Rabu, 15 Agustus 2007

Psychoanalysis: Freud's Revolutionary Approach to Human Personality

by Kristen M. Beystehner
Northwestern University

This paper focuses on Freud's revolutionary theory of psychoanalysis and whether psychoanalysis should be considered a "great" idea in personality. The fundamental principles of the theory are developed and explained. In addition, the views of experts are reviewed, and many of the criticisms and strengths of various aspects of Freud's theory are examined and explained. Upon consideration, the author considers psychoanalysis to be a valuable theory despite its weaknesses because it is comprehensive, serendipitous, innovative, and has withstood the test of time. Consequently, the author contends that psychoanalysis is indeed a "great" idea in personality.

As a therapy, psychoanalysis is based on the concept that individuals are unaware of the many factors that cause their behavior and emotions. These unconscious factors have the potential to produce unhappiness, which in turn is expressed through a score of distinguishable symptoms, including disturbing personality traits, difficulty in relating to others, or disturbances in self-esteem or general disposition (American Psychoanalytic Association, 1998).

Psychoanalytic treatment is highly individualized and seeks to show how the unconscious factors affect behavior patterns, relationships, and overall mental health. Treatment traces the unconscious factors to their origins, shows how they have evolved and developed over the course of many years, and subsequently helps individuals to overcome the challenges they face in life (National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis, 1998).

In addition to being a therapy, psychoanalysis is a method of understanding mental functioning and the stages of growth and development. Psychoanalysis is a general theory of individual human behavior and experience, and it has both contributed to and been enriched by many other disciplines. Psychoanalysis seeks to explain the complex relationship between the body and the mind and furthers the understanding of the role of emotions in medical illness and health. In addition, psychoanalysis is the basis of many other approaches to therapy. Many insights revealed by psychoanalytic treatment have formed the basis for other treatment programs in child psychiatry, family therapy, and general psychiatric practice (Farrell, 1981, p. 202).

The value and validity of psychoanalysis as a theory and treatment have been questioned since its inception in the early 1900s. Critics dispute many aspects of psychoanalysis including whether or not it is indeed a science; the value of the data upon which Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, based his theories; and the method and effectiveness of psychoanalytic treatment. There has been much criticism as well as praise regarding psychoanalysis over the years, but a hard look at both the positive and negative feedback of critics of psychoanalysis shows, in my opinion, that psychoanalysis is indeed a "great idea" in personality that should not be overlooked.

The Origins of Psychoanalysis
Sigmund Freud was the first psychoanalyst and a true pioneer in the recognition of the importance of unconscious mental activity. His theories on the inner workings of the human mind, which seemed so revolutionary at the turn of the century, are now widely accepted by most schools of psychological thought. In 1896, Freud coined the term "psychoanalysis," and for the next forty years of his life, he worked on thoroughly developing its main principles, objectives, techniques, and methodology.

Freud's many writings detail many of his thoughts on mental life, including the structural theory of the mind, dream interpretation, the technique of psychoanalysis, and assorted other topics. Eventually psychoanalysis began to thrive, and by 1925, it was established around the world as a flourishing movement. Although for many years Freud had been considered a radical by many in his profession, he was soon accepted and well-known worldwide as a leading expert in psychoanalysis (Gay, 1989, p. xii). In 1939, Freud succumbed to cancer after a lifetime dedicated to psychological thought and the development of his many theories (Gay, 1989, p. xx).

Although Freud's life had ended, he left behind a legacy unmatched by any other, a legacy that continues very much to this day. Whereas new ideas have enriched the field of psychoanalysis and techniques have adapted and expanded over the years, psychoanalysts today, like Freud, believe that psychoanalysis is the most effective method of obtaining knowledge of the mind. Through psychoanalysis, patients free themselves from terrible mental anguish and achieve greater understanding of themselves and others.

Principles of Freud's Theory of Psychoanalysis
In An Outline of Psychoanalysis, Freud (1949) explains the principal tenets on which psychoanalytic theory is based. He begins with an explanation of the three forces of the psychical apparatus--the id, the ego, and the superego. The id has the quality of being unconscious and contains everything that is inherited, everything that is present at birth, and the instincts (Freud, 1949, p. 14). The ego has the quality of being conscious and is responsible for controlling the demands of the id and of the instincts, becoming aware of stimuli, and serving as a link between the id and the external world. In addition, the ego responds to stimulation by either adaptation or flight, regulates activity, and strives to achieve pleasure and avoid unpleasure (Freud, 1949, p. 14-15). Finally, the superego, whose demands are managed by the id, is responsible for the limitation of satisfactions and represents the influence of others, such as parents, teachers, and role models, as well as the impact of racial, societal, and cultural traditions (Freud, 1949, p. 15).

Freud states that the instincts are the ultimate cause of all behavior. The two basic instincts are Eros (love) and the destructive or death instinct. The purpose of Eros is to establish and preserve unity through relationships. On the other hand, the purpose of the death instinct is to undo connections and unity via destruction (Freud, 1949, p. 18). The two instincts can either operate against each other through repulsion or combine with each other through attraction (Freud, 1949, p. 19).

Freud (1949) contends that sexual life begins with manifestations that present themselves soon after birth (p. 23). The four main phases in sexual development are the oral phase, the sadistic-anal phase, the phallic phase, and the genital phase, and each phase is characterized by specific occurrences. During the oral phase, the individual places emphasis on providing satisfaction for the needs of the mouth, which emerges as the first erotogenic zone (Freud, 1949, p. 24). During the sadistic-anal phase, satisfaction is sought through aggression and in the excretory function. During the phallic phase, the young boy enters the Oedipus phase where he fears his father and castration while simultaneously fantasizing about sexual relations with his mother (Freud, 1949, p. 25). The young girl, in contrast, enters the Electra phase, where she experiences penis envy, which often culminates in her turning away from sexual life altogether. Following the phallic phase is a period of latency, in which sexual development comes to a halt (Freud, 1949, p. 23). Finally, in the genital phase, the sexual function is completely organized and the coordination of sexual urge towards pleasure is completed. Errors occurring in the development of the sexual function result in homosexuality and sexual perversions, according to Freud (1949, p. 27).

Freud (1949) defines the qualities of the psychical process as being either conscious, preconscious, or unconscious (p. 31). Ideas considered to be conscious are those of which we are aware, yet they remain conscious only briefly. Preconscious ideas are defined as those that are capable of becoming conscious. In contrast, unconscious ideas are defined as those that are not easily accessible but can be inferred, recognized, and explained through analysis (Freud, 1949, p. 32).

Freud spent many years hypothesizing about the role of dreams and their interpretation. He defines the states of sleep to be a period of uproar and chaos during which the unconscious thoughts of the id attempt to force their way into consciousness (Freud, 1949, p. 38). In order to interpret a dream, which develops from either the id or the ego, certain assumptions must be made, including the acknowledgment that what is recalled from a dream is only a facade behind which the meaning must be inferred. Dreams are undoubtedly caused by conflict and are characterized by their power to bring up memories that the dreamer has forgotten, their strong use of symbolism, and their ability to reproduce repressed impressions of the dreamer's childhood (Freud, 1949, p. 40). In addition, dreams, which are fulfillments of wishes, according to Freud (1949), are capable of bringing up impressions that cannot have originated from the dreamer's life (Freud, 1949, p. 45).

The basic objective of psychoanalysis is to remove neuroses and thereby cure patients by returning the damaged ego to its normal state (Freud, 1949, p. 51). During analysis, a process that often takes many years, patients tell analysts both what they feel is important and what they consider to be unimportant. An aspect of analysis that has both positive and negative repercussions is transference, which occurs when patients view their analysts as parents, role models, or other figures from their past. Transference causes patients to become concerned with pleasing their analysts and, as a result, patients lose their rational aim of getting well (Freud, 1949, p. 52).

The method of psychoanalysis involves several significant steps. First, analysts gather material with which to work from patients' free associations, results of transference, dream interpretation, and the patients' slips and parapraxes (Freud, 1949, p. 56). Second, analysts begin to form hypotheses about what happened to the patients in the past and what is currently happening to them in their daily life. It is important that analysts relay the conclusions at which they arrive based on their observations only after the patients have reached the same conclusions on their own accord. Should analysts reveal their conclusions to patients too soon, resistance due to repression occurs. Overcoming this resistance requires additional time and effort by both the analysts and the patients. Once patients accept the conclusions, they are cured (Freud, 1949, p. 57).

In the final chapters of An Outline of Psychoanalysis, Freud (1949) insists that it is neither practical nor fair to scientifically define what is normal and abnormal, and despite his theory's accuracy, "reality will always remain unknowable" (p. 83). He claims that although his theory is correct to the best of his knowledge, "it is unlikely that such generalizations can be universally correct" (Freud, 1949, p. 96).

Evaluating the Criticisms of Psychoanalysis
In his "Précis of The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique," Grünbaum (1986) asserts that "while psychoanalysis may thus be said to be scientifically alive, it is currently hardly well" (p. 228). The criticisms of Freud's theory can be grouped into three general categories. First, critics contend that Freud's theory is lacking in empirical evidence and relies too heavily on therapeutic achievements, whereas others assert that even Freud's clinical data are flawed, inaccurate, and selective at best. Second, the actual method or techniques involved in psychoanalysis, such as Freud's ideas on the interpretation of dreams and the role of free association, have been criticized. Finally, some critics assert that psychoanalysis is simply not a science and many of the principles upon which it is based are inaccurate.

Criticisms of Freud's Evidence
Grünbaum (1986) believes that the reasoning on which Freud based his entire psychoanalytic theory was "fundamentally flawed, even if the validity of his clinical evidence were not in question" but that "the clinical data are themselves suspect; more often than not, they may be the patient's responses to the suggestions and expectations of the analyst" (p. 220). Grünbaum (1986) concludes that in order for psychoanalytic hypotheses to be validated in the future, data must be obtained from extraclinical studies rather than from data obtained in a clinical setting (p. 228). In other words, Grünbaum and other critics assert that psychoanalysis lacks in empirical data (Colby, 1960, p. 54).

