must be drawn between what belongs in experience to the order of the symbolic and what belongs to the imaginary. In particular, the relation between the subject, on the one hand, and the signifiers, speech, language, on the other, is frequently contrasted with the imaginary relation, that between the ego and its images.[3]

Thus, as a result of the transition from the imaginary to the symbolic order -- to the construction of the self-image and the acquisition of language -- the child is socialized into the family through acknowledgment and acceptance of difference (in gender) and absence (of the mother's body).

The Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real

It is the repression of desire and, hence, the unconscious, that determines human behavior. The relation between language and desire is described in Ecrits in the following way:

The human individual sets out with a particular organism, with certain biological needs, which are satisfied by certain objects. What effect does the acquisition of language have on these needs? All speech is demand; it presupposes the Other to whom it is addressed, whose very signifiers it takes over in its formulation. By the same token, that which comes from the Other is treated not so much as a particular satisfaction of a need, but rather as a response to an appeal, a gift, a token of love. There is no adequation between the need and the demand that conveys it; indeed, it is the gap between them that constitutes desire, at once particular like the first and absolute like the second. Desire (fundamentally in the singular) is a perpetual effect of symbolic articulation. It is not an appetite; it is essentially excentric [sic] and insatiable. That is why Lacan coordinates it not with the object that would seem to satisfy it, but with the object that causes it...[4]

Thus, to acquire language is to subject oneself to the inevitability of desire. As language articulates the "fullness" of the imaginary and cuts it up into parts, it also cuts one off from the Real -- that which is beyond the symbolic order.

The 'real' emerges as a third term, linked to the symbolic and the imaginary: it stands for what is neither symbolic nor imaginary, and remains foreclosed from the analytic experience, which is an experience of speech. What is prior to the assumption of the symbolic, the real in its 'raw' state (in the case of the subject, for instance, the organism and its biological needs), may only be supposed, it is an algebraic x. This Lacanian concept of the 'real' is not to be confused with reality, which is perfectly knowable...[5]
Object Relations Theory

Symbiosis and Separation/Individuation

Another adaptation of psychoanalytic theory known as "object relations theory" starts from the assumption that the psychological life of the human being is created in and through relations with other human beings. Thus, the object relations theorist distinguishes between the physical and the psychological birth of the individual. While the physical birth is a process that occurs over a specific and easily observable period of time, the psychological birth is typically extended over the first three years of life and can occur only in and through social relations. During this time, certain "innate potentials and character traits" (the ability to walk and talk) are allowed to develop in the presence of "good object relations". The quality of these relations affects the quality of one's linguistic and motor skills.

The first three years of life are characterized by (a) the establishment of a close (symbiotic) relationship to the primary caretaker (which is generally the mother), and (b) the subsequent dissolution of that relationship through separation (differentiating oneself from the caretaker) and individuation (establishing one's own skills and personality traits). A central element in this emerging "core identity" is one's gender, which tends to be determined within the first one and a half to two years. Unlike Freudian and Lacanian theories, in object relations theory this gendering of the subject has little to do with the child's own awareness of sexuality and reproduction. It does, however, involve the internalization of any inequities in the value assigned to one's gender, as well as the associated imbalance in power.

This psychological development of the child is part of a reciprocal process of adjustment between child and caretaker -- both must learn to be responsive to the needs and interests of the other. During the symbiotic stage (one to six or seven months) the infant, as we saw in Lacan's "imaginary", has little if any sense of distinction between self and other, and is extremely sensitive to the moods and feelings of the caretaker.

In order for this phase to be adequate [i.e. "good enough"], the mother must be emotionally available to the child in a consistent, reasonably conflict-free way. She should be able to enjoy the sensual and emotional closeness of the relationship without losing her own sense of separateness. She should be concerned for the child's well being without developing a narcissistic overinvestment in the child as a mere extension of her own self. Her infantile wishes for a symbiotic relationship should have been adequately gratified in childhood. If this was not the case, resentment and hostility may be aroused in her by the infant's needs. The mother requires adequate support, both emotional and material, during this period from adults who are able both to nurture her and reinforce her own sense of autonomy.[6]

The process of separation begins at around the sixth month and continues through the second year. During this time, the child experiences both pleasure and frustration as motor skills develop along with the corresponding awareness of one's limitations.

The child explores and continually develops its separateness, then returns to the mother for 'emotional refueling'. The potential presence of the relationship between child and mother allows the child to leave it. Gradually the relationship is internalized and becomes part of the child's internal psychic reality. Both members of the dyad must learn to let go of the early bond without rejecting the other. The ambivalence present throughout this process gradually intensifies. The child both wants to return to the symbiotic state and fears being engulfed by it. In 'good enough' social relations a resolution is achieved in which both members of the dyad come to accept their bond (mutuality) and their separateness. This is the basis of a truly reciprocal relationship with others.[7]

Self Identity and Gender Identity

The process of becoming a "gendered subject" adds further complications to the child's development during this period. Since its initial identity is fused with that of the primary caretaker, and since that role is generally filled by the mother, it follows that initially the child's gender is the same as the mother's. Thus, boys and girls are originally "feminine". To become "masculine", the boy must repress much of his early, symbiotic experience. (Girls are less likely to repress infantile experience.) By the age of five, the boy will have repressed most of the feminine components of his nature along with his earliest memories. He will deal with the ambivalence of the separation/individuation period by means of denial of having been identified with the mother, by projection of blame onto women as the source of the problem, and by domination.

These defences become part of ordinary male behavior toward adult women and to anything which seems similar to them or under their (potential) control -- the body, feelings, nature. The ability to control (and to be in control) becomes both a need and a symbol of masculinity. Relations are turned into contest[s] for power. Aggression is mobilized to distance oneself from the object and then to overpower it. The girl, on the other hand, seeks relationships, even at the expense of her own autonomy. The two genders thus come to complement each other in a rather grotesque symmetry.[8]

As we can see, there are two important aspects of child development: self-identity and gender-Identity. In the traditional context of the nuclear family, we must also be able to account for the contribution of the father to the separation/individuation process. Since the child must move away from the mother in order to achieve autonomy, the father offers an alternative with which to identify. This is less problematic for the boy since the father also facilitates gender identification. Thus, the boy tends to develop strong self-identity but weak gender-identity. Since the girl does not experience the same kind of gender transformation, but at the same time cannot identify as closely with the father, she will tend to form a weak self-identity, but a strong and less problematic gender-identity.

Reproduction of Social Patterns

Finally, it must be remembered that the key insight contained in object relations theory is that the human subject is largely the product of the interaction that it, as a developing person, has with its caretakers. And since those caretakers are themselves socially determined persons, they will pass on to the child their own personal tendencies and social experiences with respect to race, class and gender. In this way, social relations are constitutive of "human nature".

T. R. Quigley, 1998

Notes

[1] Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983, 153-4.

[2] Ibid., 165.

[3] Jacques Lacan, Ecrits, ix.

[4] Ibid., viii.

[5] Ibid., ix-x.

[6] Jane Flax, "Political Philosophy and the Patriarchal Unconscious: A Psychoanalytic Perspective on Epistemology and Metaphysics", in Discovering Reality, 252.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid., 253.

::link source: http://homepage.newschool.edu/~quigleyt/vcs/psychoanalysis.html

The Common Ground of Psychoanalytic Practice

2007-08-15T15:40:00.000-07:00

Kenneth Eisold, Ph.D.
285 Central Park West
New York, NY 10024
(212) 874-7143

Freud is constantly claiming to be scientific. But what he gives is speculation -- something prior even to the formation of an hypothesis.

-- Wittgenstein

What is it about the work we do with others -- whether short or long term psychotherapy, or group work, or organizational consultation -- that makes it "psychoanalytic." By this, I do not mean what are the core theories or the theoretical common ground (Klein, 1976; Wallerstein, 1988, 1992) that all, or most, analysts share. I mean, apart from what psychoanalysts are supposed to believe, what do they actually set out to do?

My aim in this is to pull together what many have written on the subject. I do not aim to be original. Indeed, I aspire to be reductionistic. The value I hope to provide is simply in framing the problem and providing the beginnings of an answer. If what I say strikes you as obvious, in a sense, I will have succeeded.

The answer I propose is that a psychoanalytic practice -- whether in the form of traditional psychoanalytic treatment on the couch or in face to face psychotherapy or in the form of work with families, groups, and organizations -- sets out to restore the capacity to think about human experience, a capacity that has been disabled by anxiety and fear. In other words, a psychoanalytic practice sets out to discover or rediscover what it is about our own experience that we do not or cannot grasp with our own minds, that has been rendered inaccessible or obscure.

Freud (1923) famously defined psychoanalysis as three things: "the name (1) of a procedure for the investigation of mental processes which are almost inaccessible in any other way, (2) of a method (based on that investigation) for the treatment of neurotic disorders and (3) of a collection of psychological information obtained along those lines, which is gradually being accumulated into a new scientific discipline." (p. 235) Laplanche and Pontalis (1973) reframed the third point as a group of "psychological and psychopathological theories."

My suggestion, in effect, is that we shift our focus away from points two and three. The proliferation of different forms of applied psychoanalysis -- the very idea of an applied psychoanalysis -- makes it difficult to hold on to point two. The "psychoanalytic" now refers to much more than a specific treatment modality for "neurotic disorders" -- though it includes that as well.

Point three is more complex. The emergence of applied psychoanalysis suggests that each applied psychoanalytic discipline requires its own body of theory. For example, the robust set of observations and theories about the persistence of early learning in shaping later relationships, so critical to traditional psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic psychotherapy, has less relevance to work with couples or groups. Conversely, Bion’s work on "Basic Assumptions" has little relevance to work with individuals. All such theories are useful and important, in their way. Nothing I will go on to say should be construed as challenging their importance. But we need to remind ourselves that they all do not add up to a coherent and consistent metapsychology but, rather, different domains.

There is a second point about theory: in this post-positivist and post-classical world, theory itself is seen as contingent and provisional. Psychoanalytic pluralism, in itself dictates this. But more: we have become skeptical of reality yielding its secrets to theory. We no longer believe in Truth -- but there are specific truths circumscribed by time and place.

Freud’s first point it the important one, I believe, in attempting to grasp the whole range of psychoanalytic practice -- but it has to be enlarged. His reference to "a procedure" suggests the notion of a standard technique, free association on the part of the patient and interpretation on the part of the analyst. But it is much clearer now than it could have been then that the essential clinical genius of psychoanalysis -- and here I am referring to the traditional practice of psychoanalysis itself -- has led to the development and elaboration of an array of procedures, a range and variety of techniques and methods that have been developed for exploring the puzzling and irrational aspects of human experience. It is not a matter of fundamental rules, of interpretive strictures with "parameters", etc. but of an multiplicity of methods to address an array of problems and issues.

Freud himself was more open on this point than he has often been credited with being. It is not merely that his own practice was fluid and idiosyncratic (Roazen, 1995; Lohser & Newton, 1996), he was tentative and cautious in prescribing technique for others. Moreover, he was explicit when he did write about the "rules" of treatment that he considered them "recommendations": "The extraordinary diversity of the psychical constellations concerned, the plasticity of all mental process and the wealth of determining factors oppose any mechanization of the technique." (Freud, 1913, p. 123).

What I believe we are rediscovering, in short, is that the essential work of psychoanalysis -- even before we introduce the complication of applied psychoanalysis -- is inherently problematic. The work of exploring the unknown aspects of human experience -- what has been disavowed, obscured, repressed, forgotten, displaced, dissociated, avoided, reframed, etc. etc. etc. -- the work of helping patients and clients to regain their capacity to think about the parts of their experience with which they are not in touch -- cannot be embodied in any particular set of theories or techniques. It can only be embodied in the role of the analyst. And by this I do not mean role in the sense of a part in a play, a costume, a set of lines, mannerisms, characteristic gestures, and so forth. I mean role in the sense of clarity of task, a secure grasp of the job to be performed.

As this view of psychoanalysis emerges more and more clearly, there is more interest in the analytic stance, in attempting to define how to live and work with highly charged uncertainty. Ghent (1990) has commented on the frequency with which Keats’ famous lines on "negative capability" has been cited in our literature to describe this clinical competency: "when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact or reason." (Keats, 1958, I, 193)

It is Bion’s citation of these lines to describe the ideal analytic stance in Attention and Interpretation (1970) that is most frequently noted, though Ghent himself does not cite Bion. [Rosen (1960), Leavy (1970), and Beres (1980) all appear to have seized upon those lines even earlier.] Bion linked it to his idea that the analyst should be "without memory or desire," which is, in itself a gloss on Freud’s (1912) recommendation of evenly suspended attention. Symington (1996) argues that this is not to be taken literally, but more as an indication that, as in Buddhist meditation, the analyst must not be attached to his memory of or desires for the patient -- or his own theories or previous hypotheses. They will be present but not governing his responses.

Such attempts to define a clinical stance of openness contrast with a number of observations suggesting that no matter how prepared the analyst may attempt to be to receive the unknown, he will nonetheless make mistakes. Here the stress is on having the flexibility to recover and refind one’s bearings. As Levenson (1972) put it: "the ability to be trapped, immersed and participating in the system and then to work his way out." (p. 174)

It would be way past the scope of this paper to attempt to summarize the burgeoning literature on how the analyst can cope with uncertainty, confusion, and collusion in the analytic setting. Frankly, I think we can ill afford to ignore any of it. It would be even more impossible to survey the various techniques and strategies that have been developed in the various fields of applied psychoanalytic practice. I suggest that we simply take for granted that most such techniques have some value at some times and that none work at all times. Here I think nothing need be or should be ruled out.

The key issue is not how should the applied psychoanalyst work, what strategies or states of mind can be useful. The question is what is it that these various strategies or techniques aim to accomplish? What does the analyst have to accomplish to succeed at his task.

What follows is a beginning attempt to anatomize the task, to develop a theory about the praxis of a psychoanalytic orientation, whether in psychotherapy, group or organizational work -- or some form of three, four, or five times a week psychoanalysis proper. I believe we can identify three parts:

1) The task of identifying the unknown, that which needs to become known, the area or location of work.

2) The role of anxiety as the guardian, so to speak, of that which is being kept unknown.

3) The creation of the mental reflective space required for its emergence.

THE UNKNOWN

From the start, this has to be discriminated from the unconscious or that which was in psychoanalysis, historically, the locus classicus of the unknown. Clearly, to the extent to which the dynamic unconscious is still a viable idea, it too is an area of the unknown. But the unconscious is this original sense was essentially about that which was formerly conscious or immanently conscious and then rendered forcibly or actively unconscious. In this view, the work of psychoanalysis was to undo the mental activity that kept an idea or representation from re-entering consciousness.

The emergent alternative view is that psychoanalysis aims at enlarging the capacity to engage the fullness and complexity of current reality, to enhance openness to new experience, not simply recover old experience. Once the psychoanalyst has taken the patient to the point where particular repressions, scotoma, denials and so forth have been over come, and the mind has been freed of its repetitive ruminations over what it is afraid to face, or its compulsive need to hang on to what its believes it knows, it becomes able to truly question the unknown that is actually there.

There is a parallel shift in aim, from reconstructions of the past, interpretations aimed at helping patients grasp the story of their lives, the sequence of events that have shaped who they have become, to current realities. The shift is away from narrative altogether. The patient as a character in his story becomes an object to himself. The patient in the living moment is an inquiring subject. As Gardner (1983) put it: "We are always asking questions. Our questions are always in search of other questions, and of the questions of others." (p. 45)

There is a comparable shift in the notion of transference. Instead of thinking of transference as, in Freud’s term, "new editions" of old experiences, transference tends now to be seen as evocations of old experiences in response to troubling or problematic experiences in the present. The reconstruction can be useful, but uncovering or clarifying the present will often be more so. Gill (1982) has taken the lead in developing this notion of transference, but he made it into a new alternative dogma about technique. In his work, the analysis of transference became the defining method of psychoanalysis -- in my view, not a means to an end.

Bion’s (1970) notion of "O" is probably the best known expression of the idea in psychoanalysis that our ultimate aim is to approach the full, rich, infinite complexity of actual experience, a complexity that remains finally elusive. But interpersonalists have also embraced this perspective. Levenson (1983) has made the point forcefully: "The larger and wider the patient’s perspective, the better equipped he is to live in the real world; not the neat, contained, nursery world of hermeneutic doctrine, but the wider, infinitely more erratic, and perplexing world in which we meet and discover ourselves in each other." (p. 164) Or, more succinctly: "One hopes to enlarge the patient, not ‘shrink’ him." (p. 12)

ANXIETY

There are reasons why the unknown is kept at bay in the present, reasons derived from old experience. If the notion of the dynamic unconscious is less viable as the locus of repressed impulses, it is none the less true that there are dynamic processes that actively work to screen our perceptions and curtail our activities in order to protect us from encountering what past experience has made us afraid to know. Anxiety, Freud argued, is the warning signal of remembered danger that invokes these dynamic processes.

But the unknown itself is a source of fear. We may be able to contemplate the vastness of space with awe, for example, but when we actually venture into it we become acutely aware of needing to know more than we do. Our relation to the unknown places demands upon us to know what we cannot know. We may call this fear, to differentiate it from anxiety, but I do not think that clinically it is possible to discriminate the two. Indeed it may be that the two become inextricably bound together, much as medieval map makers placed monsters in the midst of unexplored seas. When we are afraid of what we do not know, we start to become more afraid of what we know enough to fear.

The crucial point here is that it is the presence of anxiety or fear that helps us to locate the areas of the unknown that require exploration. There are a number of theories of anxiety, linked to various explanatory concepts and theoretical orientations. Unquestionably there are different sources of anxiety. But, whatever the sources, we may think of anxiety as the final common pathway, communicating danger to the mind, or, as Levenson (1983) has suggested, an "index of helplessness." (p. 157) That is, it is the indication that we are in the presence of something we must arouse ourselves to recognize and struggle to understand.

Sometimes this is quite straightforward: anxiety states, physical stress, phobias, and so forth identify points of inquiry. Other times, questions about one’s behavior point in the direction of the anxiety: repetitive patterns of failure direct us to the particulars of individual experience where anxiety is present. But sometimes the anxiety itself is quite successfully masked: Sudden shifts in attention, discrepancies in narration, illogical deductions, and so forth, are all signs for the astute clinicians that anxiety is being avoided. Something is amiss.

"Negative capability" -- "when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact or reason." (Keats, 1958, I, 193) -- is precisely the ability to tolerate anxiety and fear, to stay in the place of uncertainty in order to allow for the emergence of new thoughts or perceptions. But other stances can be useful too: humor, confusion, confrontation -- and, even, "irritable reaching after fact and reason" -- can be useful clues to the presence of anxiety, if one can stand back from the experience and reflect as to what clues it might be providing.

REFLECTIVE SPACE

To "stand back," though, requires something analogous to a space in which to move. In an analytic treatment, the patient has to recover or develop the capacity to think about what has previously not been available for thought. For this to happen, a "opening" has to occur in the mind within which the new potential for thinking can occur.

I don’t mean this literally. "Space" here is a metaphor, but one of those "metaphors" -- in Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) felicitous phrase -- "we live by." It is where "perspective" can develop or "reflection" can occur. If we can "stand back" from an immediate experience, we are creating something that can be thought of as a "distance" allowing a new relationship between experience and thought. Or we can think of it in terms of time: a delay or a pause occurs between the act and the thought, a caesura, which makes it possible for the patient to listen and hear or feel himself in a new way.

This space originates in the relationship between the analyst and the patient, that is in a mutual activity that replays and reexamines what has occurred and what is occurring so that it can be seen in a new way. As Arlow (in Raymond & Rosbrough-Reich, 1997) recently put it: "We cause the patient to reflect upon his productions in the same manner as we have been reflecting upon his productions." (p.42)

Some have written as if this space must exist in the analyst. And, indeed, the analyst has to be capable of it. But the key point is that the space has to come to exist in the patient. There are a number of psychoanalytic concepts which refer to this notion: The "therapeutic alliance" (Zetzel, 1956) refers to the pre-conditions for such space to be created within the patient analyst relationship. Winnicott’s "transitional space," of course, refers to it directly, as Kohut’s notion of empathy indirectly implies it. The concept of the "observing ego" presupposes a space from which to observe.

There is an implicit theory of mind in this idea of space, a theory which we might also say belongs to psychoanalysis, but that certainly has been promoted by it. Westen’s (1998) recent discussion of the scientific standing of key psychoanalytic concepts highlights two that are of particular relevance: the idea of unconscious mental functions, which produce behaviors inexplicable to the subject, and the idea of parallel mental processes that can simultaneously produce conflicting feelings and motivations. This is a rudimentary theory, to be sure, and one subject to amplification and modification. Yet such theories point to what it is that is kept apart in thinking that requires the space to come together.

DISCUSSION

Let me give a few examples, first an example from my analytic practice, then one from my consulting work.

Rose was referred to me by a colleague of mine, an analyst who was treating a man with whom she had been carrying on a lengthy affair. She had demanded -- and received -- several joint sessions with her lover in order, presumably, to improve that relationship. Subsequently, to free himself of her continuing demands for those joint sessions, with his analyst’s assistance, he conceived of making the referral to me. She agreed to it, I believe in part, because she had the fantasy that her lover’s analyst and I would be in communication with each other. In this way, she believed, she could continue the joint sessions with him: she would influence me, I would influence my colleague, and he would influence her lover. But it was also true that she wanted help understanding her lover and what was happening in the often stormy relationship. And there was moments of quite considerable anxiety.

It immediately became apparent that Rose needed double sessions. She spoke with such intensity and such detail that 45 minutes simply wasn’t enough time in which to shape a satisfactory encounter between us. She was not circumstantial or repetitive; indeed, she spoke effectively and logically. Then, after a few weeks, it became apparent that we would not be able to schedule regular appointments. Again, this did not seem evasive or manipulative on her part, but based on the reality that she ran a firm that required not only many meetings with clients, often rescheduled at the last minute, but also many trips out of town. I accomodated as best I could.

Rose was a very successful woman. She was currently married to her second husband, with whom she had two children, and she was president and chief stockholder of a firm in a highly competitive industry. She had many friends, was active socially, and physically; in her youth, she had been a highly successful competitive runner. She was intelligent, energetic, and attractive, priding herself on not only her drive and successes but also her caring and thoughtful nature with her many friends and colleagues. She came from a family of high achievers, and she saw herself as part of that tradition.

What rather quickly emerged in the treatment was that beneath her ebullient and energetic manner, Rose was haunted by fears of abandonment. Subject to panic attacks that terrified her, she clung to relationships that seemingly promised reassurance and stability, though her anxiety often precluded her using good judgement in chosing and developing those relationships and they were profoundly influenced, as you might imagine, by patterns of early relationships with her parents. She also kept herself perpetually busy and, as a result, in contact with others and seldom alone. The hectic schedule contained her anxiety.

We developed rather rapidly a good therapeutic relationship. Having built a bridge of contacts from her lover to his analyst to me, feeling supported in this fantasied matrix, she found in me someone who adapted to her. That is, in providing double sessions and adjusting her times to suit the hectic demands of her work life, I think she became rather quickly assured that I would not abandon her. Having, then, together created a safe-enough environment against her fear of abandonment, we were able to work: I was able to point out to her how driven her life seemed to be by this fear -- and she was gradually able to see how pervasive and controlling that fear was.

Obviously here I can’t describe our work in any detail, but with her primary anxiety contained by our relationship she was more and more able, from that vantage point, to examine her other relationships: with her husband, employees, friends, as well as her lover. The psychic space opened up within her -- much as the safe space had developed between us -- within which she could tolerate an exploration of what had remained until now as the great unknowns in her patterns of relationship.

About a year after we started our work, her lover surprized her by giving her a piece of jewelery she had always coveted. Knowing for some time she had wanted it and refraining from giving it to her, it had become a sign of his unwillingness to make a committment to her. In giving it to her now he was clearly signaling his deeper level of engagement in the relationship. But the bigger surprize to her in receiving the gift was how cold and suspicious it left her feeling towards him. She understood clearly the meaning of the signal he was sending, but she said, "I felt a wall inside."

Her recognition of this "wall" was a turning point in the treatment because, of course, the wall was not only present in her relationship with her lover; it was a constant feature of all relationships of any depth. Clearly, her internal defense against the fear of abandonment, erected at an early age, it was the means she used to try to keep any attachment from getting too intense and important to her. But her recognition of the wall was also important because it marked a significantly enlarged capacity to gaze within and reflect on her own experience. Up to this point in the treatment, she had become increasingly aware of the anxiety she was restless defending against in her attachments to others, but the danger was always without. With the wall she could see for the first time how her own behavior stood in the way of her getting what she wanted.

My second example is about a consultation I did for an academic department within a professional school of a large mid-west university. I was hired by the chair who had been brought in to run the department a year before the consultation. It had been a difficult year for him, but he had steadfastly held to his determination not to make any significant moves in the department, apart from the necessary hirings and essential administrative business, until he had been there a year and understood the department better. Now a retreat had been scheduled with the department faculty and he asked me to run it.

In talking with him it was quickly established that there had been strife ever since the department had been created several years before by merging several smaller departments. Much of it seemed petty: allocations of support staff time, TA’s, supplies. There was a major on-going battle of several years duration about the use of one of the bathrooms. Feelings ran high. It seemed that the old departments never acquiesced to their shot-gun marriage, with the result that they could agree on virtually nothing. An aggressive new Dean who came to the school two years before had brought in the new Chair to set things straight. Now the Chair was bringing me in.

Two things seemed pretty clear to be from the start: first, the Chair was quite anxious about the department. He had a sterling record in research but little experience managing a strifetorn department. I suspected that his aloof first year in role, while superficially plausible as a means of gathering data for understanding the department, actually masked his fear of engaging the problem. Indeed, after a year, he had very few ideas to offer.

The second thing was that the department was also suffused with anxiety. On one level the old animosities concerned fears over who was going to profit from the merger. But, more deeply, I came to believe, was their anxiety over the future: What did the new Dean have in mind for them? Why had she hired this Chair? What was the real agenda?

So her first year on the job was a kind of stand-off, I suspected, in which both parties eyed the other suspiciously. The purpose of this retreat was to effect a rapprochement.

My plan was to put them into their original pre-merger configuration -- following some introductory work -- in order to discuss among themselves what they had lost and gained from the merger. An additional sub-group was composed of those, including the Chair, who had joined the Department since the merger; their task was to explore their perceptions of the department they had joined. There was some resistance to this plan -- less, actually, than I anticipated -- and then a lively engagement in sub-groups with the task I had set.

The report out was extremely animated, as I had hoped, and got the expression of the conflicts down to a more basic level than the familiar fighting over secretaries and the bathroom. They were able to speak not only of their animosities but also of their sense of loss and displacement, and they were able, as well, to speak of their worries about the future. And then, unexpectedly, a former Chair, who was something of an elder statesman in the Department, stood up and spoke bitterly about how the current Chair had made himself unavailable since his arrival. He felt he didn’t really care about the Department or the students, that he was only interested in his research, etc. Essentially, he accused him of being the source of the previous year’s dissension.

After an anxious pause, in which it was not clear he would respond, he rose to his defense: he reminded the faculty that he had adhered to the policy announced on his arrival of not acting definitively the first year and that, contrary to the accusation, he cared a great deal for the department and had, indeed, succeeded in a getting several faculty lines approved by the Dean. Then, angrily, he pointed out how few members of the Department had approached him in the past year. His door was open, but few had come in. He felt isolated by them.

Up until this point, what had happened in the retreat was a recapitulation of the issues along with a retracing of the dynamic pattern of anxieties and defenses riddling the Department. Putting them back into their original configurations allowed them to feel safe, building up the case against the other factions while projecting into them their resentments and fears -- much as they had for several years. Reporting out made it possible for each faction to see how much the other reflected back themselves; that is, far from being the enemy who was seeking to take things away or wrest control, each faction was able to see the other as wrestling with essentially the same problems as themselves. This created the potential for dialogue, but deprived them of their familiar projective defenses.

At this point, the former chair became the vehicle for identifying the new projective target, the new Chair, against whom all factions could now unite, feeling equally aggrieved. He, in turn, unleashed his resentment and anger at them. In doing so, he aggressively came out of his office, so to speak, not only overcoming for the moment his own anxieties about the role into which he had been cast and defensive isolation but also no longer allowing himself to be the receptacle for their hostile projections. His reply was cogent and effective. Suddenly, they could no longer use each other for their familiar projections. They had become too real.