Other critics disagree with Grünbaum and insist that although extraclinical studies must and should be performed, clinical data are a reliable and necessary source of evidence because the theory of psychoanalysis would be impossible to test otherwise (Edelson, 1986, p. 232). Shevrin (1986) insists that "Freud's admirable heuristic hypotheses did not come out of the thin air or simply out of his imagination" (p.258) as other critics might have the reader believe. Instead, Shevrin (1986) continues, "extraclinical methods must be drawn upon in addition to the clinical method because the clinical method is the only way we can be in touch with certain phenomena" (p. 259). Only with quantification, many critics assert, can supposedly scientific theories even begin to be evaluated based on their empirical merits.

Additional critics contend that Freud's clinical data are flawed or invalid. Greenberg (1986) believes that Freud's case studies do not place enough stress on revealing the outcome of the treatment and that Freud's aim was more to illustrate his theoretical points (p. 240). In addition, Freud fully presented only twelve cases, but he mentioned over one hundred minor cases. Greenberg asserts that many of the presented cases would not even be considered acceptable examples of psychoanalysis and, in short, that virtually all of the case studies had basic shortcomings (p. 240). Finally, Greenberg finds it "both striking and curious" (p. 240) that Freud chose to illustrate the usefulness of psychoanalysis through the display of unsuccessful cases. "We were forced to conclude," maintains Greenberg, "that Freud never presented any data, in statistical or case study form, that demonstrated that his treatment was of benefit to a significant number of the patients he himself saw" (p. 241). Many other powerful criticisms about Freud's inaccurate and subsequently flawed evidence have been published. These critics contend that Freud's evidence is flawed due to the lack of an experiment, the lack of a control group, and the lack of observations that went unrecorded (Colby, 1960, p. 54). In addition, critics find fault with the demographically restricted sample of individuals on which Freud based the majority of his data and theory (Holt, 1986, p. 242).

Criticisms of Freud's Technique
"Free association" is a method employed in psychoanalysis where the patients speak about any subject matter whatsoever and the analyst draws conclusions based on what is said. According to Storr (1986), "Grünbaum forcefully argues that free association is neither free nor validating evidence for psychoanalytic theory" (p. 260). "For my own part, however," Grünbaum (1986) concludes, "I find it unwarranted to use free association to validate causal inferences" (p. 224). Grünbaum (1986) contends that free association is not a valid method of accessing the patients' repressed memories because there is no way of ensuring that the analyst is capable of distinguishing between the patients' actual memories and imagined memories constructed due to the influence of the analyst's leading questions (p. 226).

Spence (1986) is critical of Grünbaum's argument, although he acknowledges that

we simply do not know the amount of contamination, the spread of infection within the session, and the extent to which suggested responses are balanced by unexpected confirmations which support the theory and take the analyst by surprise. (p. 259)

Spence contends that free associations are not necessarily contaminated and also makes note of the fact that psychoanalysts "are particularly sensitized (in the course of their training) to the dangers of suggestion, and schooled in a tradition which places an emphasis on minimal comment and redundant examples" (p. 259). Spence concludes that the answer to the important question concerning the validity of free association will only be realized through close inspection of the transcripts of meetings between the patient and analyst.

In addition to his criticism of free association, Grünbaum (1986) finds fault with Freud's theory of dreams. In spite of Freud's view that this theory represented his greatest insight and success, it has very much failed in the eyes of most of today's critics.

Finally, many people feel that a major flaw of psychoanalysis is that, according to Farrell (1981), "it appears to encourage analytic and psychodynamic practitioners to overlook the place and great importance of ordinary common sense" (p. 216). Because psychoanalysis deals chiefly with unconscious motives and repressed emotions, common sense no longer seems to be applicable. Farrell (1981) and other critics believe that it is increasingly important for analysts to be aware of common sense and the role that it can, should, and does play in psychoanalysis (p. 216).

Criticisms of the Principles of Psychoanalysis
Storr (1981) insists, "Only a few fundamentalist psychoanalysts of an old-fashioned kind think that Freud was a scientist or that psychoanalysis was or could be a scientific enterprise," and that, "...to understand persons cannot be a scientific enterprise" (p. 260). Although many psychoanalysts themselves would undoubtedly consider psychoanalysis to be a science, many critics would disagree.

Popper, by far one of psychoanalysis' most well-known critics and a strong critic of Grünbaum, insists that psychoanalysis cannot be considered a science because it is not falsifiable. He claims that psychoanalysis' "so-called predictions are not predictions of overt behavior but of hidden psychological states. This is why they are so untestable" (Popper, 1986, p. 254). Popper (1986) claims that only when individuals are not neurotic is it possible to empirically determine if prospective patients are currently neurotic (p. 254). Popper (1986) asserts that psychoanalysis has often maintained that every individual is neurotic to some degree due to the fact that everyone has suffered and repressed a trauma at one point or another in his or her life (p. 255). However, this concept of ubiquitous repression is impossible to test because there is no overt behavioral method of doing so (p. 254).

Other critics claim that psychoanalysis cannot be considered a science due to its lack of predictions. Psychoanalysts, critics maintain, state that certain childhood experiences, such as abuse or molestation, produce certain outcomes or states of neurosis. To take this idea one step further, one should be able to predict that if children experience abuse, for instance, they will become characterized by certain personality traits. In addition, this concept would theoretically work in reverse. For instance, if individuals are observed in a particular neurotic state, one should be able to predict that they had this or that childhood experience. However, neither of these predictions can be made with any accuracy (Colby, 1960, p. 55).

Additional critics insist that psychoanalysis is not a science because of the lack of interpretive rules or regulations. Colby (1960) contends that critics of psychoanalysis have difficulties with the idea that "there are no clear, intersubjectively shared lines of reasoning between theories and observations" (p. 54). For instance, one psychoanalyst will observe one phenomenon and interpret it one way, whereas another psychoanalyst will observe the same phenomenon and interpret it in a completely different way that is contradictory to the first psychoanalyst's interpretation (Colby, 1960, p. 54). Colby (1960) concludes that if analysts themselves cannot concur that a certain observation is an example of a certain theory, then the regulations that govern psychoanalytic interpretation are undependable (p. 55).

Eysenck (1986) maintains:

I have always taken it for granted that the obvious failure of Freudian therapy to significantly improve on spontaneous remission or placebo treatment is the clearest proof we have of the inadequacy of Freudian theory, closely followed by the success of alternative methods of treatment, such as behavior therapy. (p. 236)

Whereas critics, such as Popper (1986), insist that Freud's theories cannot be falsified and therefore are not scientific, Eysenck claims that because Freud's theories can be falsified, they are scientific. Grünbaum (1986) concurs with Eysenck that Freud's theory is falsifiable and therefore scientific, but he goes one step further and claims that Freud's theory of psychoanalysis has been proven wrong and is simply bad science.

Evaluating the Strengths of Psychoanalysis
In order to evaluate the strengths of Freud's theory of psychoanalysis, one must consider a few of the qualities that make a theory of personality or behavior "great." Among the many qualities that people consider to be important are that the theory addresses its problem, can be applied in practical ways, fits with other theories, and withstands the test of time. In addition, a good theory, according to many philosophers of science, is falsifiable, able to be generalized, leads to new theories and ideas, and is recognized by others in the field. Clearly psychoanalysis meets many of these criteria.

As noted previously, Freud coined the term "psychoanalysis" in 1856. Even today, as we are rapidly approaching the twenty-first century, psychoanalysis remains as a valid option for patients suffering from mental illnesses. The acceptance and popularity of psychoanalysis is apparent through the existence of numerous institutes, organizations, and conferences established around the world with psychoanalysis as their focus. The theory of psychoanalysis was innovative and revolutionary, and clearly has withstood the test of time.

Perhaps even more noteworthy than the longevity of psychoanalysis is the fact that it has served as a catalyst to many professionals in the field of psychology and prompted them to see connections that they otherwise would have missed. Psychoanalysis enlightened health professionals about many aspects of the human mind and its inner workings, phenomena that had previously been inexplicable. As a direct result of psychoanalysis, approaches to psychological treatment now considered routine or commonplace were developed worldwide (Farrell, 1981, p. 202).

By far one of the greatest strengths of psychoanalysis is that it is a very comprehensive theory. Psychoanalysis, originally intended as a theory to explain therapeutic or psychological concepts, explains the nature of human development and all aspects of mental functioning. However, many experts contend that psychoanalysis can also be used to describe or explain a vast array of other concepts outside of the realm of the psychological field. For example, religion, Shakespeare's character "Hamlet," the nature of companies and their leaders, or an artist's paintings can all be explained by the principles of psychoanalysis. This comprehensiveness suggests that the theory of psychoanalysis is, at least to some extent, pointing in the general direction of the truth (Farrell, 1981, p. 195).

Conclusion
I concur with the many critics who insist upon the invalidity of Freud's evidence due to the lack of empirical data and the demographically restricted sample of individuals on which Freud based the majority of his ideas. Like Farrell (1981), I agree that sometimes it appears as if common sense does not have a place in psychoanalytic theory and, as a result, I believe irrelevant and false assumptions are made all too frequently. In addition, parts of Freudian theory are too generalized and fail to leave adequate room for exceptions to the general rule. Finally, I find it hard to accept that all mental problems stem from issues concerning aspects of sex, such as unresolved Oedipal and Electra complexes. I believe that this is a gross exaggeration and overgeneralization.

Despite the weaknesses of psychoanalysis, I believe that the many strengths of the theory are extremely significant. Therefore, I maintain that psychoanalysis is a theory that should not be disregarded. Because psychoanalysis was developed a century ago and is still considered to be a credible and effective method of treating mental illnesses, I contend that at least significant parts of the theory are accurate. Second, I believe that psychoanalysis is a scientific theory due to the fact that it is falsifiable and has, in fact, been proven false because other methods of treatment have been proven effective. Third, I believe that psychoanalysis is comprehensive, can be applied in practical ways, and contains valid arguments. Finally, I believe that psychoanalysis is a substantial theory of personality because it is directly responsible for the development of additional psychological theories and hypotheses that otherwise may have been missed.

Psychoanalysis is widely disputed, but perhaps it is necessary to return to the founder of psychoanalysis himself. Freud (1949) wrote in his Outline of Psychoanalysis

the teachings of psychoanalysis are based on an incalculable number of observations and experiences, and only someone who has repeated those observations on himself and on others is in a position to arrive at a judgment of his own upon it. (p. 11)

Although I am hardly an expert on psychoanalysis, I believe that to dismiss the theory completely would be a tremendous oversight because without it many other valuable psychological techniques and theories most likely would have remained undiscovered.