It took awhile for the entire group to put out its feelings and settle down, but with this last exchange the essential task of creating the psychic space within the group had been accomplished, enabling it to step back from the positions in which it had been locked. From this point on, the group worked surprising quickly to put together a representative task force that was to work with the Chair to develop a new administrative structure for the Department, to which I was to consult, with a mandate to report back to the faculty as a whole in six months.

I am tempted to go on describing the fate of this extended consultation, illustrating the unremitting struggle with anxieties and defenses against anxiety in order continually to open up psychic spaces for reflection. But I would like to make a final point. As I came to learn in the course of the ensuing year, the big unknown that loomed over the Department was its future in the School that was being reshaped by the Dean. There was a real question about future role of the Department, a question that was not only obscured by the Department’s internal wrangling but which also required, I think, its concerted, best efforts to address. At this point, I am not sure that the Department has reached the point of being able to see that.

Let me briefly recapitulate. Although in both of these cases I used a great many psychoanalytic concepts, the common ground was in the essential method to restore the capacity to think, a method that employed a number of divergent strategies. With Rose, I was extremely mindful of the impact of early experience on her current relationships, including his relationship to me. With the academic department, I employed not only Bion’s notions of "basic assumptions" but also a variety of work that has been done on the phenomenon of the scapegoat and group relations. But while these core ideas were useful -- even indispensable -- I used them to guide me in creating circumstances where, taking my cue from current anxieties, largely manifested in defensive behaviors, a space for reflection could be opened up, leading to new thoughts.

CONCLUSION

Perhaps it appears that in seeking to find the common ground in psychoanalytic practice I have discarded most of what is valuable and interesting. As I said, this is a reductionistic exercise. Moreover, in attempting to clarify the essential aspects of psychoanalytic work I have left out vast territories of theory and practice -- indeed, most of what I find stimulating and engaging myself.

But the effort is worth the risk, I believe, because currently we are unable to say what it is that defines us as psychoanalysts or psychoanalytically-oriented practitioners. There are consequences for that, internally and externally. Internally, without clarity about the nature of the work we engage in, we are hampered in thinking about training and continuing professional development. Externally, we cannot clearly differentiate ourselves from the competition. Unable to do that, we are not only hampered in defending ourselves against attack but also unable to state cogently what it is we have to offer that sets us apart. The public is understandably confused.

We have many things to offer, of course. But if we could agree on some such central definition of our essential work as I am proposing, we could not only present ourselves to the world more clearly and convincingly, we might also be able to fight less among ourselves. We could, then, compete at trying to do it better.

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Psychoanalysis: Freud's Revolutionary Approach to Human Personality

2007-08-15T15:32:00.000-07:00

by Kristen M. Beystehner
Northwestern University

This paper focuses on Freud's revolutionary theory of psychoanalysis and whether psychoanalysis should be considered a "great" idea in personality. The fundamental principles of the theory are developed and explained. In addition, the views of experts are reviewed, and many of the criticisms and strengths of various aspects of Freud's theory are examined and explained. Upon consideration, the author considers psychoanalysis to be a valuable theory despite its weaknesses because it is comprehensive, serendipitous, innovative, and has withstood the test of time. Consequently, the author contends that psychoanalysis is indeed a "great" idea in personality.

As a therapy, psychoanalysis is based on the concept that individuals are unaware of the many factors that cause their behavior and emotions. These unconscious factors have the potential to produce unhappiness, which in turn is expressed through a score of distinguishable symptoms, including disturbing personality traits, difficulty in relating to others, or disturbances in self-esteem or general disposition (American Psychoanalytic Association, 1998).

Psychoanalytic treatment is highly individualized and seeks to show how the unconscious factors affect behavior patterns, relationships, and overall mental health. Treatment traces the unconscious factors to their origins, shows how they have evolved and developed over the course of many years, and subsequently helps individuals to overcome the challenges they face in life (National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis, 1998).

In addition to being a therapy, psychoanalysis is a method of understanding mental functioning and the stages of growth and development. Psychoanalysis is a general theory of individual human behavior and experience, and it has both contributed to and been enriched by many other disciplines. Psychoanalysis seeks to explain the complex relationship between the body and the mind and furthers the understanding of the role of emotions in medical illness and health. In addition, psychoanalysis is the basis of many other approaches to therapy. Many insights revealed by psychoanalytic treatment have formed the basis for other treatment programs in child psychiatry, family therapy, and general psychiatric practice (Farrell, 1981, p. 202).

The value and validity of psychoanalysis as a theory and treatment have been questioned since its inception in the early 1900s. Critics dispute many aspects of psychoanalysis including whether or not it is indeed a science; the value of the data upon which Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, based his theories; and the method and effectiveness of psychoanalytic treatment. There has been much criticism as well as praise regarding psychoanalysis over the years, but a hard look at both the positive and negative feedback of critics of psychoanalysis shows, in my opinion, that psychoanalysis is indeed a "great idea" in personality that should not be overlooked.

The Origins of Psychoanalysis
Sigmund Freud was the first psychoanalyst and a true pioneer in the recognition of the importance of unconscious mental activity. His theories on the inner workings of the human mind, which seemed so revolutionary at the turn of the century, are now widely accepted by most schools of psychological thought. In 1896, Freud coined the term "psychoanalysis," and for the next forty years of his life, he worked on thoroughly developing its main principles, objectives, techniques, and methodology.

Freud's many writings detail many of his thoughts on mental life, including the structural theory of the mind, dream interpretation, the technique of psychoanalysis, and assorted other topics. Eventually psychoanalysis began to thrive, and by 1925, it was established around the world as a flourishing movement. Although for many years Freud had been considered a radical by many in his profession, he was soon accepted and well-known worldwide as a leading expert in psychoanalysis (Gay, 1989, p. xii). In 1939, Freud succumbed to cancer after a lifetime dedicated to psychological thought and the development of his many theories (Gay, 1989, p. xx).

Although Freud's life had ended, he left behind a legacy unmatched by any other, a legacy that continues very much to this day. Whereas new ideas have enriched the field of psychoanalysis and techniques have adapted and expanded over the years, psychoanalysts today, like Freud, believe that psychoanalysis is the most effective method of obtaining knowledge of the mind. Through psychoanalysis, patients free themselves from terrible mental anguish and achieve greater understanding of themselves and others.

Principles of Freud's Theory of Psychoanalysis
In An Outline of Psychoanalysis, Freud (1949) explains the principal tenets on which psychoanalytic theory is based. He begins with an explanation of the three forces of the psychical apparatus--the id, the ego, and the superego. The id has the quality of being unconscious and contains everything that is inherited, everything that is present at birth, and the instincts (Freud, 1949, p. 14). The ego has the quality of being conscious and is responsible for controlling the demands of the id and of the instincts, becoming aware of stimuli, and serving as a link between the id and the external world. In addition, the ego responds to stimulation by either adaptation or flight, regulates activity, and strives to achieve pleasure and avoid unpleasure (Freud, 1949, p. 14-15). Finally, the superego, whose demands are managed by the id, is responsible for the limitation of satisfactions and represents the influence of others, such as parents, teachers, and role models, as well as the impact of racial, societal, and cultural traditions (Freud, 1949, p. 15).

Freud states that the instincts are the ultimate cause of all behavior. The two basic instincts are Eros (love) and the destructive or death instinct. The purpose of Eros is to establish and preserve unity through relationships. On the other hand, the purpose of the death instinct is to undo connections and unity via destruction (Freud, 1949, p. 18). The two instincts can either operate against each other through repulsion or combine with each other through attraction (Freud, 1949, p. 19).

Freud (1949) contends that sexual life begins with manifestations that present themselves soon after birth (p. 23). The four main phases in sexual development are the oral phase, the sadistic-anal phase, the phallic phase, and the genital phase, and each phase is characterized by specific occurrences. During the oral phase, the individual places emphasis on providing satisfaction for the needs of the mouth, which emerges as the first erotogenic zone (Freud, 1949, p. 24). During the sadistic-anal phase, satisfaction is sought through aggression and in the excretory function. During the phallic phase, the young boy enters the Oedipus phase where he fears his father and castration while simultaneously fantasizing about sexual relations with his mother (Freud, 1949, p. 25). The young girl, in contrast, enters the Electra phase, where she experiences penis envy, which often culminates in her turning away from sexual life altogether. Following the phallic phase is a period of latency, in which sexual development comes to a halt (Freud, 1949, p. 23). Finally, in the genital phase, the sexual function is completely organized and the coordination of sexual urge towards pleasure is completed. Errors occurring in the development of the sexual function result in homosexuality and sexual perversions, according to Freud (1949, p. 27).

Freud (1949) defines the qualities of the psychical process as being either conscious, preconscious, or unconscious (p. 31). Ideas considered to be conscious are those of which we are aware, yet they remain conscious only briefly. Preconscious ideas are defined as those that are capable of becoming conscious. In contrast, unconscious ideas are defined as those that are not easily accessible but can be inferred, recognized, and explained through analysis (Freud, 1949, p. 32).

Freud spent many years hypothesizing about the role of dreams and their interpretation. He defines the states of sleep to be a period of uproar and chaos during which the unconscious thoughts of the id attempt to force their way into consciousness (Freud, 1949, p. 38). In order to interpret a dream, which develops from either the id or the ego, certain assumptions must be made, including the acknowledgment that what is recalled from a dream is only a facade behind which the meaning must be inferred. Dreams are undoubtedly caused by conflict and are characterized by their power to bring up memories that the dreamer has forgotten, their strong use of symbolism, and their ability to reproduce repressed impressions of the dreamer's childhood (Freud, 1949, p. 40). In addition, dreams, which are fulfillments of wishes, according to Freud (1949), are capable of bringing up impressions that cannot have originated from the dreamer's life (Freud, 1949, p. 45).

The basic objective of psychoanalysis is to remove neuroses and thereby cure patients by returning the damaged ego to its normal state (Freud, 1949, p. 51). During analysis, a process that often takes many years, patients tell analysts both what they feel is important and what they consider to be unimportant. An aspect of analysis that has both positive and negative repercussions is transference, which occurs when patients view their analysts as parents, role models, or other figures from their past. Transference causes patients to become concerned with pleasing their analysts and, as a result, patients lose their rational aim of getting well (Freud, 1949, p. 52).

The method of psychoanalysis involves several significant steps. First, analysts gather material with which to work from patients' free associations, results of transference, dream interpretation, and the patients' slips and parapraxes (Freud, 1949, p. 56). Second, analysts begin to form hypotheses about what happened to the patients in the past and what is currently happening to them in their daily life. It is important that analysts relay the conclusions at which they arrive based on their observations only after the patients have reached the same conclusions on their own accord. Should analysts reveal their conclusions to patients too soon, resistance due to repression occurs. Overcoming this resistance requires additional time and effort by both the analysts and the patients. Once patients accept the conclusions, they are cured (Freud, 1949, p. 57).

In the final chapters of An Outline of Psychoanalysis, Freud (1949) insists that it is neither practical nor fair to scientifically define what is normal and abnormal, and despite his theory's accuracy, "reality will always remain unknowable" (p. 83). He claims that although his theory is correct to the best of his knowledge, "it is unlikely that such generalizations can be universally correct" (Freud, 1949, p. 96).

Evaluating the Criticisms of Psychoanalysis
In his "Précis of The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique," Grünbaum (1986) asserts that "while psychoanalysis may thus be said to be scientifically alive, it is currently hardly well" (p. 228). The criticisms of Freud's theory can be grouped into three general categories. First, critics contend that Freud's theory is lacking in empirical evidence and relies too heavily on therapeutic achievements, whereas others assert that even Freud's clinical data are flawed, inaccurate, and selective at best. Second, the actual method or techniques involved in psychoanalysis, such as Freud's ideas on the interpretation of dreams and the role of free association, have been criticized. Finally, some critics assert that psychoanalysis is simply not a science and many of the principles upon which it is based are inaccurate.

Criticisms of Freud's Evidence
Grünbaum (1986) believes that the reasoning on which Freud based his entire psychoanalytic theory was "fundamentally flawed, even if the validity of his clinical evidence were not in question" but that "the clinical data are themselves suspect; more often than not, they may be the patient's responses to the suggestions and expectations of the analyst" (p. 220). Grünbaum (1986) concludes that in order for psychoanalytic hypotheses to be validated in the future, data must be obtained from extraclinical studies rather than from data obtained in a clinical setting (p. 228). In other words, Grünbaum and other critics assert that psychoanalysis lacks in empirical data (Colby, 1960, p. 54).

Other critics disagree with Grünbaum and insist that although extraclinical studies must and should be performed, clinical data are a reliable and necessary source of evidence because the theory of psychoanalysis would be impossible to test otherwise (Edelson, 1986, p. 232). Shevrin (1986) insists that "Freud's admirable heuristic hypotheses did not come out of the thin air or simply out of his imagination" (p.258) as other critics might have the reader believe. Instead, Shevrin (1986) continues, "extraclinical methods must be drawn upon in addition to the clinical method because the clinical method is the only way we can be in touch with certain phenomena" (p. 259). Only with quantification, many critics assert, can supposedly scientific theories even begin to be evaluated based on their empirical merits.

Additional critics contend that Freud's clinical data are flawed or invalid. Greenberg (1986) believes that Freud's case studies do not place enough stress on revealing the outcome of the treatment and that Freud's aim was more to illustrate his theoretical points (p. 240). In addition, Freud fully presented only twelve cases, but he mentioned over one hundred minor cases. Greenberg asserts that many of the presented cases would not even be considered acceptable examples of psychoanalysis and, in short, that virtually all of the case studies had basic shortcomings (p. 240). Finally, Greenberg finds it "both striking and curious" (p. 240) that Freud chose to illustrate the usefulness of psychoanalysis through the display of unsuccessful cases. "We were forced to conclude," maintains Greenberg, "that Freud never presented any data, in statistical or case study form, that demonstrated that his treatment was of benefit to a significant number of the patients he himself saw" (p. 241). Many other powerful criticisms about Freud's inaccurate and subsequently flawed evidence have been published. These critics contend that Freud's evidence is flawed due to the lack of an experiment, the lack of a control group, and the lack of observations that went unrecorded (Colby, 1960, p. 54). In addition, critics find fault with the demographically restricted sample of individuals on which Freud based the majority of his data and theory (Holt, 1986, p. 242).

Criticisms of Freud's Technique
"Free association" is a method employed in psychoanalysis where the patients speak about any subject matter whatsoever and the analyst draws conclusions based on what is said. According to Storr (1986), "Grünbaum forcefully argues that free association is neither free nor validating evidence for psychoanalytic theory" (p. 260). "For my own part, however," Grünbaum (1986) concludes, "I find it unwarranted to use free association to validate causal inferences" (p. 224). Grünbaum (1986) contends that free association is not a valid method of accessing the patients' repressed memories because there is no way of ensuring that the analyst is capable of distinguishing between the patients' actual memories and imagined memories constructed due to the influence of the analyst's leading questions (p. 226).

Spence (1986) is critical of Grünbaum's argument, although he acknowledges that

we simply do not know the amount of contamination, the spread of infection within the session, and the extent to which suggested responses are balanced by unexpected confirmations which support the theory and take the analyst by surprise. (p. 259)

Spence contends that free associations are not necessarily contaminated and also makes note of the fact that psychoanalysts "are particularly sensitized (in the course of their training) to the dangers of suggestion, and schooled in a tradition which places an emphasis on minimal comment and redundant examples" (p. 259). Spence concludes that the answer to the important question concerning the validity of free association will only be realized through close inspection of the transcripts of meetings between the patient and analyst.

In addition to his criticism of free association, Grünbaum (1986) finds fault with Freud's theory of dreams. In spite of Freud's view that this theory represented his greatest insight and success, it has very much failed in the eyes of most of today's critics.

Finally, many people feel that a major flaw of psychoanalysis is that, according to Farrell (1981), "it appears to encourage analytic and psychodynamic practitioners to overlook the place and great importance of ordinary common sense" (p. 216). Because psychoanalysis deals chiefly with unconscious motives and repressed emotions, common sense no longer seems to be applicable. Farrell (1981) and other critics believe that it is increasingly important for analysts to be aware of common sense and the role that it can, should, and does play in psychoanalysis (p. 216).

Criticisms of the Principles of Psychoanalysis
Storr (1981) insists, "Only a few fundamentalist psychoanalysts of an old-fashioned kind think that Freud was a scientist or that psychoanalysis was or could be a scientific enterprise," and that, "...to understand persons cannot be a scientific enterprise" (p. 260). Although many psychoanalysts themselves would undoubtedly consider psychoanalysis to be a science, many critics would disagree.

Popper, by far one of psychoanalysis' most well-known critics and a strong critic of Grünbaum, insists that psychoanalysis cannot be considered a science because it is not falsifiable. He claims that psychoanalysis' "so-called predictions are not predictions of overt behavior but of hidden psychological states. This is why they are so untestable" (Popper, 1986, p. 254). Popper (1986) claims that only when individuals are not neurotic is it possible to empirically determine if prospective patients are currently neurotic (p. 254). Popper (1986) asserts that psychoanalysis has often maintained that every individual is neurotic to some degree due to the fact that everyone has suffered and repressed a trauma at one point or another in his or her life (p. 255). However, this concept of ubiquitous repression is impossible to test because there is no overt behavioral method of doing so (p. 254).

Other critics claim that psychoanalysis cannot be considered a science due to its lack of predictions. Psychoanalysts, critics maintain, state that certain childhood experiences, such as abuse or molestation, produce certain outcomes or states of neurosis. To take this idea one step further, one should be able to predict that if children experience abuse, for instance, they will become characterized by certain personality traits. In addition, this concept would theoretically work in reverse. For instance, if individuals are observed in a particular neurotic state, one should be able to predict that they had this or that childhood experience. However, neither of these predictions can be made with any accuracy (Colby, 1960, p. 55).

Additional critics insist that psychoanalysis is not a science because of the lack of interpretive rules or regulations. Colby (1960) contends that critics of psychoanalysis have difficulties with the idea that "there are no clear, intersubjectively shared lines of reasoning between theories and observations" (p. 54). For instance, one psychoanalyst will observe one phenomenon and interpret it one way, whereas another psychoanalyst will observe the same phenomenon and interpret it in a completely different way that is contradictory to the first psychoanalyst's interpretation (Colby, 1960, p. 54). Colby (1960) concludes that if analysts themselves cannot concur that a certain observation is an example of a certain theory, then the regulations that govern psychoanalytic interpretation are undependable (p. 55).

Eysenck (1986) maintains:

I have always taken it for granted that the obvious failure of Freudian therapy to significantly improve on spontaneous remission or placebo treatment is the clearest proof we have of the inadequacy of Freudian theory, closely followed by the success of alternative methods of treatment, such as behavior therapy. (p. 236)

Whereas critics, such as Popper (1986), insist that Freud's theories cannot be falsified and therefore are not scientific, Eysenck claims that because Freud's theories can be falsified, they are scientific. Grünbaum (1986) concurs with Eysenck that Freud's theory is falsifiable and therefore scientific, but he goes one step further and claims that Freud's theory of psychoanalysis has been proven wrong and is simply bad science.

Evaluating the Strengths of Psychoanalysis
In order to evaluate the strengths of Freud's theory of psychoanalysis, one must consider a few of the qualities that make a theory of personality or behavior "great." Among the many qualities that people consider to be important are that the theory addresses its problem, can be applied in practical ways, fits with other theories, and withstands the test of time. In addition, a good theory, according to many philosophers of science, is falsifiable, able to be generalized, leads to new theories and ideas, and is recognized by others in the field. Clearly psychoanalysis meets many of these criteria.

As noted previously, Freud coined the term "psychoanalysis" in 1856. Even today, as we are rapidly approaching the twenty-first century, psychoanalysis remains as a valid option for patients suffering from mental illnesses. The acceptance and popularity of psychoanalysis is apparent through the existence of numerous institutes, organizations, and conferences established around the world with psychoanalysis as their focus. The theory of psychoanalysis was innovative and revolutionary, and clearly has withstood the test of time.

Perhaps even more noteworthy than the longevity of psychoanalysis is the fact that it has served as a catalyst to many professionals in the field of psychology and prompted them to see connections that they otherwise would have missed. Psychoanalysis enlightened health professionals about many aspects of the human mind and its inner workings, phenomena that had previously been inexplicable. As a direct result of psychoanalysis, approaches to psychological treatment now considered routine or commonplace were developed worldwide (Farrell, 1981, p. 202).

By far one of the greatest strengths of psychoanalysis is that it is a very comprehensive theory. Psychoanalysis, originally intended as a theory to explain therapeutic or psychological concepts, explains the nature of human development and all aspects of mental functioning. However, many experts contend that psychoanalysis can also be used to describe or explain a vast array of other concepts outside of the realm of the psychological field. For example, religion, Shakespeare's character "Hamlet," the nature of companies and their leaders, or an artist's paintings can all be explained by the principles of psychoanalysis. This comprehensiveness suggests that the theory of psychoanalysis is, at least to some extent, pointing in the general direction of the truth (Farrell, 1981, p. 195).

Conclusion
I concur with the many critics who insist upon the invalidity of Freud's evidence due to the lack of empirical data and the demographically restricted sample of individuals on which Freud based the majority of his ideas. Like Farrell (1981), I agree that sometimes it appears as if common sense does not have a place in psychoanalytic theory and, as a result, I believe irrelevant and false assumptions are made all too frequently. In addition, parts of Freudian theory are too generalized and fail to leave adequate room for exceptions to the general rule. Finally, I find it hard to accept that all mental problems stem from issues concerning aspects of sex, such as unresolved Oedipal and Electra complexes. I believe that this is a gross exaggeration and overgeneralization.

Despite the weaknesses of psychoanalysis, I believe that the many strengths of the theory are extremely significant. Therefore, I maintain that psychoanalysis is a theory that should not be disregarded. Because psychoanalysis was developed a century ago and is still considered to be a credible and effective method of treating mental illnesses, I contend that at least significant parts of the theory are accurate. Second, I believe that psychoanalysis is a scientific theory due to the fact that it is falsifiable and has, in fact, been proven false because other methods of treatment have been proven effective. Third, I believe that psychoanalysis is comprehensive, can be applied in practical ways, and contains valid arguments. Finally, I believe that psychoanalysis is a substantial theory of personality because it is directly responsible for the development of additional psychological theories and hypotheses that otherwise may have been missed.

Psychoanalysis is widely disputed, but perhaps it is necessary to return to the founder of psychoanalysis himself. Freud (1949) wrote in his Outline of Psychoanalysis

the teachings of psychoanalysis are based on an incalculable number of observations and experiences, and only someone who has repeated those observations on himself and on others is in a position to arrive at a judgment of his own upon it. (p. 11)

Although I am hardly an expert on psychoanalysis, I believe that to dismiss the theory completely would be a tremendous oversight because without it many other valuable psychological techniques and theories most likely would have remained undiscovered.

Peer Commentary

Analyzing Psychoanalysis
Sapna Cheryan
Northwestern University

Beystehner's article, "Psychoanalysis: Freud's Revolutionary Approach to Human Personality," examines Freud and his field of psychoanalysis in order to determine if the recognition it has received since its inception at the turn of the century has been deserved. In this article, Beystehner reviews various aspects of psychoanalysis, history of Freud, main ideas, and criticisms of psychoanalysis. The article concludes by acknowledging flaws in psychoanalysis, but asserts the value that Freud and his theories have added to the field of psychology.

Sigmund Freud was the psychologist responsible for forming and forwarding the first ideas in psychoanalysis. His theories were highly controversial and remain so to this day. The foundation of psychoanalysis is rooted in the idea that humans have unconscious longings that must be analyzed in order to understand behavior. Such unconscious desires are usually sexual and aggressive tendencies. Psychoanalysis is a method to uncover the source and elements of these impulses. Various methods, including free association, dream interpretation, and analysis of slips in conversation are used to identify latent longings.

Beystehner classifies critics into three categories. The first group is critical of Freud because of his method of data collection or his lack of data. A second group of critics dislikes techniques that psychoanalysts use to assist their patients. Free association, according to Grünbaum (1986), is "not a valid method of accessing the patients' repressed actual memories because there is no way of ensuring that the analyst is capable of distinguishing between the patients' actual memories and imagined memories constructed due to the influence of the analyst's leading questions" (p. 226). Finally, Beystehner refers to critics who condemn psychoanalysis as not being scientific. Because it is impossible to test, lacks predictions, and has no "interpretive rules," it contradicts many of the fundamental tenets of science.

Beystehner does an excellent job of reviewing the history of psychoanalysis and summarizing main ideas. Although she identifies some important critics, many others are left out. Freud has a significant number feminist critics because many of his theories viewed women's sexuality in a negative light. In addition, Beystehner discusses Freud's view that homosexuality is an "error occurring in the development of the sexual function." Such an idea has been criticized with relatively recent emerging research on homosexuality. Therefore, critiques of Freud stretch farther than examined in this article. Nonetheless, Beystehner's conclusion about psychoanalysis is valuable.

First, the aspects that make a theory "great" are underscored. Beystehner shows how Freud's theories satisfy such aspects, thereby making it one of the greatest theories about human behavior. Flaws are acknowledged, yet "psychoanalysis is a theory that should not be disregarded." It has helped develop and refine many new fields of psychology.

Peer Commentary

Great Ideas, But Great Science?
Nathan Jones
Northwestern University

The paper on psychoanalysis by Beystehner presents an argument that attempts to establish Freud's revolutionary theory of psychotherapy as a "great" idea in the study of personality. Despite the great criticism of him by several scientists, the author believes Freud should not be overlooked. She believes that Freud's theory, by withstanding the tests of time and by influencing so many other ideas in the field of personality, cannot be dismissed. In addition, she believes that psychoanalysis is a scientific method. The arguments are presented in a neat, linear manner that can be followed easily. First, the author gives origins and histories of psychotherapy, and then goes on to explain the theories of Freud. She finally documents important critical and positive viewpoints on the father of psychoanalysis.

The paper is strong in its clear presentation, with a final conclusion that is supported by the evidence brought forth in the author's argument. However, many criticisms of Freud are left unresolved. The author does state in her conclusion that Freud's arguments have their weaknesses, but she believes that an idea can still be great if it is flawed. The problem is that the strengths of his work are unclear and are directly refuted by Freud's critics. Perhaps the greatest question left unresolved is the falsifiablity of Freud. Can we interpret his theories as a true science, or are they merely speculations at the human mind? The author believes that psychoanalysis is a scientific method because it is falsifiable, but no concrete proof of that is presented. The author shows that Freud is important because he influenced so much thought in the 20th century, and because he addressed issues previously kept in the dark. However, I believe the author falls short of establishing psychoanalysis as a science. The criticisms are overwhelming, and the author rarely takes the time to refute these points.

The criticisms collected regarding psychoanalysis are placed into three categories by the author, criticisms of Freud's evidence, techniques, and principles. Freud and his theories are criticized on all levels. Attacks range from his intentions to his empirical evidence. At one point it is stated: "Greenburg believes that Freud's case studies do not place enough stress on revealing the outcome of the treatment and that Freud's aim was to illustrate his theoretical points." And then almost immediately following: "Critics contend that Freud's evidence is flawed due to the lack of an experiment, the lack of a control group, and the lack of observations that went unrecorded (Colby, 1960, p. 54)." Things that are synonymous with modern scientific theory and method are omitted from Freud's theory. These multiple gaping holes in Freud's work are presented in quick procession, and are followed by no discussion. Instead, the reader is left thinking only of all of Freud's flaws. A mountain of these facts is built up, but it is never knocked down.