Peer Commentary

Analyzing Psychoanalysis
Sapna Cheryan
Northwestern University

Beystehner's article, "Psychoanalysis: Freud's Revolutionary Approach to Human Personality," examines Freud and his field of psychoanalysis in order to determine if the recognition it has received since its inception at the turn of the century has been deserved. In this article, Beystehner reviews various aspects of psychoanalysis, history of Freud, main ideas, and criticisms of psychoanalysis. The article concludes by acknowledging flaws in psychoanalysis, but asserts the value that Freud and his theories have added to the field of psychology.

Sigmund Freud was the psychologist responsible for forming and forwarding the first ideas in psychoanalysis. His theories were highly controversial and remain so to this day. The foundation of psychoanalysis is rooted in the idea that humans have unconscious longings that must be analyzed in order to understand behavior. Such unconscious desires are usually sexual and aggressive tendencies. Psychoanalysis is a method to uncover the source and elements of these impulses. Various methods, including free association, dream interpretation, and analysis of slips in conversation are used to identify latent longings.

Beystehner classifies critics into three categories. The first group is critical of Freud because of his method of data collection or his lack of data. A second group of critics dislikes techniques that psychoanalysts use to assist their patients. Free association, according to Grünbaum (1986), is "not a valid method of accessing the patients' repressed actual memories because there is no way of ensuring that the analyst is capable of distinguishing between the patients' actual memories and imagined memories constructed due to the influence of the analyst's leading questions" (p. 226). Finally, Beystehner refers to critics who condemn psychoanalysis as not being scientific. Because it is impossible to test, lacks predictions, and has no "interpretive rules," it contradicts many of the fundamental tenets of science.

Beystehner does an excellent job of reviewing the history of psychoanalysis and summarizing main ideas. Although she identifies some important critics, many others are left out. Freud has a significant number feminist critics because many of his theories viewed women's sexuality in a negative light. In addition, Beystehner discusses Freud's view that homosexuality is an "error occurring in the development of the sexual function." Such an idea has been criticized with relatively recent emerging research on homosexuality. Therefore, critiques of Freud stretch farther than examined in this article. Nonetheless, Beystehner's conclusion about psychoanalysis is valuable.

First, the aspects that make a theory "great" are underscored. Beystehner shows how Freud's theories satisfy such aspects, thereby making it one of the greatest theories about human behavior. Flaws are acknowledged, yet "psychoanalysis is a theory that should not be disregarded." It has helped develop and refine many new fields of psychology.

Peer Commentary

Great Ideas, But Great Science?
Nathan Jones
Northwestern University

The paper on psychoanalysis by Beystehner presents an argument that attempts to establish Freud's revolutionary theory of psychotherapy as a "great" idea in the study of personality. Despite the great criticism of him by several scientists, the author believes Freud should not be overlooked. She believes that Freud's theory, by withstanding the tests of time and by influencing so many other ideas in the field of personality, cannot be dismissed. In addition, she believes that psychoanalysis is a scientific method. The arguments are presented in a neat, linear manner that can be followed easily. First, the author gives origins and histories of psychotherapy, and then goes on to explain the theories of Freud. She finally documents important critical and positive viewpoints on the father of psychoanalysis.

The paper is strong in its clear presentation, with a final conclusion that is supported by the evidence brought forth in the author's argument. However, many criticisms of Freud are left unresolved. The author does state in her conclusion that Freud's arguments have their weaknesses, but she believes that an idea can still be great if it is flawed. The problem is that the strengths of his work are unclear and are directly refuted by Freud's critics. Perhaps the greatest question left unresolved is the falsifiablity of Freud. Can we interpret his theories as a true science, or are they merely speculations at the human mind? The author believes that psychoanalysis is a scientific method because it is falsifiable, but no concrete proof of that is presented. The author shows that Freud is important because he influenced so much thought in the 20th century, and because he addressed issues previously kept in the dark. However, I believe the author falls short of establishing psychoanalysis as a science. The criticisms are overwhelming, and the author rarely takes the time to refute these points.

The criticisms collected regarding psychoanalysis are placed into three categories by the author, criticisms of Freud's evidence, techniques, and principles. Freud and his theories are criticized on all levels. Attacks range from his intentions to his empirical evidence. At one point it is stated: "Greenburg believes that Freud's case studies do not place enough stress on revealing the outcome of the treatment and that Freud's aim was to illustrate his theoretical points." And then almost immediately following: "Critics contend that Freud's evidence is flawed due to the lack of an experiment, the lack of a control group, and the lack of observations that went unrecorded (Colby, 1960, p. 54)." Things that are synonymous with modern scientific theory and method are omitted from Freud's theory. These multiple gaping holes in Freud's work are presented in quick procession, and are followed by no discussion. Instead, the reader is left thinking only of all of Freud's flaws. A mountain of these facts is built up, but it is never knocked down.

Instead of defending Freud against the points of the previous section, the portion of the paper evaluating the strengths of Freud concentrates on the influence Freud has had both inside and outside of psychology. The author states that "a good theory, according to many philosophers of science, is falsifiable, able to be generalized, leads to new theories and ideas, and is recognized by others in the field. Clearly psychoanalysis meets many of these criteria." Yet the formerly stated criticisms of psychoanalysis as a science seem too great to ignore; the author offers no resolution to these points. More importantly, the author fails to prove the falsifiability of the theories. The only proof given is that psychoanalysis is falsifiable "because other methods of treatment have been proven effective." This is a vague statement that, even if true, in no way provides a strong foundation to such an important and pivotal argument. Creating falsifiability is vital in establishing psychoanalysis as a scientific theory. Without a reasonable claim at this, it is difficult to discuss a theory as a science. Instead of clearly meeting the criteria of a good, scientific theory, psychoanalysis falls short. Because of this, evaluating psychoanalysis as a scientific method is unreasonable. This is significant in evaluating Freud's theories as "great." The only strengths successfully argued are that his psychoanalysis still lingers today and that it has led to new theories and ideas.

I do not believe that the ideas of Freud should be dismissed completely. Freud's influence has been great on many. He has permeated into society and is now commonplace in the public's evaluation of personality. The author of this article explains how Freud's work acted as a catalyst, opening the eyes of several scientists to new theories that otherwise would have been missed. Freud's theories can effectively be applied to the human personality and to the development of the human mind and sexuality. They can even be applied to works outside of the realm of psychology. Yet, in this article, the author does not effectively establish psychoanalysis as a science. The criticisms of Freud (his technique, method, and principles), and the author's failure to prove falsifiability of psychoanalysis make it impossible to accept his theories as a science. Freud's revolutionary thinking and his effect on those who followed clearly establish that his theories have had a "great" impact in the field of personality. However, the author does not provide significant evidence to establish Freud's work as a scientific method.

Peer Commentary

Psychoanalysis: A Not-So-Great Idea?
Anna S. Lin
Northwestern University

This paper discusses Freud's theory of psychoanalysis, including an evaluation of whether or not the theory qualifies as a "great" idea of personality. The author notes several strong arguments that critics of the theory have made, but also suggests that the theory is comprehensive enough to remain in consideration. For example, although Beystehner makes the assertion that Freud's data were not scientific, she also points out that the theory is not only still in use after an entire century, but it has influenced many more theories as well.

The author describes the theory of psychoanalysis fairly well. Although slightly brief, the outline of psychoanalysis given is understandable if the reader has some knowledge of the topic. Some concepts, such as the latent stage and the Electra complex, could be further elaborated. Similarly, Freudian slips, or "parapraxes," are not explained at all. Beystehner also states that there are both positive and negative aspects of transference, but does not provide adequate descriptions of these.

It seems that the criticisms Beystehner makes against psychoanalysis are much more powerful than the defending arguments. For instance, the claims that Freud's data were either "flawed or invalid" indicate that Freud's theory is not scientifically based, a rather large, influential argument against the theory. The comments against Freud's technique of free association fuel the debate on whether his work was done on empirical grounds. Beystehner provides ample support for this criticism, and the reader begins to question whether or not the theory is really based on adequate evidence. It is somewhat contradictory that a theory with such a dubious foundation could remain in existence for so long, let alone serve as the basis for other theories. Beystehner asserts that psychoanalysis is, in fact, a falsifiable theory, and so it is appropriately categorized as a scientific theory. However, her paper lacks the support necessary to convince the reader of this idea. The fact that other types of treatment have been shown to be effective does not satisfy the reader as acceptable evidence that the theory is scientific. The concepts behind Freud's psychoanalysis are nearly impossible to test empirically; how does one go about proving the existence of an id? It is no wonder that Freud's data were "flawed." Psychoanalysis can only be based on observations and interpretations, which are not always standardized, and thus predictions are not always accurate. Beystehner has done well in bringing these problems to light.

Nevertheless, psychoanalysis is a very comprehensive theory that can be used to explain many aspects of human psychology. The author evaluates this point as well as other strengths of the theory, but the reasoning in support of the theory is not quite up to par with the arguments against it. The main item that confirms the theory's strength deals with the "longevity of psychoanalysis." The reader is left to wonder how, with all the criticism against it, the theory has remained intact for so long. Although psychoanalysis is extremely comprehensive, contains some valid arguments, and has been utilized in both clinical and research psychology, empirical support in favor of the theory seems to be lacking.

Beystehner also seems to draw several conclusions without offering clarifying examples. She states that "irrelevant and false assumptions are made all too frequently" in the field of psychoanalysis, and specific examples could be included. Also, she claims that psychoanalysis "can be applied in practical ways," which is a rather vague description of the theory's usefulness.

In her conclusion, Beystehner uses a quote from Freud, in which Freud implies that he has based psychoanalysis on his observations of both himself and others. However, Rand and Torok (1997) have noted that Freud did not completely understand himself, which would contribute to his flawed data results (p. 221). Once again, the validity of psychoanalysis comes into question. Perhaps the case for the theory needs some reconsideration. Undoubtedly, the author has made some very clear points, and should be commended on her accomplishment of compiling such a comprehensive evaluation of psychoanalysis. On the other hand, the justifications for agreeing with the theory fall short of the critique against it, and so the reader can conclude that psychoanalysis may not be as great of a theory as previously thought.