Instead of defending Freud against the points of the previous section, the portion of the paper evaluating the strengths of Freud concentrates on the influence Freud has had both inside and outside of psychology. The author states that "a good theory, according to many philosophers of science, is falsifiable, able to be generalized, leads to new theories and ideas, and is recognized by others in the field. Clearly psychoanalysis meets many of these criteria." Yet the formerly stated criticisms of psychoanalysis as a science seem too great to ignore; the author offers no resolution to these points. More importantly, the author fails to prove the falsifiability of the theories. The only proof given is that psychoanalysis is falsifiable "because other methods of treatment have been proven effective." This is a vague statement that, even if true, in no way provides a strong foundation to such an important and pivotal argument. Creating falsifiability is vital in establishing psychoanalysis as a scientific theory. Without a reasonable claim at this, it is difficult to discuss a theory as a science. Instead of clearly meeting the criteria of a good, scientific theory, psychoanalysis falls short. Because of this, evaluating psychoanalysis as a scientific method is unreasonable. This is significant in evaluating Freud's theories as "great." The only strengths successfully argued are that his psychoanalysis still lingers today and that it has led to new theories and ideas.

I do not believe that the ideas of Freud should be dismissed completely. Freud's influence has been great on many. He has permeated into society and is now commonplace in the public's evaluation of personality. The author of this article explains how Freud's work acted as a catalyst, opening the eyes of several scientists to new theories that otherwise would have been missed. Freud's theories can effectively be applied to the human personality and to the development of the human mind and sexuality. They can even be applied to works outside of the realm of psychology. Yet, in this article, the author does not effectively establish psychoanalysis as a science. The criticisms of Freud (his technique, method, and principles), and the author's failure to prove falsifiability of psychoanalysis make it impossible to accept his theories as a science. Freud's revolutionary thinking and his effect on those who followed clearly establish that his theories have had a "great" impact in the field of personality. However, the author does not provide significant evidence to establish Freud's work as a scientific method.

Peer Commentary

Psychoanalysis: A Not-So-Great Idea?
Anna S. Lin
Northwestern University

This paper discusses Freud's theory of psychoanalysis, including an evaluation of whether or not the theory qualifies as a "great" idea of personality. The author notes several strong arguments that critics of the theory have made, but also suggests that the theory is comprehensive enough to remain in consideration. For example, although Beystehner makes the assertion that Freud's data were not scientific, she also points out that the theory is not only still in use after an entire century, but it has influenced many more theories as well.

The author describes the theory of psychoanalysis fairly well. Although slightly brief, the outline of psychoanalysis given is understandable if the reader has some knowledge of the topic. Some concepts, such as the latent stage and the Electra complex, could be further elaborated. Similarly, Freudian slips, or "parapraxes," are not explained at all. Beystehner also states that there are both positive and negative aspects of transference, but does not provide adequate descriptions of these.

It seems that the criticisms Beystehner makes against psychoanalysis are much more powerful than the defending arguments. For instance, the claims that Freud's data were either "flawed or invalid" indicate that Freud's theory is not scientifically based, a rather large, influential argument against the theory. The comments against Freud's technique of free association fuel the debate on whether his work was done on empirical grounds. Beystehner provides ample support for this criticism, and the reader begins to question whether or not the theory is really based on adequate evidence. It is somewhat contradictory that a theory with such a dubious foundation could remain in existence for so long, let alone serve as the basis for other theories. Beystehner asserts that psychoanalysis is, in fact, a falsifiable theory, and so it is appropriately categorized as a scientific theory. However, her paper lacks the support necessary to convince the reader of this idea. The fact that other types of treatment have been shown to be effective does not satisfy the reader as acceptable evidence that the theory is scientific. The concepts behind Freud's psychoanalysis are nearly impossible to test empirically; how does one go about proving the existence of an id? It is no wonder that Freud's data were "flawed." Psychoanalysis can only be based on observations and interpretations, which are not always standardized, and thus predictions are not always accurate. Beystehner has done well in bringing these problems to light.

Nevertheless, psychoanalysis is a very comprehensive theory that can be used to explain many aspects of human psychology. The author evaluates this point as well as other strengths of the theory, but the reasoning in support of the theory is not quite up to par with the arguments against it. The main item that confirms the theory's strength deals with the "longevity of psychoanalysis." The reader is left to wonder how, with all the criticism against it, the theory has remained intact for so long. Although psychoanalysis is extremely comprehensive, contains some valid arguments, and has been utilized in both clinical and research psychology, empirical support in favor of the theory seems to be lacking.

Beystehner also seems to draw several conclusions without offering clarifying examples. She states that "irrelevant and false assumptions are made all too frequently" in the field of psychoanalysis, and specific examples could be included. Also, she claims that psychoanalysis "can be applied in practical ways," which is a rather vague description of the theory's usefulness.

In her conclusion, Beystehner uses a quote from Freud, in which Freud implies that he has based psychoanalysis on his observations of both himself and others. However, Rand and Torok (1997) have noted that Freud did not completely understand himself, which would contribute to his flawed data results (p. 221). Once again, the validity of psychoanalysis comes into question. Perhaps the case for the theory needs some reconsideration. Undoubtedly, the author has made some very clear points, and should be commended on her accomplishment of compiling such a comprehensive evaluation of psychoanalysis. On the other hand, the justifications for agreeing with the theory fall short of the critique against it, and so the reader can conclude that psychoanalysis may not be as great of a theory as previously thought.

Peer Commentary

Freud Alone
Ethan R. Plaut
Northwestern University

Beystehner's essay on psychoanalysis is a good introduction to Freudian theory, and also addresses the issue of whether it holds water as a science, but stops there, which is somewhat misleading. There are even a few simple factual statements that I find questionable, including the statement that the superego's demands are managed by the id. Nothing can really be "managed" by the id, nor the superego, for that matter. These two elements counterbalance each other, but only the ego is capable of "management." The term "Electra phase" is also attributed to Freud, which is a term with which he personally did not agree. In a paper such as this one that addresses Freudian theory, rather than psychoanalysis as a whole, it would be more appropriate to simply note the theoretical gaps in the theory for females. Freud's famous quote "What do women want?" would be appropriate to note. He conceded that he was unable to make his theory a balanced one for both sexes, so why not simply address that in the paper?

Neglecting much of the literature is a much more serious offense. Only Freud's writings are addressed as far as psychoanalytic theory goes, and all of the innovations within Freud's framework are ignored. Psychoanalysis has come a long way since Freud's day, including changes that account for the aforementioned inability of Freud's theory to address the issues specific to women. Many criticisms of Freud are briefly noted in the essay, but the only one that is properly addressed is the question of whether psychoanalysis has a solid scientific basis in theory and practice--that is, whether it should be considered a "pure science." This question may be an issue, but I think it is essentially a secondary one. Many modern analysts would simply concede this point, and go on their merry post-Freudian way. Far more important issues regarding sexuality, etc., are simply glossed over and left to rot as loose ends, unaddressed in the paper and, therefore, in the reader's head. There has been a lot of criticism of psychoanalysis, and it has held up very well under fire. To address only the question of scientific status, which is one of the few criticisms that has been conceded by analysts, but is (arguably) a relatively unimportant criticism, is a horrible mistake in a paper that aims to survey the literature on psychoanalysis. The paper is relatively good on the points that it addresses, but for an overview of psychoanalysis, it fails to emphasize the right points.

Peer Commentary

Freud's Psychoanalytic Theory Raises Concerns in Light of Modern Culture
Purva H. Rawal
Northwestern University

Sigmund Freud is arguably the most well known psychologist of the 20th century. As the founder of psychoanalysis, he has greatly impacted the development of psychotherapy and treatment methods through the course of the century. His influence on the field remains strong and his theory continues to generate controversy. Psychoanalysis remains embroiled in this controversy as many detractors claim that the theory has its flaws. Its redeeming factor is the legacy it leaves behind, as it has furthered the therapeutic field in unimaginable ways. Contrastingly, opponents of the theory point to the lack of empirical evidence and the heavy reliance on free association techniques as proof of obvious inadequacies. Psychoanalysis is undoubtedly a "great" idea in psychology as the author clearly notes; however, the theory's shortcomings are far from few in the light of modern demands.

One of the greatest inadequacies in Freud's theory that the author does not investigate further is the inability of the theory to explain behaviors in our modern culture. In many senses, Freud's theory was only applicable in his own era. The prevalence of same-sex parents raising children in homosexual homes or the even more common phenomenon of single-parent households raise questions that psychoanalysis fails to answer. The psychoanalytic theory is horribly inadequate in its investigation of female emotional and sexual development. Freud concentrated on male development, as he was part of a male dominated era; however the lack of foresight is clear as half the population's development has been insufficiently accounted for under the guidelines of the theory. Difficulties arise when one attempts to explain female development and behavior based on psychoanalytic theory because it is so incomplete in this arena. The demographic scope of investigation of psychoanalysis is apparent when measured against modern standards.

The role and interpretation of dreams was one of the cornerstones of Freud's theory. He used dreams and their subsequent interpretations to bring subconscious conflict to the forefront. The author succinctly describes the role of dreams in psychoanalysis; however, more recent evidence refuting Freud's claims is rather interesting. The proliferation of psychotherapy in the modern day has brought controversial and unsettling issues under close scrutiny. The ability of therapists to strongly influence patients' memories has been supported in numerous studies. Loftus (1993a, 1993b, 1995) has also shown in many studies that memories are often reconstructed and that the therapist aids in the construction process through such avenues as dream interpretation and hypnosis. The question of whether dreams are a reliable source of information has been refuted by most in the field; yet, patients continue to reconstruct memories with the aid of therapists. The modern scientific phenomenon has it roots in Freud's original psychoanalytic theory.

Clear mention is made of the fundamental technique of free-association in Freud's clinical cases. The reliance on free-association and on dream interpretation point to a greater problem: the lack of empirical evidence. The lack of empirical evidence is a point to which the strongest opponents of psychoanalysis look in criticism of the theory. Perhaps the reason many modern psychologists are unable to reconcile the psychoanalytic theory with modern treatment techniques is due to this apparent lack of empirical evidence. Modern science looks to empirical evidence for confirmation of any theory's validity. Freud was clearly unable to provide the empirical evidence of modern standards; thus, only if we look at the psychoanalytic theory from the ideas it has spurred rather than at its literal meaning can psychoanalysis be considered a "great" idea in personality.

Psychoanalysis displays its greatest strength as one views the progress that has been made in the treatment of the mentally ill. Proponents of psychoanalysis have contributed to its widespread influence as it has encouraged other fields of research and investigation. Psychoanalysis fostered interest in human emotional and psychological development traced back to a young age. The human can be seen from a much more holistic viewpoint as one looks at the psychoanalytic theory, which combines the inner workings of the mind and attempts to explain them in the context of a dynamic social environment.

The author provides an accurate assessment of Freud's psychoanalytic theory as she points out its two major inadequacies, the demographic restrictions of the subject population and the lack of empirical evidence, while also salvaging the theory by concentrating on the legacy it left behind. Although the specifics of the psychoanalytic theory cannot be supported via empirical evidence and many aspects of the theory cannot explain modern phenomena, Freud still made a considerable and lasting contribution to psychology. The controversy surrounding his theory to this very day is testimony of its greatest strength: its ability to foster and encourage further investigation and the presentation of new theories. Freud brought psychology to a new precipice as he delved into the workings of the inner mind.

Author Response

Evaluating the Criticisms: Psychoanalysis and its Legacy
Kristen M. Beystehner
Northwestern University

It seems to me that there are several common criticisms of my paper, "Psychoanalysis: Freud's Revolutionary Approach to Human Personality." First, several commentators are of the opinion that I failed to fully establish falsifiability of Freud's psychoanalytic theory. Second, several commentators believe that I did not adequately describe the most important criticisms of Freudian theory. Third, several commentators feel that I failed to fully resolve or refute the criticisms of psychoanalysis that I detailed in my paper. In this response, I will attempt to reply to these and all of the other valuable criticisms made by the authors of the peer commentaries on my article.

In her commentary, "Analyzing Psychoanalysis," Cheryan cites two weaknesses of my paper to be the omission of feminist critics of psychoanalysis and the omission of recent research concerning homosexuality. As Cheryan writes, "Critiques of Freud stretch farther than examined in this article." I am in agreement with this point. Clearly Freud and psychoanalysis have been criticized and attacked from nearly every angle. In choosing to classify the criticisms of Freud into the three categories of criticisms of Freud's evidence, Freud's technique, and the basic principles of psychoanalysis, I was attempting merely to highlight some of the criticisms that appeared to be significant and mentioned by many authors. Perhaps with a bit more research, I would have found more criticisms of the type Cheryan mentions, but because of the vast number of criticisms against Freud and his work, it was necessary that I select several areas of criticism on which to focus my article.

Like Cheryan, Rawal points out in her article that I failed to investigate psychoanalysis' inability to explain certain behaviors in our modern world. She too cites the examples of homosexuality and the overall inadequacy of the theory's positions on the sexual and emotional development of females. I have to agree with Rawal and Cheryan that one of the greatest oversights of Freud was his failure to develop his theory well enough for females. This was due, as Rawal notes in her commentary, to the time period in which Freud worked, an era that was definitely male-dominated.

In his commentary, "Freud Alone," Plaut mentions a statement in my paper with which he finds fault. In my paper, I stated that the superego's demands are managed by the id. Plaut goes on to explain how "nothing can really be 'managed' by the id, nor the superego." Upon review of my sources, I have to conclude that I misinterpreted some information. In short, this statement in my paper is, in fact, false. To correct this error, I wish to emphasize the fact that the demands of both the superego and the id are managed by the ego.

Plaut also cites my use of the term "Electra complex," a term with which Freud did not personally agree. Once again, Plaut is correct here. The term was first used by Jung, and Freud did, in fact, argue against its introduction in one of his papers. I must admit that I did realize that Freud did not coin the term "Electra complex," but I included it in my paper for two reasons. First, the term is used by many critics and appears to be generally accepted, and second, I felt that the term made differentiating between the developmental experiences of males and females easier for the reader to comprehend.

Plaut states in his article that "only Freud's writings are addressed as far as psychoanalytic theory goes, and all of the innovations within Freud's framework are ignored." He is correct here, and I agree with him that psychoanalysis has come a long way since Freud. However, the purpose of my particular paper was not to provide a current update of those innovations. Instead, I attempted to provide an overview of Freud's theory, not the theories of his successors. Finally, I evaluated whether or not I believe Freud's specific theory of psychoanalysis, not the practice of psychoanalysis in general, is indeed a valuable theory of human personality.