Peer Commentary

Freud Alone
Ethan R. Plaut
Northwestern University

Beystehner's essay on psychoanalysis is a good introduction to Freudian theory, and also addresses the issue of whether it holds water as a science, but stops there, which is somewhat misleading. There are even a few simple factual statements that I find questionable, including the statement that the superego's demands are managed by the id. Nothing can really be "managed" by the id, nor the superego, for that matter. These two elements counterbalance each other, but only the ego is capable of "management." The term "Electra phase" is also attributed to Freud, which is a term with which he personally did not agree. In a paper such as this one that addresses Freudian theory, rather than psychoanalysis as a whole, it would be more appropriate to simply note the theoretical gaps in the theory for females. Freud's famous quote "What do women want?" would be appropriate to note. He conceded that he was unable to make his theory a balanced one for both sexes, so why not simply address that in the paper?

Neglecting much of the literature is a much more serious offense. Only Freud's writings are addressed as far as psychoanalytic theory goes, and all of the innovations within Freud's framework are ignored. Psychoanalysis has come a long way since Freud's day, including changes that account for the aforementioned inability of Freud's theory to address the issues specific to women. Many criticisms of Freud are briefly noted in the essay, but the only one that is properly addressed is the question of whether psychoanalysis has a solid scientific basis in theory and practice--that is, whether it should be considered a "pure science." This question may be an issue, but I think it is essentially a secondary one. Many modern analysts would simply concede this point, and go on their merry post-Freudian way. Far more important issues regarding sexuality, etc., are simply glossed over and left to rot as loose ends, unaddressed in the paper and, therefore, in the reader's head. There has been a lot of criticism of psychoanalysis, and it has held up very well under fire. To address only the question of scientific status, which is one of the few criticisms that has been conceded by analysts, but is (arguably) a relatively unimportant criticism, is a horrible mistake in a paper that aims to survey the literature on psychoanalysis. The paper is relatively good on the points that it addresses, but for an overview of psychoanalysis, it fails to emphasize the right points.

Peer Commentary

Freud's Psychoanalytic Theory Raises Concerns in Light of Modern Culture
Purva H. Rawal
Northwestern University

Sigmund Freud is arguably the most well known psychologist of the 20th century. As the founder of psychoanalysis, he has greatly impacted the development of psychotherapy and treatment methods through the course of the century. His influence on the field remains strong and his theory continues to generate controversy. Psychoanalysis remains embroiled in this controversy as many detractors claim that the theory has its flaws. Its redeeming factor is the legacy it leaves behind, as it has furthered the therapeutic field in unimaginable ways. Contrastingly, opponents of the theory point to the lack of empirical evidence and the heavy reliance on free association techniques as proof of obvious inadequacies. Psychoanalysis is undoubtedly a "great" idea in psychology as the author clearly notes; however, the theory's shortcomings are far from few in the light of modern demands.

One of the greatest inadequacies in Freud's theory that the author does not investigate further is the inability of the theory to explain behaviors in our modern culture. In many senses, Freud's theory was only applicable in his own era. The prevalence of same-sex parents raising children in homosexual homes or the even more common phenomenon of single-parent households raise questions that psychoanalysis fails to answer. The psychoanalytic theory is horribly inadequate in its investigation of female emotional and sexual development. Freud concentrated on male development, as he was part of a male dominated era; however the lack of foresight is clear as half the population's development has been insufficiently accounted for under the guidelines of the theory. Difficulties arise when one attempts to explain female development and behavior based on psychoanalytic theory because it is so incomplete in this arena. The demographic scope of investigation of psychoanalysis is apparent when measured against modern standards.

The role and interpretation of dreams was one of the cornerstones of Freud's theory. He used dreams and their subsequent interpretations to bring subconscious conflict to the forefront. The author succinctly describes the role of dreams in psychoanalysis; however, more recent evidence refuting Freud's claims is rather interesting. The proliferation of psychotherapy in the modern day has brought controversial and unsettling issues under close scrutiny. The ability of therapists to strongly influence patients' memories has been supported in numerous studies. Loftus (1993a, 1993b, 1995) has also shown in many studies that memories are often reconstructed and that the therapist aids in the construction process through such avenues as dream interpretation and hypnosis. The question of whether dreams are a reliable source of information has been refuted by most in the field; yet, patients continue to reconstruct memories with the aid of therapists. The modern scientific phenomenon has it roots in Freud's original psychoanalytic theory.

Clear mention is made of the fundamental technique of free-association in Freud's clinical cases. The reliance on free-association and on dream interpretation point to a greater problem: the lack of empirical evidence. The lack of empirical evidence is a point to which the strongest opponents of psychoanalysis look in criticism of the theory. Perhaps the reason many modern psychologists are unable to reconcile the psychoanalytic theory with modern treatment techniques is due to this apparent lack of empirical evidence. Modern science looks to empirical evidence for confirmation of any theory's validity. Freud was clearly unable to provide the empirical evidence of modern standards; thus, only if we look at the psychoanalytic theory from the ideas it has spurred rather than at its literal meaning can psychoanalysis be considered a "great" idea in personality.

Psychoanalysis displays its greatest strength as one views the progress that has been made in the treatment of the mentally ill. Proponents of psychoanalysis have contributed to its widespread influence as it has encouraged other fields of research and investigation. Psychoanalysis fostered interest in human emotional and psychological development traced back to a young age. The human can be seen from a much more holistic viewpoint as one looks at the psychoanalytic theory, which combines the inner workings of the mind and attempts to explain them in the context of a dynamic social environment.

The author provides an accurate assessment of Freud's psychoanalytic theory as she points out its two major inadequacies, the demographic restrictions of the subject population and the lack of empirical evidence, while also salvaging the theory by concentrating on the legacy it left behind. Although the specifics of the psychoanalytic theory cannot be supported via empirical evidence and many aspects of the theory cannot explain modern phenomena, Freud still made a considerable and lasting contribution to psychology. The controversy surrounding his theory to this very day is testimony of its greatest strength: its ability to foster and encourage further investigation and the presentation of new theories. Freud brought psychology to a new precipice as he delved into the workings of the inner mind.

Author Response

Evaluating the Criticisms: Psychoanalysis and its Legacy
Kristen M. Beystehner
Northwestern University

It seems to me that there are several common criticisms of my paper, "Psychoanalysis: Freud's Revolutionary Approach to Human Personality." First, several commentators are of the opinion that I failed to fully establish falsifiability of Freud's psychoanalytic theory. Second, several commentators believe that I did not adequately describe the most important criticisms of Freudian theory. Third, several commentators feel that I failed to fully resolve or refute the criticisms of psychoanalysis that I detailed in my paper. In this response, I will attempt to reply to these and all of the other valuable criticisms made by the authors of the peer commentaries on my article.

In her commentary, "Analyzing Psychoanalysis," Cheryan cites two weaknesses of my paper to be the omission of feminist critics of psychoanalysis and the omission of recent research concerning homosexuality. As Cheryan writes, "Critiques of Freud stretch farther than examined in this article." I am in agreement with this point. Clearly Freud and psychoanalysis have been criticized and attacked from nearly every angle. In choosing to classify the criticisms of Freud into the three categories of criticisms of Freud's evidence, Freud's technique, and the basic principles of psychoanalysis, I was attempting merely to highlight some of the criticisms that appeared to be significant and mentioned by many authors. Perhaps with a bit more research, I would have found more criticisms of the type Cheryan mentions, but because of the vast number of criticisms against Freud and his work, it was necessary that I select several areas of criticism on which to focus my article.

Like Cheryan, Rawal points out in her article that I failed to investigate psychoanalysis' inability to explain certain behaviors in our modern world. She too cites the examples of homosexuality and the overall inadequacy of the theory's positions on the sexual and emotional development of females. I have to agree with Rawal and Cheryan that one of the greatest oversights of Freud was his failure to develop his theory well enough for females. This was due, as Rawal notes in her commentary, to the time period in which Freud worked, an era that was definitely male-dominated.

In his commentary, "Freud Alone," Plaut mentions a statement in my paper with which he finds fault. In my paper, I stated that the superego's demands are managed by the id. Plaut goes on to explain how "nothing can really be 'managed' by the id, nor the superego." Upon review of my sources, I have to conclude that I misinterpreted some information. In short, this statement in my paper is, in fact, false. To correct this error, I wish to emphasize the fact that the demands of both the superego and the id are managed by the ego.

Plaut also cites my use of the term "Electra complex," a term with which Freud did not personally agree. Once again, Plaut is correct here. The term was first used by Jung, and Freud did, in fact, argue against its introduction in one of his papers. I must admit that I did realize that Freud did not coin the term "Electra complex," but I included it in my paper for two reasons. First, the term is used by many critics and appears to be generally accepted, and second, I felt that the term made differentiating between the developmental experiences of males and females easier for the reader to comprehend.

Plaut states in his article that "only Freud's writings are addressed as far as psychoanalytic theory goes, and all of the innovations within Freud's framework are ignored." He is correct here, and I agree with him that psychoanalysis has come a long way since Freud. However, the purpose of my particular paper was not to provide a current update of those innovations. Instead, I attempted to provide an overview of Freud's theory, not the theories of his successors. Finally, I evaluated whether or not I believe Freud's specific theory of psychoanalysis, not the practice of psychoanalysis in general, is indeed a valuable theory of human personality.

Plaut also asserts that I failed to emphasize the right points. He believes that, although the question of whether or not psychoanalysis has a solid, scientific foundation may be an important issue, "it is essentially a secondary one." I disagree. Many of the foremost critics of psychoanalysis find fault with the theory because they believe that it is not scientific. Consequently, I believe that the arguments for and against this argument are indeed extremely important, far more important than Plaut acknowledges.

Finally, Plaut asserts that many modern analysts would simply concede that psychoanalysis is a science and "go on their merry post-Freudian way." However, I find this hard to accept because I have found criticisms stating the exact opposite of Plaut's remark. As I stated in my paper, Storr (1981) insists, "Only a few fundamentalist psychoanalysts of an old-fashioned kind think that Freud was a scientist or that psychoanalysis was or could be a scientific enterprise" (p. 260). There is quite a difference between "many modern analysts," as Plaut asserts and "only a few fundamentalist psychoanalysts," according to Storr. This and the importance of the issue of whether psychoanalysis is indeed a science are definite sources of disagreement between Plaut's beliefs and my own.

In "Psychoanalysis: A Not-So-Great Idea?" Lin first cites my omission of Freudian slips as a significant error. Although I did allude to Freudian slips, or "parapraxes" in the section of my paper detailing the method of psychoanalytic treatment, Lin is correct in stating that I failed adequately to explain their nature. In regards to this and other brief descriptions of various topics in my paper of which Lin would like to see more explanation, I was merely trying to be succinct. I highlighted the basics of Freud's theory, and I maintain that the primary aspects of his psychoanalytic theory are explained quite adequately.

Lin also cites my use of one of Freud's quotations in my conclusion and the fact that recent research has shown that, according to Lin, "Freud did not completely understand himself, which would contribute to his flawed data results." In regards to this point, I must admit that I am not familiar with the research Lin cites, and I can only offer my intent for including this quotation, which was merely to illustrate Freud's opinion that only individuals schooled in the details of psychoanalytic theory are in a position whereby they can offer their views of psychoanalysis.

Perhaps more important though is the criticism of both Lin and Jones that I failed to establish psychoanalysis as a falsifiable theory. However, I believe that falsifiability is a somewhat straightforward issue. In my opinion, because methods of treatment other than psychoanalysis have been used successfully in the treatment of mental illness, psychoanalysis has indeed been falsified. Among the alternative methods that have been proven effective are behavior and cognitive therapy, not to mention spontaneous remission or placebo treatment (Eysenck, 1986, p. 236).

Lin also considers the conclusion of my paper to be vague and in need of more examples. In attempting to be brief, I may have inadvertently neglected a few of the details that Lin mentions. First, in regards to my statement that "irrelevant and false assumptions are made all too frequently" in the field of psychoanalysis, I was referring primarily to the types of generalizations whereby psychoanalysts, for instance, define the causes of all sorts of mental issues to be due to unresolved Oedipal and Electra complexes. This type of generalization is, in my opinion, exaggerated and lacking in common sense. Second, in regards to my statement that psychoanalysis "can be applied in practical ways," I was referring to its use as a method of treatment of various mental illnesses, its attempt at explaining the inner workings of the human mind in the context of the world and the environment, and its ability to serve as a catalyst for further investigation of other psychological theories. I apologize for this apparent lack of clarity.

Lin and Jones both believe that the strengths of psychoanalysis that I detailed do not stack up to the many criticisms of the theory. However, I disagree. The fact that psychoanalysis has withstood the test of time so well indicates without a doubt that at least parts of the theory are accurate. In addition, Freud's influence on the field of psychology remains strong even today. The legacy that Freud left behind is tremendous, and his theories have furthered the field of psychology in an infinite number of ways. Although my paper detailed many criticisms of Freud's theory, I believe that these only serve to further illustrate one of psychoanalysis' greatest strengths: its controversiality. As a direct result of Freud's theory, additional psychological theories and hypotheses have been developed that otherwise may have been missed. This, in my opinion, is by far the greatest achievement of Freud's psychoanalytic theory and overshadows any and all of its many criticisms.

In his commentary "Great Ideas, But Great Science?" Jones asserts the primary weaknesses of my article to be many of the same criticisms made by Lin, as I have noted previously. These include the arguments that the criticisms of psychoanalysis are left unresolved, that the strengths of psychoanalysis are vague and do not stack up well against its many criticisms, and that the falsifiability of the theory is not well-established.

In addition, Jones finds fault with my categorization of the criticisms of Freud and his theory. He emphasizes that, "Freud and his theories are criticized on all levels. Attacks range from his intentions to his empirical evidence." I strongly agree with Jones on this issue. Jones seems to be bothered by the conflicting criticisms and my lack of discussion regarding each one. However, I believe much of the criticism that I detailed is somewhat self-explanatory, and in response to Jones' assertion that the "reader is left thinking only of Freud's flaws," I believe that the strengths of Freud's theory, including its legacy, serendipitous quality, and controversiality, are indeed strong enough to overpower the many arguments against it.

Jones, like Lin, maintains that the falisifiability of psychoanalysis is not well-established though he insists this is in part due to the somewhat vague statement in my conclusion that "other methods have been proven effective." As I mentioned previously, behavioral and cognitive therapy have both been successful in the treatment of mental illnesses. Therefore, I would like to reiterate that psychoanalysis has definitely been falsified as was noted by Eysenck (1986) and many other critics. As a result, contrary to the opinion of Jones, psychoanalysis does meet this aspect of the definition of a scientific theory and should therefore, in my opinion, be considered scientific.

All of the criticisms from each of the peer commentators are valuable and interesting. However, I believe that no critic can deny the fact that psychoanalysis is indeed a "great" idea of human personality. Clearly, psychoanalysis is an important tool in practice. It provides great insight into the inner workings of the human mind, provides a deeper understanding as to the fundamental problems that cause mental illness, and its controversiality has resulted in the investigation and development of many other psychological theories. In my opinion, these tremendous achievements of Freud and his theory far outweigh the many criticisms. It is my desire, along with many other supporters of psychoanalysis, that the theory of psychoanalysis be fully appreciated for its relevance and profound effects on modern-day psychology as well as its use in the clinical environment, despite the many criticisms against it.

References
American Psychoanalytic Association (1998, January 31). About psychoanalysis [WWW document]. URL http://www.apsa.org/pubinfo/about.htm

Colby, K. M. (1960). An introduction to psychoanalytic research. New York: Basic.

Edelson, M. (1986). The evidential value of the psychoanalyst's clinical data. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, 232-234.

Erwin, E. (1986). Defending Freudianism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, 235-236.

Eysenck, H. J. (1986). Failure of treatment--failure of theory? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, 236.

Farrell, B. A. (1981). The standing of psychoanalysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Freud, S. (1949). An outline of psychoanalysis. New York: Norton.

Gay, P. (1989). Sigmund Freud: A brief life. In J. Strachy (Ed.), An outline of psychoanalysis (pp. vii-xx). New York: Norton.

Greenberg, R. P. (1986). The case against Freud's cases. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, 240-241.

Grünbaum, A. (1986). Précis of The foundations of psychoanalysis: A philosophical critique. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, 217-284.

Holt, R. R. (1986). Some reflections on testing psychoanalytic hypotheses. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, 242-244.

Loftus, E. F. (1993a). Desperately seeking memories of the first few years of childhood: The reality of early memories. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 122, 274-277.

Loftus, E. F. (1993b). The reality of repressed memories. American Psychologist, 48, 518-537.

Loftus, E. F. (1995, March-April). Remembering dangerously. Skeptical Inquirer, 20-29.

National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis (1998, January 31). The making of a psychoanalyst [WWW document]. URL http://www.npap.org/inst.htm

Notturno, M. A., & McHugh, P. R. (1986). Is Freudian psychoanalytic theory really falsifiable? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, 250-252.

Popper, K. (1986). Predicting overt behavior versus predicting hidden states. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, 254-255.

Rand, N., & Torok, M. (1997). Questions for Freud: The secret history of psychoanalysis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Spence, D. P. (1986). Are free associations necessarily contaminated? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, 259.

Wax, M. L. (1986). Psychoanalysis: Conventional wisdom, self knowledge, or inexact science? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, 264-265.

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Psychoanalysis: From Theory to Practice, Past to Present

by Ethan R. Plaut
Northwestern University

This paper first summarizes the central theory of psychoanalysis, beginning with Freud's groundbreaking contributions divided into five parts: dynamic, economic, developmental, structural, and adaptive. It then moves on to more recent developments within the Freudian framework. Next there is an account of the basic techniques of psychoanalytical treatment. Finally, there is a section on some of the many criticisms of psychoanalysis, with responses.

Psychoanalysis remains the single most influential theory for the practice of psychotherapy. Freud (1964) began the movement, so this paper will begin with his foundation. One way of dividing his theory is into five parts: the dynamic, the economic, the developmental, the structural, and the adaptive (Rapaport & Gill, 1959).

Freud's Theory
Dynamic
The "dynamic" level of Freud's (1964) theory deals with instinctual forces (Rapaport & Gill, 1959). He traces all instincts, and in a certain sense therefore all actions, back to two instincts; they are the Eros ("sexual instinct" or "libido") and the "destructive (aggressive) instinct." They work together and against each other and have a hand in everything we do. The primary example of this is sex itself, where of course the libido is present, and varying degrees of aggression (or lack thereof) can lead someone to either be bashful and impotent or a sex murderer, and anything in-between.

Economic
Freud's (1964) theory of the instincts is further realized in the "economic" level of his theory (Rapaport & Gill, 1959). This attempts, in some fashion, to abstractly quantify the power of instincts through the concept of "psychic energy." This is described through a system in which this energy in invested towards instinctual goals through cathexes, toward maximizing the pleasure for the individual. This, however, is balanced by the concept of anti-cathexes, in which the energy is invested as a force against the instinct, via defense in the ego (this concept will be further elaborated in the section on the structural model).

Developmental
The third part of Freud's (1964) theory is the "developmental" (Rapaport & Gill, 1959). Freud noted three major ideas in his theory that contradicted common beliefs. First, sexual life begins at birth. Second, a distinction between 'sexual' and 'genital' has to be made, because the former is a broader term encompassing many things totally disconnected from the genitals, for example oral and anal pleasure (Freud, 1964). Third, physical pleasure may be brought into the service of reproduction, but the two often fail to coincide completely. His model of development is four stages long, and only lasts through early life (other more complex models that give detailed representations of adulthood have been proposed by others; Erickson's will be addressed later in the section of this paper devoted to developments within the Freudian framework).

The oral phase begins at birth, when the mouth is the only erotogenic zone. It is, of course, for the purpose of nourishment that the baby persistently sucks at its mother's breast, but the baby nevertheless derives pleasure from this. The (Sadistic-)Anal Phase is characterized by satisfaction being sought in aggression and in the excretory function. In the Phallic Phase the male genitals take center stage. The male then enters the "Oedipal Stage" and begins touching his penis and fantasizing about doing something with it to his mother, until the threat of castration and realization of the lack of a penis in females throws him into the period of latency. In Freud's view, girls, recognizing their lack of a penis and inferior clitoris, suffer developmentally and often begin turning away from sex altogether. The next phase, puberty, is the one in which the individuals become increasingly aware of their adult sexual roles.

Structural
The fourth point of Freud's (1964) theory, the all-important "structural" divisions, come under two main categories: the structural and the topographical models (Rapaport & Gill, 1959). The structural model consists of three parts: the id, the ego, and the superego. The id is the agency of the "psychical apparatus" which contains much of what is inherited (there are also inherited ego characteristics), including the instincts. Psychic energy gets displaced and transformed, and then eventually discharged through action. Psychic determinism is that the instincts and their vicissitudes determine human behavior, modified by the ego.