Plaut also asserts that I failed to emphasize the right points. He believes that, although the question of whether or not psychoanalysis has a solid, scientific foundation may be an important issue, "it is essentially a secondary one." I disagree. Many of the foremost critics of psychoanalysis find fault with the theory because they believe that it is not scientific. Consequently, I believe that the arguments for and against this argument are indeed extremely important, far more important than Plaut acknowledges.

Finally, Plaut asserts that many modern analysts would simply concede that psychoanalysis is a science and "go on their merry post-Freudian way." However, I find this hard to accept because I have found criticisms stating the exact opposite of Plaut's remark. As I stated in my paper, Storr (1981) insists, "Only a few fundamentalist psychoanalysts of an old-fashioned kind think that Freud was a scientist or that psychoanalysis was or could be a scientific enterprise" (p. 260). There is quite a difference between "many modern analysts," as Plaut asserts and "only a few fundamentalist psychoanalysts," according to Storr. This and the importance of the issue of whether psychoanalysis is indeed a science are definite sources of disagreement between Plaut's beliefs and my own.

In "Psychoanalysis: A Not-So-Great Idea?" Lin first cites my omission of Freudian slips as a significant error. Although I did allude to Freudian slips, or "parapraxes" in the section of my paper detailing the method of psychoanalytic treatment, Lin is correct in stating that I failed adequately to explain their nature. In regards to this and other brief descriptions of various topics in my paper of which Lin would like to see more explanation, I was merely trying to be succinct. I highlighted the basics of Freud's theory, and I maintain that the primary aspects of his psychoanalytic theory are explained quite adequately.

Lin also cites my use of one of Freud's quotations in my conclusion and the fact that recent research has shown that, according to Lin, "Freud did not completely understand himself, which would contribute to his flawed data results." In regards to this point, I must admit that I am not familiar with the research Lin cites, and I can only offer my intent for including this quotation, which was merely to illustrate Freud's opinion that only individuals schooled in the details of psychoanalytic theory are in a position whereby they can offer their views of psychoanalysis.

Perhaps more important though is the criticism of both Lin and Jones that I failed to establish psychoanalysis as a falsifiable theory. However, I believe that falsifiability is a somewhat straightforward issue. In my opinion, because methods of treatment other than psychoanalysis have been used successfully in the treatment of mental illness, psychoanalysis has indeed been falsified. Among the alternative methods that have been proven effective are behavior and cognitive therapy, not to mention spontaneous remission or placebo treatment (Eysenck, 1986, p. 236).

Lin also considers the conclusion of my paper to be vague and in need of more examples. In attempting to be brief, I may have inadvertently neglected a few of the details that Lin mentions. First, in regards to my statement that "irrelevant and false assumptions are made all too frequently" in the field of psychoanalysis, I was referring primarily to the types of generalizations whereby psychoanalysts, for instance, define the causes of all sorts of mental issues to be due to unresolved Oedipal and Electra complexes. This type of generalization is, in my opinion, exaggerated and lacking in common sense. Second, in regards to my statement that psychoanalysis "can be applied in practical ways," I was referring to its use as a method of treatment of various mental illnesses, its attempt at explaining the inner workings of the human mind in the context of the world and the environment, and its ability to serve as a catalyst for further investigation of other psychological theories. I apologize for this apparent lack of clarity.

Lin and Jones both believe that the strengths of psychoanalysis that I detailed do not stack up to the many criticisms of the theory. However, I disagree. The fact that psychoanalysis has withstood the test of time so well indicates without a doubt that at least parts of the theory are accurate. In addition, Freud's influence on the field of psychology remains strong even today. The legacy that Freud left behind is tremendous, and his theories have furthered the field of psychology in an infinite number of ways. Although my paper detailed many criticisms of Freud's theory, I believe that these only serve to further illustrate one of psychoanalysis' greatest strengths: its controversiality. As a direct result of Freud's theory, additional psychological theories and hypotheses have been developed that otherwise may have been missed. This, in my opinion, is by far the greatest achievement of Freud's psychoanalytic theory and overshadows any and all of its many criticisms.

In his commentary "Great Ideas, But Great Science?" Jones asserts the primary weaknesses of my article to be many of the same criticisms made by Lin, as I have noted previously. These include the arguments that the criticisms of psychoanalysis are left unresolved, that the strengths of psychoanalysis are vague and do not stack up well against its many criticisms, and that the falsifiability of the theory is not well-established.

In addition, Jones finds fault with my categorization of the criticisms of Freud and his theory. He emphasizes that, "Freud and his theories are criticized on all levels. Attacks range from his intentions to his empirical evidence." I strongly agree with Jones on this issue. Jones seems to be bothered by the conflicting criticisms and my lack of discussion regarding each one. However, I believe much of the criticism that I detailed is somewhat self-explanatory, and in response to Jones' assertion that the "reader is left thinking only of Freud's flaws," I believe that the strengths of Freud's theory, including its legacy, serendipitous quality, and controversiality, are indeed strong enough to overpower the many arguments against it.

Jones, like Lin, maintains that the falisifiability of psychoanalysis is not well-established though he insists this is in part due to the somewhat vague statement in my conclusion that "other methods have been proven effective." As I mentioned previously, behavioral and cognitive therapy have both been successful in the treatment of mental illnesses. Therefore, I would like to reiterate that psychoanalysis has definitely been falsified as was noted by Eysenck (1986) and many other critics. As a result, contrary to the opinion of Jones, psychoanalysis does meet this aspect of the definition of a scientific theory and should therefore, in my opinion, be considered scientific.

All of the criticisms from each of the peer commentators are valuable and interesting. However, I believe that no critic can deny the fact that psychoanalysis is indeed a "great" idea of human personality. Clearly, psychoanalysis is an important tool in practice. It provides great insight into the inner workings of the human mind, provides a deeper understanding as to the fundamental problems that cause mental illness, and its controversiality has resulted in the investigation and development of many other psychological theories. In my opinion, these tremendous achievements of Freud and his theory far outweigh the many criticisms. It is my desire, along with many other supporters of psychoanalysis, that the theory of psychoanalysis be fully appreciated for its relevance and profound effects on modern-day psychology as well as its use in the clinical environment, despite the many criticisms against it.

References
American Psychoanalytic Association (1998, January 31). About psychoanalysis [WWW document]. URL http://www.apsa.org/pubinfo/about.htm

Colby, K. M. (1960). An introduction to psychoanalytic research. New York: Basic.

Edelson, M. (1986). The evidential value of the psychoanalyst's clinical data. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, 232-234.

Erwin, E. (1986). Defending Freudianism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, 235-236.

Eysenck, H. J. (1986). Failure of treatment--failure of theory? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, 236.

Farrell, B. A. (1981). The standing of psychoanalysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Freud, S. (1949). An outline of psychoanalysis. New York: Norton.

Gay, P. (1989). Sigmund Freud: A brief life. In J. Strachy (Ed.), An outline of psychoanalysis (pp. vii-xx). New York: Norton.

Greenberg, R. P. (1986). The case against Freud's cases. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, 240-241.

Grünbaum, A. (1986). Précis of The foundations of psychoanalysis: A philosophical critique. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, 217-284.

Holt, R. R. (1986). Some reflections on testing psychoanalytic hypotheses. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, 242-244.

Loftus, E. F. (1993a). Desperately seeking memories of the first few years of childhood: The reality of early memories. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 122, 274-277.

Loftus, E. F. (1993b). The reality of repressed memories. American Psychologist, 48, 518-537.

Loftus, E. F. (1995, March-April). Remembering dangerously. Skeptical Inquirer, 20-29.

National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis (1998, January 31). The making of a psychoanalyst [WWW document]. URL http://www.npap.org/inst.htm

Notturno, M. A., & McHugh, P. R. (1986). Is Freudian psychoanalytic theory really falsifiable? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, 250-252.

Popper, K. (1986). Predicting overt behavior versus predicting hidden states. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, 254-255.

Rand, N., & Torok, M. (1997). Questions for Freud: The secret history of psychoanalysis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Spence, D. P. (1986). Are free associations necessarily contaminated? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, 259.

Wax, M. L. (1986). Psychoanalysis: Conventional wisdom, self knowledge, or inexact science? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, 264-265.

Last modified August 1998
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Psychoanalysis: From Theory to Practice, Past to Present

2007-08-15T15:29:00.000-07:00

by Ethan R. Plaut
Northwestern University

This paper first summarizes the central theory of psychoanalysis, beginning with Freud's groundbreaking contributions divided into five parts: dynamic, economic, developmental, structural, and adaptive. It then moves on to more recent developments within the Freudian framework. Next there is an account of the basic techniques of psychoanalytical treatment. Finally, there is a section on some of the many criticisms of psychoanalysis, with responses.

Psychoanalysis remains the single most influential theory for the practice of psychotherapy. Freud (1964) began the movement, so this paper will begin with his foundation. One way of dividing his theory is into five parts: the dynamic, the economic, the developmental, the structural, and the adaptive (Rapaport & Gill, 1959).

Freud's Theory
Dynamic
The "dynamic" level of Freud's (1964) theory deals with instinctual forces (Rapaport & Gill, 1959). He traces all instincts, and in a certain sense therefore all actions, back to two instincts; they are the Eros ("sexual instinct" or "libido") and the "destructive (aggressive) instinct." They work together and against each other and have a hand in everything we do. The primary example of this is sex itself, where of course the libido is present, and varying degrees of aggression (or lack thereof) can lead someone to either be bashful and impotent or a sex murderer, and anything in-between.

Economic
Freud's (1964) theory of the instincts is further realized in the "economic" level of his theory (Rapaport & Gill, 1959). This attempts, in some fashion, to abstractly quantify the power of instincts through the concept of "psychic energy." This is described through a system in which this energy in invested towards instinctual goals through cathexes, toward maximizing the pleasure for the individual. This, however, is balanced by the concept of anti-cathexes, in which the energy is invested as a force against the instinct, via defense in the ego (this concept will be further elaborated in the section on the structural model).

Developmental
The third part of Freud's (1964) theory is the "developmental" (Rapaport & Gill, 1959). Freud noted three major ideas in his theory that contradicted common beliefs. First, sexual life begins at birth. Second, a distinction between 'sexual' and 'genital' has to be made, because the former is a broader term encompassing many things totally disconnected from the genitals, for example oral and anal pleasure (Freud, 1964). Third, physical pleasure may be brought into the service of reproduction, but the two often fail to coincide completely. His model of development is four stages long, and only lasts through early life (other more complex models that give detailed representations of adulthood have been proposed by others; Erickson's will be addressed later in the section of this paper devoted to developments within the Freudian framework).

The oral phase begins at birth, when the mouth is the only erotogenic zone. It is, of course, for the purpose of nourishment that the baby persistently sucks at its mother's breast, but the baby nevertheless derives pleasure from this. The (Sadistic-)Anal Phase is characterized by satisfaction being sought in aggression and in the excretory function. In the Phallic Phase the male genitals take center stage. The male then enters the "Oedipal Stage" and begins touching his penis and fantasizing about doing something with it to his mother, until the threat of castration and realization of the lack of a penis in females throws him into the period of latency. In Freud's view, girls, recognizing their lack of a penis and inferior clitoris, suffer developmentally and often begin turning away from sex altogether. The next phase, puberty, is the one in which the individuals become increasingly aware of their adult sexual roles.

Structural
The fourth point of Freud's (1964) theory, the all-important "structural" divisions, come under two main categories: the structural and the topographical models (Rapaport & Gill, 1959). The structural model consists of three parts: the id, the ego, and the superego. The id is the agency of the "psychical apparatus" which contains much of what is inherited (there are also inherited ego characteristics), including the instincts. Psychic energy gets displaced and transformed, and then eventually discharged through action. Psychic determinism is that the instincts and their vicissitudes determine human behavior, modified by the ego.

The ego is the agency that acts as an intermediary between the id and the external world. It takes on the tasks of voluntary movement (using muscles in response to stimuli) and self preservation. It is charged with gaining control over the demands of the instincts, and choosing which ones to satisfy and when. The ego seeks pleasure and avoids unpleasure. When increases in unpleasure are expected, they are met by anxiety. The ego not only has to balance the id with reality, but also with the superego. The superego is the agency formed over time by the parents and society of the individual. It observes, orders, judges, and threatens the ego with punishment just like the parents whose place it has taken. We are generally aware of it as our conscience. Freud (1964) attributed the severity of the superego to the strength of defense used against the temptation of the Oedipus complex (and used this to claim that men have more fully developed superegos--but that is a more complex matter that is more fully dealt with in the sections of this paper on criticisms).

The second structural model is the topographical one. It, again, consists of three main parts: the unconscious, the preconscious, and the conscious. The unconscious is the part of the mind that is inaccessible to conscious thought. It is governed by the pleasure principle, which is simply that drives seek discharge as readily as possible. The barriers between it and the conscious are repression and other defenses. Freud (1953b) saw dreams (and dream analysis) as the central window to the unconscious (see the section on treatment). The preconscious is the part of the mind which is accessible to conscious thought, but is not currently being thought about. An example of preconscious thoughts might be accessible but distant memories. The line of demarcation between the unconscious and the preconscious is the important distinction to draw; the line between the preconscious and the conscious is less important, and is blurry at best.

The conscious is the accessible, "conscious" part of the mind, which contains thought processes including (very importantly) speech (although the preconscious is also considered somewhat verbal). In contrast to the unconscious, the conscious is governed to a large extent by the reality principle, which is that one must generally act according to the reality in which one lives, and therefore gratification must often be delayed.

Adaptive
The last element of Freudian theory is the "adaptive," which has been given much greater emphasis by more modern analysis (Rapaport & Gill, 1959). Freud addressed it, but only in a fairly scattered way. This final major element is how the psyche, the first four elements, relate to the outside world. The ego acts to balance the psyche with reality, as in the example of temporary restraint in order to gain or retain long-term happiness. One important thing to note here is how much emphasis analysts put on person-to-person relationships, most importantly that of the mother and child.

Developments Within the Freudian Framework
There have been many developments within the Freudian framework. This paper will mainly address the work of four people in this context; Freud's daughter, Anna Freud, E. H. Erikson, M. Klein, and H. Kohut.