The ego is the agency that acts as an intermediary between the id and the external world. It takes on the tasks of voluntary movement (using muscles in response to stimuli) and self preservation. It is charged with gaining control over the demands of the instincts, and choosing which ones to satisfy and when. The ego seeks pleasure and avoids unpleasure. When increases in unpleasure are expected, they are met by anxiety. The ego not only has to balance the id with reality, but also with the superego. The superego is the agency formed over time by the parents and society of the individual. It observes, orders, judges, and threatens the ego with punishment just like the parents whose place it has taken. We are generally aware of it as our conscience. Freud (1964) attributed the severity of the superego to the strength of defense used against the temptation of the Oedipus complex (and used this to claim that men have more fully developed superegos--but that is a more complex matter that is more fully dealt with in the sections of this paper on criticisms).

The second structural model is the topographical one. It, again, consists of three main parts: the unconscious, the preconscious, and the conscious. The unconscious is the part of the mind that is inaccessible to conscious thought. It is governed by the pleasure principle, which is simply that drives seek discharge as readily as possible. The barriers between it and the conscious are repression and other defenses. Freud (1953b) saw dreams (and dream analysis) as the central window to the unconscious (see the section on treatment). The preconscious is the part of the mind which is accessible to conscious thought, but is not currently being thought about. An example of preconscious thoughts might be accessible but distant memories. The line of demarcation between the unconscious and the preconscious is the important distinction to draw; the line between the preconscious and the conscious is less important, and is blurry at best.

The conscious is the accessible, "conscious" part of the mind, which contains thought processes including (very importantly) speech (although the preconscious is also considered somewhat verbal). In contrast to the unconscious, the conscious is governed to a large extent by the reality principle, which is that one must generally act according to the reality in which one lives, and therefore gratification must often be delayed.

Adaptive
The last element of Freudian theory is the "adaptive," which has been given much greater emphasis by more modern analysis (Rapaport & Gill, 1959). Freud addressed it, but only in a fairly scattered way. This final major element is how the psyche, the first four elements, relate to the outside world. The ego acts to balance the psyche with reality, as in the example of temporary restraint in order to gain or retain long-term happiness. One important thing to note here is how much emphasis analysts put on person-to-person relationships, most importantly that of the mother and child.

Developments Within the Freudian Framework
There have been many developments within the Freudian framework. This paper will mainly address the work of four people in this context; Freud's daughter, Anna Freud, E. H. Erikson, M. Klein, and H. Kohut.

A. Freud
A. Freud followed in her father's footsteps and became a reputable and influential expert in her own right. Her major innovations were in the field of the ego and the mechanisms of defense. She also indicates resistance to treatment as a form of defense against instinct. She theorized that the affects associated with the instinctual impulses also are defended against in the ego, for example by the means of mastering them by putting them through a metamorphosis, which may manifest itself as emotional suppression or denial, among other things (A. Freud, 1966). A. Freud also refers in her work to a notion that W. Reich (1945) called "Charakterpanzerung," or the "armor-plating of the character." This is the residual manifestation of rigorous past defenses that have been dissociated from their original conflicts. These manifestations, such as stiffness, or peculiarities of personality, such as a fixed smile or arrogant behavior, develop into permanent character traits. The ego has too many defenses to ever be properly discussed here, among them repression (S. Freud's brainchild), displacement, reversal, etc.

Erikson
Erikson made an enormous contribution to and alteration of Freud's developmental theory. He changed and extended the stages into a more complex theory extended throughout life. He also associated a "virtue" and a related developmental issue with each stage. This is especially important because the failure to resolve those issues explains many problems. The seven stages are essentially as follows. The first, or "oral" stage has the virtue of hope and the issue of trust. The anal stage has the virtue of will and the issue of autonomy. The Oedipal stage has the virtue of purpose and the issue of initiative. The latency stage has the virtue of skill and the issue of industry. Adolescence has the virtue of fidelity and the issue of identity. The stage involving marriage and work has the virtue of love and the issue of intimacy. The stage of parenthood has the virtue of the capacity to care for others and the issue of integrity (Erikson, 1950).

Klein
Klein was an important figure in the development of psychoanalysis because she was one of the first to put greater emphasis on the pre-Oedipal stages (Klein, 1975). She wrote of critical issues during the oral and anal stages, and also of earlier Oedipal issues. She theorized that these early issues made "imprints" on later psychic developments. Among her central concepts was the formation/existence of depressive and paranoid positions. She was a major precursor of the modern analysts spoken of as the "object-relations school." This school of thought puts far greater emphasis than Freud on interpersonal relationships, beginning with the mother-child relationship.

Kohut
Currently a variant on this called "self psychology" is receiving a lot of attention. H. Kohut is one of the central figures in this movement. It focuses on the formation of the sense of self as an issue independent of Freud's structural concepts (Kohut, 1971).

Jung
Special mention must be made in this section of Jung. One cannot say that he made developments within the Freudian framework, but he founded the only other school of analysis that has maintained a significant following. Jungian analysis has a much more spiritual foundation. It rests on Jung's emphasis on myth and the presence of a "collective unconscious." This collective unconscious is considered to be present in all people, but is different from Freud's in that it is not created by repression. For Jung, therein lies what makes us human (Jung, 1959).

Treatment
Psychoanalysis is an extremely involved process that takes place over the course of a number of years. The analyst and the patient develop an intimate relationship, which includes "transference," which is a process in which the patient develops a sort of parent-child relationship with the analyst, and therefore transfers the patient's old emotions with his or her actual parents onto the analyst. This makes for an extremely touchy situation in which the analyst has a huge amount of influence, which is necessary but requires care and restraint.

Freud (1964) thought that all neuroses were a result of repressions, and so he sought to use his influence as an analyst to access and help the patient to access the relevant issues in the unconscious. Freud (1964) saw the unresolved Oedipal complex as the most universal, as well as most important, repression (in males). (Freud's theory was admittedly less developed for women, as noted by his statement "That [the eros and sexual development] of males is the more straightforward and the more understandable..." [Freud,1953a, p.207]) Freud's theory holds that males, around the age of three or four, enter into sexual fantasies about their mothers, including fantasies about taking their fathers' places. The father is pictured as threatening the boy with castration as punishment for his early masturbation fantasies and showing off of his penis, which initially seems impossible to the boy, until the realization of the lack of a penis in females. This brings on the "castration complex," which entails long term sexual repression. The question of how to get a (male) patient to accept this about himself, however, was and is an entirely different problem.

Freud (1953a) saw dreams as the major source of insight into the unconscious. Dream interpretation is a very imperfect science, as there are many levels of distortion between the patient's unconscious and the analyst's interpretation. The dream is formed to fulfill some unconscious wish that is normally repressed. The dream, however, is not literal, it is symbolic. The patient must recount his or her memory of the dream (another distortion) before the analyst can even begin to trace it to its unconscious root. The other main technique in Freudian analysis is the use of free association, in which patients essentially speak what is on their minds, "associating" one topic with the next. This has the advantage that the analyst may act as observer and listener without using his or her influence (from transference, etc.) to lead the patient in any specific direction. Each one of the two people in the psychoanalytic relationship, hopefully, will eventually meet at the same conclusion as to the cause of the problem (Freud, 1964).

Criticisms
There have been criticisms of psychoanalysis from every imaginable angle. It has been equally strongly defended, and has held up very well under fire. Two common criticisms, espoused by laypeople and professionals alike, are that the theory is too simple to ever explain something as complex as a human mind, and that Freud overemphasized sex and was unbalanced here (was sexist). My opinion is that these criticisms are to a large extent the result of misreading, and therefore miss the point. Freud's model is just that--a model. Like an economic model or any other, it simplifies something almost infinitely complex to a point at which it can be analyzed. Like the process of modeling anything, it is difficult to draw the line of oversimplification, but Freud's theory and models are practical in understanding people and have been fruitful in treatment.

In my mind, there are two important responses to the criticism regarding sexuality. The first is that people misinterpret Freud's use of the word "sexual." The word should generally be inferred to mean "sensual." Freud included in the concept "sexual" the genital, the anal, and the oral (Freud, 1964). However, even most modern Freudians would concede that Freud's emphasis on the Oedipal complex was excessive. In light of this, another legitimate response to criticisms about the role of sexuality in the theory would be to concede that Freud's emphasis was excessive, but that that in itself does not really have any effect on the theory as a whole.

One final criticism, which is often stated, is that Freud's work (and/or Freud himself) was sexist. One can only respond to this in a very limited and fairly unsatisfactory way. Freud's theory was sexually unbalanced--there is no way of denying it. However, he knew and conceded that his theory was less well developed for women; he saw but could not correct this flaw (Freud,1953a), as noted in the section on treatment. The obvious explanations for this inability are time-period cultural bias and the simple fact that Freud was male. Women were not considered equals in Victorian England. Freud's self analysis was an important input into his theories. The reduced emphasis on the Oedipal complex, and other revisions in psychoanalysis, have made modern analysis perfectly applicable to women.

The final criticism addressed here is the question of the scientific status of psychoanalysis. Grünbaum (1986) addressed this issue at length. He makes a detailed refutation of the scientific status of psychoanalysis. Many of his points are well formed and legitimate criticisms. For example, there is an element of suggestibility involved in the treatment process. The "tally argument," which Grünbaum (1986) refutes, is that, first, only the psychoanalytic method can yield correct insight into the causes of neuroses, and second, correct insight is necessary for a durable cure of those neuroses. Grünbaum (1986) writes that this argument fails because of a number of complex reasons that he enumerates in great detail, including the fact that successful treatment has occurred without these conditions being fulfilled. Additionally Freud himself weakened this argument considerably later in life (Grünbaum, 1986). Grünbaum goes on to a number of criticisms based on scientific and logical reasoning that weaken psychoanalytic treatment's scientific status.

It is true that Freud essentially considered psychoanalysis a pure science, but that is a view which has been superseded by the current view, which puts more emphasis on the issue of how fruitful psychoanalytic treatment is as a treatment. Even if an inordinate amount of time is spent writing about theory within the profession, clinical practice plays the central role in the professional lives of psychoanalysts (Michels, 1983). As a science, psychoanalysis is imperfect, but it has stood the test of time as an important basis of psychotherapy.

Peer Commentary

Evaluating the Criticisms of Freud's Theory of Psychoanalysis
Kristen M. Beystehner
Northwestern University

In "Psychoanalysis: From Theory to Practice, Past to Present," Plaut summarizes the central theory of psychoanalysis well, dividing it into five distinct categories: dynamic, economic, developmental, structural, and adaptive. The author then succinctly details the additions and developments of other top psychologists within the Freudian framework. Following a brief discussion of treatment using psychoanalysis, Plaut explores the criticisms of psychoanalysis, which he believes can be grouped into three main categories.

The first main criticism of psychoanalysis, according to the author, is that the theory of psychoanalysis is far too simple to explain the many intricacies and complexities of the human mind. Plaut asserts that Freud's theory is simply a model, whose sole purpose is to simplify something incredibly complex to a point where it can be analyzed. I concur with Plaut that it is difficult to distinguish between simplification and oversimplification when modeling anything. However, I believe that parts of Freudian theory are too generalized and fail to leave adequate room for exceptions to the general rule. I agree with the author's position that Freud's theories have been beneficial in treatment and understanding people. I maintain that because psychoanalysis was developed nearly a century ago and is still considered to be a credible and effective method of treatment for mental illness, at least significant parts of the theory are accurate.

The second main criticism of psychoanalysis, according to the author, is that Freud's theory is sexist and places too much emphasis on sex in general. I too find it hard to believe that all mental problems are the direct result of unresolved Oedipal and Electra complexes. This, in my opinion, is a gross exaggeration and overgeneralization. The author believes that Freud's sexism was a direct result of the time period's cultural bias against women and the fact that Freud himself was male. Plaut cleverly points out that Freud himself acknowledged that his theory was less developed for women.

The final criticism that Plaut details in his article concerns the scientific status of psychoanalysis. The author briefly explains the position of Grünbaum but omits the positions of Popper and Eysenck, both significant critics of psychoanalysis. Popper insists that Freud's theories cannot be falsified and therefore are not scientific, whereas Eysenck claims that Freudian theories can be falsified and therefore are scientific. Grünbaum takes Eysenck's argument one step further to claim that Freud's theories are scientific but have been proven wrong and are simply bad science. I believe that psychoanalysis is a scientific theory due to the fact that it is falsifiable and has, in fact, been proven false. Other methods of treatment, such as cognitive and behavioral therapy, have been proven effective in many instances, and this illustrates that psychoanalysis is not the only option for the treatment of neuroses and mental illnesses.

Although I agree that the criticisms mentioned by the author are noteworthy, I believe that the many criticisms of Freud's evidence and technique must not be overlooked in the evaluation of his theory. First, many critics of Freud's evidence contend that Freud's theory lacks empirical data and relies too much on therapeutic achievements, whereas others maintain that even Freud's clinical data are flawed and inaccurate. Second, Freud's use of free association and dream interpretation in treatment have been heavily criticized by many reviewers. In my opinion, these two criticisms are very important.

The author's accurate assessment of the criticisms of Freudian psychoanalytic theory demonstrates his clear knowledge of the principles upon which psychoanalysis was founded. Although the omission of the criticisms of Freud's evidence and technique is significant, I believe that the article presents Freud's psychoanalytic theory and its notable criticisms quite adequately. After all, Freud and his theories have been criticized on almost every level, yet I think the controversiality of his theory is perhaps its greatest strength. As a direct result of Freud's theory, additional psychological theories and hypotheses have been developed that otherwise may have been missed. This, in my opinion, is by far the greatest achievement of Freud and his theory.

Peer Commentary

An Analysis on the Analysis of the Evolution of Freudian Theory
Paula S. Han
Northwestern University

Plaut explores the evolution of psychoanalytic theory. He begins with the five basic contributions from Freud's psychoanalytic movement, divided into the dynamic, economic, developmental, structural, and adaptive realms. He then discusses more recent contributions to the field. Plaut also mentions the important aspects of treatment. Next, he brings forth the criticisms Freudian theory has received and makes an effort to refute them. Plaut ultimately reports that psychoanalysis has emerged as a very relevant foundation of psychotherapy.

The dynamic level of Freud's theory involves the interplay between the two main alleged human instincts--the libido or sexual instinct, and the destructive or aggressive instinct. The economic level of the theory centers on the investment of energy in exchange for the gain of pleasure. In the developmental level, Freud identifies an oral phase that begins with the infant sucking at the mother's breast. The anal phase is marked by control of excretory functions. Sexual fantasies develop in the phallic phase as well as the entrance into the "Oedipal stage" and a carnal desire for the mother. At this point, castration anxiety in males and penis envy in females lead to a period of latency, followed by the final stage of puberty.

The structural level of Freudian theory divides into structural and topographical models. The structural model is composed of the id, ego, and superego. The id functions according to instincts, and the superego according to morals. It becomes the job of the ego to balance these demands with the realities of the outside world. The topographical model breaks the mind down into the unconscious or inaccessible thought, the conscious or true awareness, and the preconscious or that which is accessible but not presently being thought about. The final, adaptive level is never formally addressed by Freud, but involves how the psyche is able to relate the first four levels to the external world.

Plaut next addresses the developments in the field of psychoanalysis since Freud. Anna Freud elaborated on the role of the ego and its use of defense mechanisms (e.g., repression), as well as the residuals resulting from their use. Erikson slightly modified and extended Freud's stages of development to include adult life. Klein emphasized pre-Oedipal life and its effects on later psychic and possible psychopathological development. Kohut moved away from Freudian concepts and focused on individual attainment of sense of self. Lastly, Jung remains noteworthy for having created another type of analysis, one considering the collective unconscious, a more spiritual concept allegedly present in all people and not created by repression.

Plaut presents some of the central ideas regarding psychoanalytic treatment. First, psychoanalysis involves transference, in which the patient transfers emotions toward the parent onto the therapist. In addition, Freud believed an unresolved Oedipus complex to be a common type of repression occurring in males, having resulted from castration anxiety. Freud also believed dream analysis to be a method of tapping into the unconscious. Lastly, Freudian technique also includes the use of free association between patient and therapist.

Plaut next tackles some common Freudian criticisms. To the criticism that Freud's theory is too simple, Plaut defends that like any other model, simplification is necessary for comprehension. To the criticism that Freud overemphasized sex, he explains that Freud's use of the word "sexual" really encompassed the genital, anal, and oral. Furthermore, he states that a possible overload on sex does not lessen Freud's theory. Plaut then discusses the criticism that Freudian theory is sexist, ignoring females. Although Plaut does admit to the one-sidedness of the Freudian model, he also mentions the bias of the day, which excluded women in general. He also argues that modern developments in the field have allowed for the inclusion of women.

Plaut finally addresses the criticism regarding the scientific validity of psychoanalysis. He presents one of Grünbaum's opinions, which basically refutes psychoanalysis as being the only method that results in the proper understanding of an individual's neuroses. Regardless, Plaut argues that psychoanalysis is currently valued as a successful aspect of clinical treatment. Plaut concludes that psychoanalysis has endured as a valid foundation of psychotherapy.

Plaut does a fine job of being comprehensive, as well as concise, in explaining the five foundations underlying Freudian psychoanalytic theory. When discussing new developments made within the field, however, Plaut fails to present fully the contribution of the other psychologists. The point at which Erikson's and Freud's correlating stages end and Erikson's expansion of stages is not clear. Plaut simply intertwines the two theories so that Erikson cannot be distinguished for his more optimistic, story-like perspective on life (McAdams, 1994, p. 657). Second, extremely little is said about Kohut, the least of which is how Kohut was influenced by psychoanalytic theory in order to expand upon it and create his "self psychology."

Although Plaut mentions the Oedipus complex throughout the paper, he fails to clarify what its correct resolution entails. He does state that the strength of the superego is proportional to the strength of the defense used against the Oedipus complex. In addition, Plaut discusses the development of a castration complex in the Oedipal male, but neither of these fully explains the resolution of the Oedipus complex. Plaut needs to bring it all together by explaining that castration anxiety in the young male leads to identification with the father and so the fear becomes internalized by the boy, enabling a moral voice to develop in the form of the superego.

When addressing the critiques to psychoanalytic theory, Plaut discusses the fact that Grünbaum was able to refute it at great length and detail, and yet Plaut does not go into any of these claims very thoroughly. Plaut should present an argument made by Grünbaum, a potentially valid and convincing one, and explain it thoroughly instead of merely stating that Grünbaum was able to do it. Lastly, Plaut never presents a sociological critique of psychoanalysis. For example he could discuss Chodorow's meriting of the social forces behind the Oedipus complex (McAdams, 1994, p. 76).

All in all, Plaut's presentation and arguments are very valid. Nevertheless, the contributions by other psychologists to the field of psychoanalysis could be further specified. In addition, a more comprehensive explanation of the relationship of the Oedipus complex and the superego is needed, possibly in the discussion of the structural level of Freud's psychoanalytic model. Lastly, Plaut's stance in favor of psychoanalysis could be further strengthened by elaborating on Grünbaum's critiques and then refuting them. Plaut should also bring forth any sociological critiques of Freud's theory and then effectively refute those.

Peer Commentary

A Good Fit, But the Wrong Function
Nathan C. Popkins
Northwestern University

The paper "Psychoanalysis: From Theory to Practice, Past to Present," discusses Freud's most famous (or infamous) contribution to psychology, psychoanalysis. Plaut covers most every aspect of psychoanalysis, dealing especially skillfully with the major criticisms of Freud's theory. These criticisms include the entire list of qualms Grünbaum has with Freud's theory, and other, more general and often raised problems. In conclusion, Plaut decides that psychoanalysis is indeed a great idea in personality.

Essentially, Plaut's paper has me convinced. Psychoanalysis is a great idea in personality, just as long as one is a male, who grew up in a two parent house, who had either a sister or female playmate at a very young age, with a great memory, and who has lots of money and no specific time frame in which one would like one's psychological problems cured. As long as people can live up to most of these criteria, there is a high probability that psychoanalysis will work well for them. Otherwise, they are pretty much out of luck. Actually, in this perspective, maybe psychoanalysis is not such a great idea afterall.

On the issue of sexual inadequacies in the theory, Plaut even admits that Freud's theory is less applicable to women than to men. This is inherent in Freud's theory, which concentrates a great deal on the relationship between mother and son. Freud's auxiliary Electra hypothesis seems little more than an attempt to cover up an obvious flaw in the overall psychoanalytic theory.