A. Freud
A. Freud followed in her father's footsteps and became a reputable and influential expert in her own right. Her major innovations were in the field of the ego and the mechanisms of defense. She also indicates resistance to treatment as a form of defense against instinct. She theorized that the affects associated with the instinctual impulses also are defended against in the ego, for example by the means of mastering them by putting them through a metamorphosis, which may manifest itself as emotional suppression or denial, among other things (A. Freud, 1966). A. Freud also refers in her work to a notion that W. Reich (1945) called "Charakterpanzerung," or the "armor-plating of the character." This is the residual manifestation of rigorous past defenses that have been dissociated from their original conflicts. These manifestations, such as stiffness, or peculiarities of personality, such as a fixed smile or arrogant behavior, develop into permanent character traits. The ego has too many defenses to ever be properly discussed here, among them repression (S. Freud's brainchild), displacement, reversal, etc.

Erikson
Erikson made an enormous contribution to and alteration of Freud's developmental theory. He changed and extended the stages into a more complex theory extended throughout life. He also associated a "virtue" and a related developmental issue with each stage. This is especially important because the failure to resolve those issues explains many problems. The seven stages are essentially as follows. The first, or "oral" stage has the virtue of hope and the issue of trust. The anal stage has the virtue of will and the issue of autonomy. The Oedipal stage has the virtue of purpose and the issue of initiative. The latency stage has the virtue of skill and the issue of industry. Adolescence has the virtue of fidelity and the issue of identity. The stage involving marriage and work has the virtue of love and the issue of intimacy. The stage of parenthood has the virtue of the capacity to care for others and the issue of integrity (Erikson, 1950).

Klein
Klein was an important figure in the development of psychoanalysis because she was one of the first to put greater emphasis on the pre-Oedipal stages (Klein, 1975). She wrote of critical issues during the oral and anal stages, and also of earlier Oedipal issues. She theorized that these early issues made "imprints" on later psychic developments. Among her central concepts was the formation/existence of depressive and paranoid positions. She was a major precursor of the modern analysts spoken of as the "object-relations school." This school of thought puts far greater emphasis than Freud on interpersonal relationships, beginning with the mother-child relationship.

Kohut
Currently a variant on this called "self psychology" is receiving a lot of attention. H. Kohut is one of the central figures in this movement. It focuses on the formation of the sense of self as an issue independent of Freud's structural concepts (Kohut, 1971).

Jung
Special mention must be made in this section of Jung. One cannot say that he made developments within the Freudian framework, but he founded the only other school of analysis that has maintained a significant following. Jungian analysis has a much more spiritual foundation. It rests on Jung's emphasis on myth and the presence of a "collective unconscious." This collective unconscious is considered to be present in all people, but is different from Freud's in that it is not created by repression. For Jung, therein lies what makes us human (Jung, 1959).

Treatment
Psychoanalysis is an extremely involved process that takes place over the course of a number of years. The analyst and the patient develop an intimate relationship, which includes "transference," which is a process in which the patient develops a sort of parent-child relationship with the analyst, and therefore transfers the patient's old emotions with his or her actual parents onto the analyst. This makes for an extremely touchy situation in which the analyst has a huge amount of influence, which is necessary but requires care and restraint.

Freud (1964) thought that all neuroses were a result of repressions, and so he sought to use his influence as an analyst to access and help the patient to access the relevant issues in the unconscious. Freud (1964) saw the unresolved Oedipal complex as the most universal, as well as most important, repression (in males). (Freud's theory was admittedly less developed for women, as noted by his statement "That [the eros and sexual development] of males is the more straightforward and the more understandable..." [Freud,1953a, p.207]) Freud's theory holds that males, around the age of three or four, enter into sexual fantasies about their mothers, including fantasies about taking their fathers' places. The father is pictured as threatening the boy with castration as punishment for his early masturbation fantasies and showing off of his penis, which initially seems impossible to the boy, until the realization of the lack of a penis in females. This brings on the "castration complex," which entails long term sexual repression. The question of how to get a (male) patient to accept this about himself, however, was and is an entirely different problem.

Freud (1953a) saw dreams as the major source of insight into the unconscious. Dream interpretation is a very imperfect science, as there are many levels of distortion between the patient's unconscious and the analyst's interpretation. The dream is formed to fulfill some unconscious wish that is normally repressed. The dream, however, is not literal, it is symbolic. The patient must recount his or her memory of the dream (another distortion) before the analyst can even begin to trace it to its unconscious root. The other main technique in Freudian analysis is the use of free association, in which patients essentially speak what is on their minds, "associating" one topic with the next. This has the advantage that the analyst may act as observer and listener without using his or her influence (from transference, etc.) to lead the patient in any specific direction. Each one of the two people in the psychoanalytic relationship, hopefully, will eventually meet at the same conclusion as to the cause of the problem (Freud, 1964).

Criticisms
There have been criticisms of psychoanalysis from every imaginable angle. It has been equally strongly defended, and has held up very well under fire. Two common criticisms, espoused by laypeople and professionals alike, are that the theory is too simple to ever explain something as complex as a human mind, and that Freud overemphasized sex and was unbalanced here (was sexist). My opinion is that these criticisms are to a large extent the result of misreading, and therefore miss the point. Freud's model is just that--a model. Like an economic model or any other, it simplifies something almost infinitely complex to a point at which it can be analyzed. Like the process of modeling anything, it is difficult to draw the line of oversimplification, but Freud's theory and models are practical in understanding people and have been fruitful in treatment.

In my mind, there are two important responses to the criticism regarding sexuality. The first is that people misinterpret Freud's use of the word "sexual." The word should generally be inferred to mean "sensual." Freud included in the concept "sexual" the genital, the anal, and the oral (Freud, 1964). However, even most modern Freudians would concede that Freud's emphasis on the Oedipal complex was excessive. In light of this, another legitimate response to criticisms about the role of sexuality in the theory would be to concede that Freud's emphasis was excessive, but that that in itself does not really have any effect on the theory as a whole.

One final criticism, which is often stated, is that Freud's work (and/or Freud himself) was sexist. One can only respond to this in a very limited and fairly unsatisfactory way. Freud's theory was sexually unbalanced--there is no way of denying it. However, he knew and conceded that his theory was less well developed for women; he saw but could not correct this flaw (Freud,1953a), as noted in the section on treatment. The obvious explanations for this inability are time-period cultural bias and the simple fact that Freud was male. Women were not considered equals in Victorian England. Freud's self analysis was an important input into his theories. The reduced emphasis on the Oedipal complex, and other revisions in psychoanalysis, have made modern analysis perfectly applicable to women.

The final criticism addressed here is the question of the scientific status of psychoanalysis. Grünbaum (1986) addressed this issue at length. He makes a detailed refutation of the scientific status of psychoanalysis. Many of his points are well formed and legitimate criticisms. For example, there is an element of suggestibility involved in the treatment process. The "tally argument," which Grünbaum (1986) refutes, is that, first, only the psychoanalytic method can yield correct insight into the causes of neuroses, and second, correct insight is necessary for a durable cure of those neuroses. Grünbaum (1986) writes that this argument fails because of a number of complex reasons that he enumerates in great detail, including the fact that successful treatment has occurred without these conditions being fulfilled. Additionally Freud himself weakened this argument considerably later in life (Grünbaum, 1986). Grünbaum goes on to a number of criticisms based on scientific and logical reasoning that weaken psychoanalytic treatment's scientific status.

It is true that Freud essentially considered psychoanalysis a pure science, but that is a view which has been superseded by the current view, which puts more emphasis on the issue of how fruitful psychoanalytic treatment is as a treatment. Even if an inordinate amount of time is spent writing about theory within the profession, clinical practice plays the central role in the professional lives of psychoanalysts (Michels, 1983). As a science, psychoanalysis is imperfect, but it has stood the test of time as an important basis of psychotherapy.

Peer Commentary

Evaluating the Criticisms of Freud's Theory of Psychoanalysis
Kristen M. Beystehner
Northwestern University

In "Psychoanalysis: From Theory to Practice, Past to Present," Plaut summarizes the central theory of psychoanalysis well, dividing it into five distinct categories: dynamic, economic, developmental, structural, and adaptive. The author then succinctly details the additions and developments of other top psychologists within the Freudian framework. Following a brief discussion of treatment using psychoanalysis, Plaut explores the criticisms of psychoanalysis, which he believes can be grouped into three main categories.

The first main criticism of psychoanalysis, according to the author, is that the theory of psychoanalysis is far too simple to explain the many intricacies and complexities of the human mind. Plaut asserts that Freud's theory is simply a model, whose sole purpose is to simplify something incredibly complex to a point where it can be analyzed. I concur with Plaut that it is difficult to distinguish between simplification and oversimplification when modeling anything. However, I believe that parts of Freudian theory are too generalized and fail to leave adequate room for exceptions to the general rule. I agree with the author's position that Freud's theories have been beneficial in treatment and understanding people. I maintain that because psychoanalysis was developed nearly a century ago and is still considered to be a credible and effective method of treatment for mental illness, at least significant parts of the theory are accurate.

The second main criticism of psychoanalysis, according to the author, is that Freud's theory is sexist and places too much emphasis on sex in general. I too find it hard to believe that all mental problems are the direct result of unresolved Oedipal and Electra complexes. This, in my opinion, is a gross exaggeration and overgeneralization. The author believes that Freud's sexism was a direct result of the time period's cultural bias against women and the fact that Freud himself was male. Plaut cleverly points out that Freud himself acknowledged that his theory was less developed for women.

The final criticism that Plaut details in his article concerns the scientific status of psychoanalysis. The author briefly explains the position of Grünbaum but omits the positions of Popper and Eysenck, both significant critics of psychoanalysis. Popper insists that Freud's theories cannot be falsified and therefore are not scientific, whereas Eysenck claims that Freudian theories can be falsified and therefore are scientific. Grünbaum takes Eysenck's argument one step further to claim that Freud's theories are scientific but have been proven wrong and are simply bad science. I believe that psychoanalysis is a scientific theory due to the fact that it is falsifiable and has, in fact, been proven false. Other methods of treatment, such as cognitive and behavioral therapy, have been proven effective in many instances, and this illustrates that psychoanalysis is not the only option for the treatment of neuroses and mental illnesses.

Although I agree that the criticisms mentioned by the author are noteworthy, I believe that the many criticisms of Freud's evidence and technique must not be overlooked in the evaluation of his theory. First, many critics of Freud's evidence contend that Freud's theory lacks empirical data and relies too much on therapeutic achievements, whereas others maintain that even Freud's clinical data are flawed and inaccurate. Second, Freud's use of free association and dream interpretation in treatment have been heavily criticized by many reviewers. In my opinion, these two criticisms are very important.

The author's accurate assessment of the criticisms of Freudian psychoanalytic theory demonstrates his clear knowledge of the principles upon which psychoanalysis was founded. Although the omission of the criticisms of Freud's evidence and technique is significant, I believe that the article presents Freud's psychoanalytic theory and its notable criticisms quite adequately. After all, Freud and his theories have been criticized on almost every level, yet I think the controversiality of his theory is perhaps its greatest strength. As a direct result of Freud's theory, additional psychological theories and hypotheses have been developed that otherwise may have been missed. This, in my opinion, is by far the greatest achievement of Freud and his theory.

Peer Commentary

An Analysis on the Analysis of the Evolution of Freudian Theory
Paula S. Han
Northwestern University

Plaut explores the evolution of psychoanalytic theory. He begins with the five basic contributions from Freud's psychoanalytic movement, divided into the dynamic, economic, developmental, structural, and adaptive realms. He then discusses more recent contributions to the field. Plaut also mentions the important aspects of treatment. Next, he brings forth the criticisms Freudian theory has received and makes an effort to refute them. Plaut ultimately reports that psychoanalysis has emerged as a very relevant foundation of psychotherapy.

The dynamic level of Freud's theory involves the interplay between the two main alleged human instincts--the libido or sexual instinct, and the destructive or aggressive instinct. The economic level of the theory centers on the investment of energy in exchange for the gain of pleasure. In the developmental level, Freud identifies an oral phase that begins with the infant sucking at the mother's breast. The anal phase is marked by control of excretory functions. Sexual fantasies develop in the phallic phase as well as the entrance into the "Oedipal stage" and a carnal desire for the mother. At this point, castration anxiety in males and penis envy in females lead to a period of latency, followed by the final stage of puberty.

The structural level of Freudian theory divides into structural and topographical models. The structural model is composed of the id, ego, and superego. The id functions according to instincts, and the superego according to morals. It becomes the job of the ego to balance these demands with the realities of the outside world. The topographical model breaks the mind down into the unconscious or inaccessible thought, the conscious or true awareness, and the preconscious or that which is accessible but not presently being thought about. The final, adaptive level is never formally addressed by Freud, but involves how the psyche is able to relate the first four levels to the external world.

Plaut next addresses the developments in the field of psychoanalysis since Freud. Anna Freud elaborated on the role of the ego and its use of defense mechanisms (e.g., repression), as well as the residuals resulting from their use. Erikson slightly modified and extended Freud's stages of development to include adult life. Klein emphasized pre-Oedipal life and its effects on later psychic and possible psychopathological development. Kohut moved away from Freudian concepts and focused on individual attainment of sense of self. Lastly, Jung remains noteworthy for having created another type of analysis, one considering the collective unconscious, a more spiritual concept allegedly present in all people and not created by repression.

Plaut presents some of the central ideas regarding psychoanalytic treatment. First, psychoanalysis involves transference, in which the patient transfers emotions toward the parent onto the therapist. In addition, Freud believed an unresolved Oedipus complex to be a common type of repression occurring in males, having resulted from castration anxiety. Freud also believed dream analysis to be a method of tapping into the unconscious. Lastly, Freudian technique also includes the use of free association between patient and therapist.

Plaut next tackles some common Freudian criticisms. To the criticism that Freud's theory is too simple, Plaut defends that like any other model, simplification is necessary for comprehension. To the criticism that Freud overemphasized sex, he explains that Freud's use of the word "sexual" really encompassed the genital, anal, and oral. Furthermore, he states that a possible overload on sex does not lessen Freud's theory. Plaut then discusses the criticism that Freudian theory is sexist, ignoring females. Although Plaut does admit to the one-sidedness of the Freudian model, he also mentions the bias of the day, which excluded women in general. He also argues that modern developments in the field have allowed for the inclusion of women.

Plaut finally addresses the criticism regarding the scientific validity of psychoanalysis. He presents one of Grünbaum's opinions, which basically refutes psychoanalysis as being the only method that results in the proper understanding of an individual's neuroses. Regardless, Plaut argues that psychoanalysis is currently valued as a successful aspect of clinical treatment. Plaut concludes that psychoanalysis has endured as a valid foundation of psychotherapy.

Plaut does a fine job of being comprehensive, as well as concise, in explaining the five foundations underlying Freudian psychoanalytic theory. When discussing new developments made within the field, however, Plaut fails to present fully the contribution of the other psychologists. The point at which Erikson's and Freud's correlating stages end and Erikson's expansion of stages is not clear. Plaut simply intertwines the two theories so that Erikson cannot be distinguished for his more optimistic, story-like perspective on life (McAdams, 1994, p. 657). Second, extremely little is said about Kohut, the least of which is how Kohut was influenced by psychoanalytic theory in order to expand upon it and create his "self psychology."

Although Plaut mentions the Oedipus complex throughout the paper, he fails to clarify what its correct resolution entails. He does state that the strength of the superego is proportional to the strength of the defense used against the Oedipus complex. In addition, Plaut discusses the development of a castration complex in the Oedipal male, but neither of these fully explains the resolution of the Oedipus complex. Plaut needs to bring it all together by explaining that castration anxiety in the young male leads to identification with the father and so the fear becomes internalized by the boy, enabling a moral voice to develop in the form of the superego.

When addressing the critiques to psychoanalytic theory, Plaut discusses the fact that Grünbaum was able to refute it at great length and detail, and yet Plaut does not go into any of these claims very thoroughly. Plaut should present an argument made by Grünbaum, a potentially valid and convincing one, and explain it thoroughly instead of merely stating that Grünbaum was able to do it. Lastly, Plaut never presents a sociological critique of psychoanalysis. For example he could discuss Chodorow's meriting of the social forces behind the Oedipus complex (McAdams, 1994, p. 76).

All in all, Plaut's presentation and arguments are very valid. Nevertheless, the contributions by other psychologists to the field of psychoanalysis could be further specified. In addition, a more comprehensive explanation of the relationship of the Oedipus complex and the superego is needed, possibly in the discussion of the structural level of Freud's psychoanalytic model. Lastly, Plaut's stance in favor of psychoanalysis could be further strengthened by elaborating on Grünbaum's critiques and then refuting them. Plaut should also bring forth any sociological critiques of Freud's theory and then effectively refute those.

Peer Commentary

A Good Fit, But the Wrong Function
Nathan C. Popkins
Northwestern University

The paper "Psychoanalysis: From Theory to Practice, Past to Present," discusses Freud's most famous (or infamous) contribution to psychology, psychoanalysis. Plaut covers most every aspect of psychoanalysis, dealing especially skillfully with the major criticisms of Freud's theory. These criticisms include the entire list of qualms Grünbaum has with Freud's theory, and other, more general and often raised problems. In conclusion, Plaut decides that psychoanalysis is indeed a great idea in personality.

Essentially, Plaut's paper has me convinced. Psychoanalysis is a great idea in personality, just as long as one is a male, who grew up in a two parent house, who had either a sister or female playmate at a very young age, with a great memory, and who has lots of money and no specific time frame in which one would like one's psychological problems cured. As long as people can live up to most of these criteria, there is a high probability that psychoanalysis will work well for them. Otherwise, they are pretty much out of luck. Actually, in this perspective, maybe psychoanalysis is not such a great idea afterall.

On the issue of sexual inadequacies in the theory, Plaut even admits that Freud's theory is less applicable to women than to men. This is inherent in Freud's theory, which concentrates a great deal on the relationship between mother and son. Freud's auxiliary Electra hypothesis seems little more than an attempt to cover up an obvious flaw in the overall psychoanalytic theory.

Another major problem with Freud's psychoanalysis is that it fails to take into account the large number of people who do not grow up in the atmosphere Freud asserts is necessary for healthy psychological development. In Freud's day, it seems likely that most people did in fact grow up in a two-parent family. Also, children with no siblings, or with only same sex siblings, have a fairly low chance of seeing a member of the opposite sex's genitalia at a young age, another event that is central to Freud's ideas concerning sexual development.

Another problem with Freud's theory is that a cure make take years (and thousands of dollars) to arrive at. This does not make Freud's psychoanalysis wrong necessarily, but inconvenient at best. When compared to other theories in personality, all other factors equal, psychoanalysis is among the least practical methods of achieving a cure.

Many argue that because Freud's theory has been around for so long, and is so widely accepted, that it must be at least mostly true. This is simply an ignorant way of approaching this issue. The fact that no better model exists does not mean that the current model is correct be default. To illustrate this point, consider the age old example of finding the area of a rectangle by a function of its perimeter. Taking a large and random sample of various rectangles, a line can be fitted to their areas that is a function of their perimeters. This line has an excellent R squared value, and would therefore suggest that area of a rectangle is in fact a function of perimeter. As everyone knows, this is wrong. Area is a function of height and width. Perhaps this effect is what has happened to psychoanalysis over the years. Although the theory is wrong and has many flaws, it often provides a good and convenient fit.

Peer Commentary

Whose Theory?
Timothy Tasker
Northwestern University

In "Psychoanalysis: From Theory to Practice, Past to Present," Plaut discusses the relevance of the theory of psychoanalysis. This article appropriately begins with the Freudian contributions to the field of psychoanalysis. I found the outline of Freud's concepts to be a very inclusive summary. I particularly appreciated the five areas into which the original theory of psychoanalysis was broken down: dynamic, economic, developmental, structural, and adaptive. Each section that followed provided a clear and concise summation of the information that it represented.

The second section of this article, beginning under "Developments within the Freudian Framework," is well written and provides an overview of the theorists who further developed psychoanalysis, including Freud's daughter, A. Freud. Plaut includes a wide variety of material that has been further researched or elaborated upon since Freud's time. According to Plaut, these researchers expanded Freud's ideas and made them more accepted--an idea with which I agree. The supporters of psychoanalysis added more information and concepts that Freud was unable to achieve and thereby made his theory more palatable as a science.

I found the section that further discussed Freud's model of the treatment of psychoses according to psychoanalysis to contain uncited material. The section itself provides great information in regards to treatment, but does not disclose who develped these ideas. Supposedly, these concepts should be attributed to Freud. This both discounts the reliability of the writer and makes further research into the field, by a reader, a virtual nightmare.

Although I liked the assignment of "economic" as a factor in, or part of understanding, Freud's theory, it only confuses the matter when included in a discussion of a general model. "Economic" can be understood both in terms of money and in terms of conservation. This is an important distinction that needs to be made. Which definition fits where is the question with which readers are left.

Despite all of the flaws in psychoanalysis, I agree with Plaut in his closing statements concerning the relevance of this theory of personality. No one can doubt the fact that psychoanalysis is an important tool in practice. It provides great insight and can lead to a deeper understanding as to the fundamental problems that underline the issues for which a patient has sought help. It is my hope, along with Plaut, that psychoanalysis will someday be appreciated for its relevance and use in today's clinical environment.

Author Response

Psychoanalysis Remains, Although in the Context and Shadow of its Criticism
Ethan R. Plaut
Northwestern University

The responses to and criticisms of my paper are all a game of give and take, each one starting off by acknowledging Freud's greatness in one sense or another, but then undermining him and/or my paper in another way. Beystehner acknowledges that psychoanalysis is a model, so it is necessarily simplified, and also acknowledges that the line of oversimplification is hard to draw, but then tries to draw it herself. She states her opinion, which is commonly held and important, that the theory is too general and does not leave room for exceptions. I would concede this if it is applied to Freud alone, but modern analysis has greatly changed many things. Emphasis has been taken off of the oedipal complex, among other things, and placed elsewhere. Beystehner also notes that I neglected Popper and Eysenck in my survey of criticisms. First, I must note that for every critic of psychoanalysis to be addressed in detail, a multi-volume work would have to be undertaken. Second, I think that these specific criticisms are at the bottom of the list of those that I should have included. This is because they are arguments about psychoanalysis as a science, and I have conceded in my paper that it is by no means completely scientific in the sense in which these criticisms would be relevant. Again, I offer this same argument to the criticisms of Freud's data. The data are clinical, which makes them subjective and subject to suggestion, but this is simply unavoidable in studies of this nature.

As for the criticism of Freud's (over-) use of free association and dream analysis, I simply disagree. I believe that the way for humans to best deal with problems is to get them out. Human expression is most natural through language. The analyst, of course, is more than a shoulder to cry on, but that is a good starting point, so I think that free association is a perfectly good method. As for dream analysis, first I will note that it is the expression of the unconscious, just as speech is the expression of the conscious. For this reason, it should not be ignored. Second, I will note that dream analysis is generally not as central to modern therapy as it was in Freud's day. Beystehner's closing comment, that psychoanalysis has found its greatest achievement in its controversy, in the other theories it has spawned, is a bit unfair. This is definitely one of the important things that has resulted from Freud's work and that of his followers, but it is silly to me and offensive to analysts to give no importance to all of the patients who have been helped by the therapy.

Han notes that my explanation of Erikson's work was incomplete. This is true. I only mentioned his work in the context of his central contribution to psychoanalysis, involving developmental stages. For a general paper of this length on psychoanalysis as a whole, I think he has been properly addressed. The dividing line between Freud and Erikson is not drawn for two reasons. First, Freud's stages are discussed earlier in the paper, so the differences are somewhat apparent. Second, even Kohut's stages, which essentially correspond to Freud's, are a bit different, so it would be a bit of an oversimplification to say that those stages are the same, but that the later ones are new.

Han then claims that my explanation of the oedipal complex, its resolution, and its relation to the superego, are all incomplete. The resolution of the oedipal complex can only come about through psychoanalysis, at least according to Freud, and entails the patient's realizing and admitting the feelings and fantasies to him- or herself. The results can vary greatly, one example being a cure of neuroses caused by the repression. As for the relation to the superego, this is a subject area that is highly controversial. The relation is hotly debated, and is too complex to warrant the time, space, and understanding that would be required to properly explain it in a paper of this nature. One basic viewpoint is that the identification with the father caused by castration anxiety leads to internalizing of fear, which allows the superego to develop as the moral voice.

Han's final criticism that I will address here regards my section on criticisms. Some critics were omitted, true enough. I believe, however, that my coverage of Grünbaum was sufficient. I conceded the man's point that psychoanalysis is flawed as a science. With no need to refute him, and no need to elaborate his point, why should I have spent more words on him rather than another critic?

Popkins states, "Psychoanalysis is a great idea in personality, just as long as one is a male, who grew up in a two parent house, who had either a sister or female playmate at a very young age, with a great memory, and who has lots of money and no specific time frame in which one would like one's psychological problems cured." This is a very witty way of pointing out a lot of weak criticisms. As for the context of childhood, I simply disagree with the assertion made here. There is no reason that an adopted girl with no siblings and a "poor memory" should be excluded from therapy. As for the criticism of the length and price of therapy, like in so many things, quick-fixes do not work, and time is money. This makes the theory inaccessible and inconvenient, but that is a criticism that all health care must face these days, with expensive machinery and long-term therapies involved in such things as cancer treatment.

Freud should not be credited with something associated with the term "Electra complex/hypothesis." This is simply something with which Freud did not agree. The claim that an only child, or a child with only same sex siblings will have a low chance of seeing the genetalia of the opposite sex is preposterous. I am an only child, and I knew what a vagina was long before I even knew that word, or any other, to describe it. Children are openly exposed to nudity until long after they begin to recognize it, whether it be on the bodies of their parents, those of people in opposite-sex bathrooms, or anyone else's body. Also, Popkins' statement, "The fact that no better model exists does not mean that the current model is correct by default," although persuasive on the surface, falls apart under scrutiny. A model is not a statement of fact, it is an imperfect representation. As such, describing a model as "correct" is somewhat odd. If the model helps us to understand personality, it has some merit.

Tasker makes two main criticisms. First he states that there was uncited material in my section on treatment. I found none. Anything not cited was simply an overview on my part, and I apologize, but I cannot find what Tasker refers to in the paper. Second, Tasker criticizes the use of the word "economic" in reference to the divisions of Freud's theory used here. The divisions, and the term, are not mine, and the source is cited (Rapaport, & Gill, 1959). As for my personal opinion, I do not think that this is particularly important. The term obviously has nothing to do with money, and I think conservation would also be an inappropriate term to identify with this concept in this context. The name given to the division should not be misleading, of course, but it has nothing to do with the theory itself.

References
Erikson, E. H. (1950). Childhood and society. New York: Norton.

Freud, A. (1966). The ego and the mechanisms of defense, the writings of Anna Freud (Vol. II). New York: International Universities Press.

Freud, S. (1953a). Three essays on sexuality, the standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. IV). London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis.

Freud, S. (1953b). The interpretation of dreams, the standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. IV). London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis.

Freud, S. (1964). An outline of psychoanalysis, the standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. XXIII). London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis.

Grünbaum, A. (1986). Précis of The foundations of psychoanalysis: A philosophical critique. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, 217-284.

Jung, C. G. (1959). The archetypes and the collective unconscious, collected works (Vol.9, pt. 1; trans. R. F. C. Hull). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Klein, M. (1975). Envy and gratitude and other works, the writings of Melanie Klein (Vol. III). New York: Free Press.

Kohut, H. (1971). The analysis of the self. New York: International Universities Press.

McAdams, D.P. (1994). The person: An introduction to personality psychology (2nd ed.). Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace.

Michels, R. (1983). The scientific and clinical functions of psychoanalytic theory, the future of psychoanalysis. (Ed. A. Goldberg). New York: International Universities Press.

Rapaport, D., & Gill, M. M. (1959) The points of view and assumptions of metapsychology, the collected papers of David Rapaport (Ed. M. M. Gill). New York: Basic.

Reich, W. (1949). Character-analysis. New York: Noonday.

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What is Psychoanalysis?

2007-08-01T21:03:00.000-07:00

Psychoanalysis is a family of psychological theories and methods based on the work of Sigmund Freud. As a technique of psychotherapy, psychoanalysis seeks to discover connections among the unconscious components of patients' mental processes. The analyst's goal is to help liberate the patient from unexamined or unconscious barriers of transference and resistance, that is, past patterns of relating that are no longer serviceable or that inhibit freedom.