Another major problem with Freud's psychoanalysis is that it fails to take into account the large number of people who do not grow up in the atmosphere Freud asserts is necessary for healthy psychological development. In Freud's day, it seems likely that most people did in fact grow up in a two-parent family. Also, children with no siblings, or with only same sex siblings, have a fairly low chance of seeing a member of the opposite sex's genitalia at a young age, another event that is central to Freud's ideas concerning sexual development.

Another problem with Freud's theory is that a cure make take years (and thousands of dollars) to arrive at. This does not make Freud's psychoanalysis wrong necessarily, but inconvenient at best. When compared to other theories in personality, all other factors equal, psychoanalysis is among the least practical methods of achieving a cure.

Many argue that because Freud's theory has been around for so long, and is so widely accepted, that it must be at least mostly true. This is simply an ignorant way of approaching this issue. The fact that no better model exists does not mean that the current model is correct be default. To illustrate this point, consider the age old example of finding the area of a rectangle by a function of its perimeter. Taking a large and random sample of various rectangles, a line can be fitted to their areas that is a function of their perimeters. This line has an excellent R squared value, and would therefore suggest that area of a rectangle is in fact a function of perimeter. As everyone knows, this is wrong. Area is a function of height and width. Perhaps this effect is what has happened to psychoanalysis over the years. Although the theory is wrong and has many flaws, it often provides a good and convenient fit.

Peer Commentary

Whose Theory?
Timothy Tasker
Northwestern University

In "Psychoanalysis: From Theory to Practice, Past to Present," Plaut discusses the relevance of the theory of psychoanalysis. This article appropriately begins with the Freudian contributions to the field of psychoanalysis. I found the outline of Freud's concepts to be a very inclusive summary. I particularly appreciated the five areas into which the original theory of psychoanalysis was broken down: dynamic, economic, developmental, structural, and adaptive. Each section that followed provided a clear and concise summation of the information that it represented.

The second section of this article, beginning under "Developments within the Freudian Framework," is well written and provides an overview of the theorists who further developed psychoanalysis, including Freud's daughter, A. Freud. Plaut includes a wide variety of material that has been further researched or elaborated upon since Freud's time. According to Plaut, these researchers expanded Freud's ideas and made them more accepted--an idea with which I agree. The supporters of psychoanalysis added more information and concepts that Freud was unable to achieve and thereby made his theory more palatable as a science.

I found the section that further discussed Freud's model of the treatment of psychoses according to psychoanalysis to contain uncited material. The section itself provides great information in regards to treatment, but does not disclose who develped these ideas. Supposedly, these concepts should be attributed to Freud. This both discounts the reliability of the writer and makes further research into the field, by a reader, a virtual nightmare.

Although I liked the assignment of "economic" as a factor in, or part of understanding, Freud's theory, it only confuses the matter when included in a discussion of a general model. "Economic" can be understood both in terms of money and in terms of conservation. This is an important distinction that needs to be made. Which definition fits where is the question with which readers are left.

Despite all of the flaws in psychoanalysis, I agree with Plaut in his closing statements concerning the relevance of this theory of personality. No one can doubt the fact that psychoanalysis is an important tool in practice. It provides great insight and can lead to a deeper understanding as to the fundamental problems that underline the issues for which a patient has sought help. It is my hope, along with Plaut, that psychoanalysis will someday be appreciated for its relevance and use in today's clinical environment.

Author Response

Psychoanalysis Remains, Although in the Context and Shadow of its Criticism
Ethan R. Plaut
Northwestern University

The responses to and criticisms of my paper are all a game of give and take, each one starting off by acknowledging Freud's greatness in one sense or another, but then undermining him and/or my paper in another way. Beystehner acknowledges that psychoanalysis is a model, so it is necessarily simplified, and also acknowledges that the line of oversimplification is hard to draw, but then tries to draw it herself. She states her opinion, which is commonly held and important, that the theory is too general and does not leave room for exceptions. I would concede this if it is applied to Freud alone, but modern analysis has greatly changed many things. Emphasis has been taken off of the oedipal complex, among other things, and placed elsewhere. Beystehner also notes that I neglected Popper and Eysenck in my survey of criticisms. First, I must note that for every critic of psychoanalysis to be addressed in detail, a multi-volume work would have to be undertaken. Second, I think that these specific criticisms are at the bottom of the list of those that I should have included. This is because they are arguments about psychoanalysis as a science, and I have conceded in my paper that it is by no means completely scientific in the sense in which these criticisms would be relevant. Again, I offer this same argument to the criticisms of Freud's data. The data are clinical, which makes them subjective and subject to suggestion, but this is simply unavoidable in studies of this nature.

As for the criticism of Freud's (over-) use of free association and dream analysis, I simply disagree. I believe that the way for humans to best deal with problems is to get them out. Human expression is most natural through language. The analyst, of course, is more than a shoulder to cry on, but that is a good starting point, so I think that free association is a perfectly good method. As for dream analysis, first I will note that it is the expression of the unconscious, just as speech is the expression of the conscious. For this reason, it should not be ignored. Second, I will note that dream analysis is generally not as central to modern therapy as it was in Freud's day. Beystehner's closing comment, that psychoanalysis has found its greatest achievement in its controversy, in the other theories it has spawned, is a bit unfair. This is definitely one of the important things that has resulted from Freud's work and that of his followers, but it is silly to me and offensive to analysts to give no importance to all of the patients who have been helped by the therapy.

Han notes that my explanation of Erikson's work was incomplete. This is true. I only mentioned his work in the context of his central contribution to psychoanalysis, involving developmental stages. For a general paper of this length on psychoanalysis as a whole, I think he has been properly addressed. The dividing line between Freud and Erikson is not drawn for two reasons. First, Freud's stages are discussed earlier in the paper, so the differences are somewhat apparent. Second, even Kohut's stages, which essentially correspond to Freud's, are a bit different, so it would be a bit of an oversimplification to say that those stages are the same, but that the later ones are new.

Han then claims that my explanation of the oedipal complex, its resolution, and its relation to the superego, are all incomplete. The resolution of the oedipal complex can only come about through psychoanalysis, at least according to Freud, and entails the patient's realizing and admitting the feelings and fantasies to him- or herself. The results can vary greatly, one example being a cure of neuroses caused by the repression. As for the relation to the superego, this is a subject area that is highly controversial. The relation is hotly debated, and is too complex to warrant the time, space, and understanding that would be required to properly explain it in a paper of this nature. One basic viewpoint is that the identification with the father caused by castration anxiety leads to internalizing of fear, which allows the superego to develop as the moral voice.

Han's final criticism that I will address here regards my section on criticisms. Some critics were omitted, true enough. I believe, however, that my coverage of Grünbaum was sufficient. I conceded the man's point that psychoanalysis is flawed as a science. With no need to refute him, and no need to elaborate his point, why should I have spent more words on him rather than another critic?

Popkins states, "Psychoanalysis is a great idea in personality, just as long as one is a male, who grew up in a two parent house, who had either a sister or female playmate at a very young age, with a great memory, and who has lots of money and no specific time frame in which one would like one's psychological problems cured." This is a very witty way of pointing out a lot of weak criticisms. As for the context of childhood, I simply disagree with the assertion made here. There is no reason that an adopted girl with no siblings and a "poor memory" should be excluded from therapy. As for the criticism of the length and price of therapy, like in so many things, quick-fixes do not work, and time is money. This makes the theory inaccessible and inconvenient, but that is a criticism that all health care must face these days, with expensive machinery and long-term therapies involved in such things as cancer treatment.

Freud should not be credited with something associated with the term "Electra complex/hypothesis." This is simply something with which Freud did not agree. The claim that an only child, or a child with only same sex siblings will have a low chance of seeing the genetalia of the opposite sex is preposterous. I am an only child, and I knew what a vagina was long before I even knew that word, or any other, to describe it. Children are openly exposed to nudity until long after they begin to recognize it, whether it be on the bodies of their parents, those of people in opposite-sex bathrooms, or anyone else's body. Also, Popkins' statement, "The fact that no better model exists does not mean that the current model is correct by default," although persuasive on the surface, falls apart under scrutiny. A model is not a statement of fact, it is an imperfect representation. As such, describing a model as "correct" is somewhat odd. If the model helps us to understand personality, it has some merit.

Tasker makes two main criticisms. First he states that there was uncited material in my section on treatment. I found none. Anything not cited was simply an overview on my part, and I apologize, but I cannot find what Tasker refers to in the paper. Second, Tasker criticizes the use of the word "economic" in reference to the divisions of Freud's theory used here. The divisions, and the term, are not mine, and the source is cited (Rapaport, & Gill, 1959). As for my personal opinion, I do not think that this is particularly important. The term obviously has nothing to do with money, and I think conservation would also be an inappropriate term to identify with this concept in this context. The name given to the division should not be misleading, of course, but it has nothing to do with the theory itself.

References
Erikson, E. H. (1950). Childhood and society. New York: Norton.

Freud, A. (1966). The ego and the mechanisms of defense, the writings of Anna Freud (Vol. II). New York: International Universities Press.

Freud, S. (1953a). Three essays on sexuality, the standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. IV). London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis.

Freud, S. (1953b). The interpretation of dreams, the standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. IV). London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis.

Freud, S. (1964). An outline of psychoanalysis, the standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. XXIII). London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis.

Grünbaum, A. (1986). Précis of The foundations of psychoanalysis: A philosophical critique. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9, 217-284.

Jung, C. G. (1959). The archetypes and the collective unconscious, collected works (Vol.9, pt. 1; trans. R. F. C. Hull). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Klein, M. (1975). Envy and gratitude and other works, the writings of Melanie Klein (Vol. III). New York: Free Press.

Kohut, H. (1971). The analysis of the self. New York: International Universities Press.

McAdams, D.P. (1994). The person: An introduction to personality psychology (2nd ed.). Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace.

Michels, R. (1983). The scientific and clinical functions of psychoanalytic theory, the future of psychoanalysis. (Ed. A. Goldberg). New York: International Universities Press.

Rapaport, D., & Gill, M. M. (1959) The points of view and assumptions of metapsychology, the collected papers of David Rapaport (Ed. M. M. Gill). New York: Basic.

Reich, W. (1949). Character-analysis. New York: Noonday.

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